Windows Command Line Obfuscation Via Superscript Characters
Description
The following analytic detects Windows system binaries executed with command line arguments that contain superscript or modifier letter characters (for example the Unicode characters used in "/ᵖᵃckᵃge") in place of regular ASCII letters. Windows command line parsers such as msiexec.exe normalize these look-alike characters, so the argument still works while evading string-based detections. This technique has been observed in ClickFix-style campaigns where victims paste a command into the Run dialog that silently installs a remote MSI package with msiexec.exe.
Query · spl
| tstats `security_content_summariesonly`
count min(_time) as firstTime
max(_time) as lastTime
FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes WHERE
Processes.process_path = "*:\\Windows\\*"
NOT Processes.process_name IN (
"backgroundTaskHost.exe",
"csrss.exe",
"csrss.exe",
"dllhost.exe",
"lsass.exe",
"msedgewebview2.exe",
"RuntimeBroker.exe",
"SensorRuntimeBroker.exe",
"services.exe",
"sihost.exe",
"smss.exe",
"svchost.exe",
"taskhostw.exe",
"wininit.exe",
"winlogon.exe",
"WmiPrvSE.exe",
"WUDFHost.exe"
)
by Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name
Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid
Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path
Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid Processes.process_hash
Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level Processes.process_name Processes.process_path
Processes.user Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| regex process="(?:\\-\\-|/)(?:[a-zA-Z0-9]+)?[\\x{1D00}-\\x{1D7F}\\x{02B0}-\\x{02FF}\\x{1D80}-\\x{1DBF}\\x{2070}-\\x{209F}\\x{FF00}-\\x{FFEF}]+(?:[a-zA-Z0-9]+)?"
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `windows_command_line_obfuscation_via_superscript_characters_filter`
Implementation guide
The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed.
To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process.
Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions.
These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product.
The logs must also be mapped to the Processes node of the Endpoint data model.
Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field
names and speed up the data modeling process.
Known false positives
- Legitimate use of superscript or modifier characters in arguments to Windows binaries is very rare. Locales or applications that pass fullwidth characters (for example East Asian input methods) in command line switches may generate false positives. Filter by process or parent process as needed.
Analyst notes
Known false positives: Legitimate use of superscript or modifier characters in arguments to Windows binaries is very rare. Locales or applications that pass fullwidth characters (for example East Asian input methods) in command line switches may generate false positives. Filter by process or parent process as needed.