Windows Suspicious Child Process of TieringEngineService.exe


Description

Detects the RedSun privilege escalation exploit delivering a SYSTEM-level shell to the attacker's session. RedSun replaces the legitimate TieringEngineService.exe with a malicious binary, which launches a process as SYSTEM, usually some sort of shell or shell spawner (conhost.exe, cmd.exe, PowerShell, etc.) in the attacker's active session.

Query · spl

| tstats `security_content_summariesonly`
  count min(_time) as firstTime
        max(_time) as lastTime

FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes WHERE

Processes.parent_process_name="TieringEngineService.exe"
(
    Processes.process IN (
        "*bitsadmin.exe*",
        "*cmd.exe*",
        "*conhost.exe*",
        "*cscript.exe*",
        "*curl.exe*",
        "*powershell.exe*",
        "*pwsh.exe*",
        "*rundll32.exe*",
        "*wmic.exe*"
    )
    OR
    Processes.process_name IN (
        "bitsadmin.exe",
        "cmd.exe",
        "conhost.exe",
        "cscript.exe",
        "curl.exe",
        "powershell.exe",
        "pwsh.exe",
        "rundll32.exe",
        "wmic.exe"
    )
)
Processes.user IN (
    "*AUTHORITY*",
    "*System*"
)

BY Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.original_file_name
   Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process
   Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id
   Processes.parent_process_name action
   parent_process_exec parent_process_guid
   parent_process_path process_exec process_guid
   process_hash process_integrity_level
   process_path user_id vendor_product

| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `windows_suspicious_child_process_of_tieringengineservice_exe_filter`

Implementation guide

The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the Processes node of the Endpoint data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.

Known false positives

  • No false positives have been identified at this time.

Analyst notes

Known false positives: No false positives have been identified at this time.

Raw source Windows Suspicious Child Process of TieringEngineService.exe · SPL
Esc
Published by splunk/security_content ↗, licensed under Apache 2.0 ↗. Reproduced here unmodified.
name: Windows Suspicious Child Process of TieringEngineService.exe
id: 69edec6c-877e-4423-9b9b-025b589123a8
version: 1
creation_date: '2026-05-01'
modification_date: '2026-05-01'
author: Raven Tait, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: |-
    Detects the RedSun privilege escalation exploit delivering a SYSTEM-level shell to the attacker's session.
    RedSun replaces the legitimate TieringEngineService.exe with a malicious binary, which launches a process as SYSTEM, usually some sort of shell or shell spawner (conhost.exe, cmd.exe, PowerShell, etc.) in the attacker's active session.
data_source:
    - Sysmon EventID 1
    - Windows Event Log Security 4688
    - CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2
search: |
    | tstats `security_content_summariesonly`
      count min(_time) as firstTime
            max(_time) as lastTime

    FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes WHERE

    Processes.parent_process_name="TieringEngineService.exe"
    (
        Processes.process IN (
            "*bitsadmin.exe*",
            "*cmd.exe*",
            "*conhost.exe*",
            "*cscript.exe*",
            "*curl.exe*",
            "*powershell.exe*",
            "*pwsh.exe*",
            "*rundll32.exe*",
            "*wmic.exe*"
        )
        OR
        Processes.process_name IN (
            "bitsadmin.exe",
            "cmd.exe",
            "conhost.exe",
            "cscript.exe",
            "curl.exe",
            "powershell.exe",
            "pwsh.exe",
            "rundll32.exe",
            "wmic.exe"
        )
    )
    Processes.user IN (
        "*AUTHORITY*",
        "*System*"
    )

    BY Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.original_file_name
       Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process
       Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id
       Processes.parent_process_name action
       parent_process_exec parent_process_guid
       parent_process_path process_exec process_guid
       process_hash process_integrity_level
       process_path user_id vendor_product

    | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
    | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
    | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
    | `windows_suspicious_child_process_of_tieringengineservice_exe_filter`
how_to_implement: |-
    The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint` data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.
known_false_positives: |-
    No false positives have been identified at this time.
references:
    - https://github.com/Nightmare-Eclipse/RedSun
    - https://www.huntress.com/blog/nightmare-eclipse-intrusion
drilldown_searches:
    - name: View the detection results for - "$dest$"
      search: '%original_detection_search% | search  dest = "$dest$"'
      earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
      latest_offset: $info_max_time$
    - name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$dest$"
      search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$dest$") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
      earliest_offset: 7d
      latest_offset: "0"
finding:
    title: Possible suspicious child process $process_path$ spawned from $parent_process_path$ on $dest$
    entity:
        field: dest
        type: system
        score: 50
threat_objects:
    - field: parent_process_name
      type: parent_process_name
    - field: process
      type: process
    - field: process_name
      type: process_name
analytic_story:
    - RedSun
    - Windows Privilege Escalation
asset_type: Endpoint
cve:
    - CVE-2026-33825
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1068
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
    - name: True Positive Test
      attack_data:
        - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1068/redsun/windows-sysmon.log
          source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
          sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog
      test_type: unit

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