Windows FFmpeg Audio and Video Device Discovery
Description
This analytic detects the use of FFmpeg (ffmpeg.exe) to enumerate connected audio and video devices on a Windows endpoint. Adversaries and stealers such as SalatStealer abuse FFmpeg's DirectShow (dshow) input interface by invoking it with the -list_devices true and -hide_banner flags from a temporary directory, allowing them to silently discover available webcams, microphones, and capture cards without triggering obvious user-facing activity. Device discovery of this kind maps to MITRE ATT&CK T1125 (Video Capture), where threat actors profile the system's multimedia capabilities as a precursor to covert audio or video surveillance. The combination of an unusual process path (temp), the dshow input filter, and the device-listing arguments is a strong indicator of malicious reconnaissance rather than legitimate administrative use.
Query · spl
| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
WHERE (
(
Processes.process_name = ffmpeg.exe OR
Processes.original_file_name = ffmpeg.exe
) AND
Processes.process_path IN ("*\\temp\\*") AND
Processes.process = "*-list_devices*" AND
Processes.process = "*-hide_banner*" AND
Processes.process = "* dshow *"
)
BY Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name
Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid
Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path
Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid
Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level
Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.user
Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `windows_ffmpeg_audio_and_video_device_discovery_filter`
Implementation guide
The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the Processes node of the Endpoint data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.
Known false positives
- Administrators or administrative scripts may use this application. Filter as needed.
Analyst notes
Known false positives: Administrators or administrative scripts may use this application. Filter as needed.