Windows Command Line Obfuscation Via Superscript Characters


Description

The following analytic detects Windows system binaries executed with command line arguments that contain superscript or modifier letter characters (for example the Unicode characters used in "/ᵖᵃckᵃge") in place of regular ASCII letters. Windows command line parsers such as msiexec.exe normalize these look-alike characters, so the argument still works while evading string-based detections. This technique has been observed in ClickFix-style campaigns where victims paste a command into the Run dialog that silently installs a remote MSI package with msiexec.exe.

Query · spl

| tstats `security_content_summariesonly`
  count min(_time) as firstTime
        max(_time) as lastTime

FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes WHERE

Processes.process_path = "*:\\Windows\\*"

NOT Processes.process_name IN (
        "backgroundTaskHost.exe",
        "csrss.exe",
        "csrss.exe",
        "dllhost.exe",
        "lsass.exe",
        "msedgewebview2.exe",
        "RuntimeBroker.exe",
        "SensorRuntimeBroker.exe",
        "services.exe",
        "sihost.exe",
        "smss.exe",
        "svchost.exe",
        "taskhostw.exe",
        "wininit.exe",
        "winlogon.exe",
        "WmiPrvSE.exe",
        "WUDFHost.exe"
    )

by Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name
   Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid
   Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path
   Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid Processes.process_hash
   Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level Processes.process_name Processes.process_path
   Processes.user Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product

| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`

| regex process="(?:\\-\\-|/)(?:[a-zA-Z0-9]+)?[\\x{1D00}-\\x{1D7F}\\x{02B0}-\\x{02FF}\\x{1D80}-\\x{1DBF}\\x{2070}-\\x{209F}\\x{FF00}-\\x{FFEF}]+(?:[a-zA-Z0-9]+)?"

| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `windows_command_line_obfuscation_via_superscript_characters_filter`

Implementation guide

The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the Processes node of the Endpoint data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.

Known false positives

  • Legitimate use of superscript or modifier characters in arguments to Windows binaries is very rare. Locales or applications that pass fullwidth characters (for example East Asian input methods) in command line switches may generate false positives. Filter by process or parent process as needed.

Analyst notes

Known false positives: Legitimate use of superscript or modifier characters in arguments to Windows binaries is very rare. Locales or applications that pass fullwidth characters (for example East Asian input methods) in command line switches may generate false positives. Filter by process or parent process as needed.

Raw source Windows Command Line Obfuscation Via Superscript Characters · SPL
Esc
Published by splunk/security_content ↗, licensed under Apache 2.0 ↗. Reproduced here unmodified.
name: Windows Command Line Obfuscation Via Superscript Characters
id: 62b43310-8a83-4ff1-bcff-efb45ae8cc0d
version: 1
creation_date: '2026-11-12'
modification_date: '2026-11-12'
author: Onur Mustafa Erdogan, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: |
    The following analytic detects Windows system binaries executed with command line arguments that contain superscript or modifier letter characters (for example the Unicode characters used in "/ᵖᵃckᵃge") in place of regular ASCII letters.
    Windows command line parsers such as msiexec.exe normalize these look-alike characters, so the argument still works while evading string-based detections.
    This technique has been observed in ClickFix-style campaigns where victims paste a command into the Run dialog that silently installs a remote MSI package with msiexec.exe.
data_source:
    - Sysmon EventID 1
    - Windows Event Log Security 4688
    - CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2
search: |
    | tstats `security_content_summariesonly`
      count min(_time) as firstTime
            max(_time) as lastTime

    FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes WHERE

    Processes.process_path = "*:\\Windows\\*"

    NOT Processes.process_name IN (
            "backgroundTaskHost.exe",
            "csrss.exe",
            "csrss.exe",
            "dllhost.exe",
            "lsass.exe",
            "msedgewebview2.exe",
            "RuntimeBroker.exe",
            "SensorRuntimeBroker.exe",
            "services.exe",
            "sihost.exe",
            "smss.exe",
            "svchost.exe",
            "taskhostw.exe",
            "wininit.exe",
            "winlogon.exe",
            "WmiPrvSE.exe",
            "WUDFHost.exe"
        )

    by Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name
       Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid
       Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path
       Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid Processes.process_hash
       Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level Processes.process_name Processes.process_path
       Processes.user Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product

    | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`

    | regex process="(?:\\-\\-|/)(?:[a-zA-Z0-9]+)?[\\x{1D00}-\\x{1D7F}\\x{02B0}-\\x{02FF}\\x{1D80}-\\x{1DBF}\\x{2070}-\\x{209F}\\x{FF00}-\\x{FFEF}]+(?:[a-zA-Z0-9]+)?"

    | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
    | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
    | `windows_command_line_obfuscation_via_superscript_characters_filter`
how_to_implement: |
    The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed.
    To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process.
    Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions.
    These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product.
    The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint` data model.
    Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field
    names and speed up the data modeling process.
known_false_positives: |
    Legitimate use of superscript or modifier characters in arguments to Windows binaries is very rare.
    Locales or applications that pass fullwidth characters (for example East Asian input methods) in command line switches may generate false positives.
    Filter by process or parent process as needed.
references:
    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/010/
    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/
    - https://www.huntress.com/blog/the-evolving-tradecraft-of-clickfix
    - https://app.any.run/tasks/a2ac674c-0b4c-42c9-b669-03f4699c8b96/
    - https://claudio-a.me/posts/netsupportrat/
drilldown_searches:
    - name: View the detection results for - "$user$" and "$dest$"
      search: '%original_detection_search% | search  user = "$user$" dest = "$dest$"'
      earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
      latest_offset: $info_max_time$
    - name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$user$" and "$dest$"
      search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$user$", "$dest$") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
      earliest_offset: 7d
      latest_offset: "0"
finding:
    title: Superscript characters found in the command line [$process$] of [$process_name$] on endpoint [$dest$] by user [$user$].
    entity:
        field: dest
        type: system
        score: 50
threat_objects:
    - field: process
      type: process
    - field: parent_process_name
      type: parent_process_name
analytic_story:
    - Windows System Binary Proxy Execution MSIExec
    - Fake CAPTCHA Campaigns
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1027.010
    - T1218
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
    - name: True Positive Test
      attack_data:
        - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1027.010/windows_superscript_obfuscation/windows_superscript_obfuscation.log
          source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
          sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog
      test_type: unit

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