Windows FFmpeg DirectShow Video Capture


Description

This analytic detects active video capture performed by FFmpeg (ffmpeg.exe) via the Windows DirectShow (dshow) interface, a technique observed in SalatStealer and related UAC-0252 campaigns. After enumerating available devices, threat actors invoke FFmpeg with a specific video capture command that references a named webcam device (video=), requests MJPEG encoding (mjpeg), and uses the dshow input filter — all from a temporary directory to reduce forensic footprint. This sequence moves beyond reconnaissance into active collection, aligning with MITRE ATT&CK T1125 (Video Capture), where adversaries silently record from the victim's webcam to gather intelligence or capture sensitive on-screen activity. The presence of ffmpeg.exe in a temp path combined with these DirectShow video arguments is highly anomalous outside of dedicated multimedia or screen-recording software, making it a strong signal of covert surveillance activity.

Query · spl

| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
      WHERE (
              (
                Processes.process_name = ffmpeg.exe OR
                Processes.original_file_name = ffmpeg.exe
              ) AND

              Processes.process_path IN ("*\\temp\\*") AND
              Processes.process = "*video=*" AND
              Processes.process = "* mjpeg *" AND
              Processes.process = "* dshow *"
            )
      BY Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name
        Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid
        Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path
        Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid
        Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level
        Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.user
        Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product
    | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
    | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
    | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `windows_ffmpeg_directshow_video_capture_filter`

Implementation guide

The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the Processes node of the Endpoint data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.

Known false positives

  • Administrators or administrative scripts may use this application. Filter as needed.

Analyst notes

Known false positives: Administrators or administrative scripts may use this application. Filter as needed.

Raw source Windows FFmpeg DirectShow Video Capture · SPL
Esc
Published by splunk/security_content ↗, licensed under Apache 2.0 ↗. Reproduced here unmodified.
name: Windows FFmpeg DirectShow Video Capture
id: 636f1a0b-562a-4629-80f6-5ad46d2ebdee
version: 1
creation_date: '2026-05-20'
modification_date: '2026-05-20'
author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
status: production
type: Anomaly
description: This analytic detects active video capture performed by FFmpeg (ffmpeg.exe) via the Windows DirectShow (dshow) interface, a technique observed in SalatStealer and related UAC-0252 campaigns. After enumerating available devices, threat actors invoke FFmpeg with a specific video capture command that references a named webcam device (video=), requests MJPEG encoding (mjpeg), and uses the dshow input filter — all from a temporary directory to reduce forensic footprint. This sequence moves beyond reconnaissance into active collection, aligning with MITRE ATT&CK T1125 (Video Capture), where adversaries silently record from the victim's webcam to gather intelligence or capture sensitive on-screen activity. The presence of ffmpeg.exe in a temp path combined with these DirectShow video arguments is highly anomalous outside of dedicated multimedia or screen-recording software, making it a strong signal of covert surveillance activity.
data_source:
    - Sysmon EventID 1
    - Windows Event Log Security 4688
    - CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2
search: |
    | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
          WHERE (
                  (
                    Processes.process_name = ffmpeg.exe OR
                    Processes.original_file_name = ffmpeg.exe
                  ) AND

                  Processes.process_path IN ("*\\temp\\*") AND
                  Processes.process = "*video=*" AND
                  Processes.process = "* mjpeg *" AND
                  Processes.process = "* dshow *"
                )
          BY Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name
            Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid
            Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path
            Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid
            Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level
            Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.user
            Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product
        | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
        | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
        | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
    | `windows_ffmpeg_directshow_video_capture_filter`
how_to_implement: The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint` data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.
known_false_positives: Administrators or administrative scripts may use this application. Filter as needed.
references:
    - https://www.broadcom.com/support/security-center/protection-bulletin/uac-0252-activity-delivering-shadowsniff-and-salatstealer-malware
    - https://bazaar.abuse.ch/browse/tag/SalatStealer/
drilldown_searches:
    - name: View the detection results for - "$dest$"
      search: '%original_detection_search% | search  dest = "$dest$"'
      earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
      latest_offset: $info_max_time$
    - name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$dest$"
      search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$dest$") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
      earliest_offset: 7d
      latest_offset: "0"
intermediate_findings:
    entities:
        - field: dest
          type: system
          score: 20
          message: a ffmpeg.exe process [$process_path$] capture video using DirectShow on [$dest$].
threat_objects:
    - field: parent_process_name
      type: parent_process_name
    - field: process_name
      type: process_name
    - field: process
      type: process
analytic_story:
    - Salat Stealer
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1125
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
    - name: True Positive Test
      attack_data:
        - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1125/salat_stealer_ffmpeg/ffmpeg_event.log
          source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
          sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog
      test_type: unit

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