O365 Admin Consent Bypassed by Service Principal


Description

The following analytic identifies instances where a service principal in Office 365 Azure Active Directory assigns app roles without standard admin consent. It leverages o365_management_activity logs, specifically focusing on the 'Add app role assignment to service principal' operation. This activity is significant for SOCs as it may indicate a bypass of critical administrative controls, potentially leading to unauthorized access or privilege escalation. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to misuse automated processes to assign sensitive permissions, compromising the security of the environment.

Query · spl

`o365_management_activity` Workload=AzureActiveDirectory Operation="Add app role assignment to service principal." | eval len=mvcount('Actor{}.ID') | eval userType = mvindex('Actor{}.ID',len-1) | eval roleId = mvindex('ModifiedProperties{}.NewValue', 0) | eval roleValue = mvindex('ModifiedProperties{}.NewValue', 1) | eval roleDescription = mvindex('ModifiedProperties{}.NewValue', 2) | eval dest_user = mvindex('Target{}.ID', 0) | search userType = "ServicePrincipal" | eval src_user = user | fillnull | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by signature dest user src vendor_account vendor_product dest_user roleId roleValue roleDescription | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_admin_consent_bypassed_by_service_principal_filter`

Implementation guide

You must install the Splunk Microsoft Office 365 Add-on and ingest Office 365 management activity events.

Known false positives

  • Service Principals are sometimes configured to legitimately bypass the consent process for purposes of automation. Filter as needed.

Analyst notes

Known false positives: Service Principals are sometimes configured to legitimately bypass the consent process for purposes of automation. Filter as needed.

Raw source O365 Admin Consent Bypassed by Service Principal · SPL
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Published by splunk/security_content ↗, licensed under Apache 2.0 ↗. Reproduced here unmodified.
name: O365 Admin Consent Bypassed by Service Principal
id: 8a1b22eb-50ce-4e26-a691-97ff52349569
version: 9
creation_date: '2024-02-14'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Mauricio Velazco, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: The following analytic identifies instances where a service principal in Office 365 Azure Active Directory assigns app roles without standard admin consent. It leverages `o365_management_activity` logs, specifically focusing on the 'Add app role assignment to service principal' operation. This activity is significant for SOCs as it may indicate a bypass of critical administrative controls, potentially leading to unauthorized access or privilege escalation. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to misuse automated processes to assign sensitive permissions, compromising the security of the environment.
data_source:
    - O365 Add app role assignment to service principal.
search: "`o365_management_activity` Workload=AzureActiveDirectory Operation=\"Add app role assignment to service principal.\" | eval len=mvcount('Actor{}.ID') | eval userType = mvindex('Actor{}.ID',len-1) | eval roleId = mvindex('ModifiedProperties{}.NewValue', 0) | eval roleValue = mvindex('ModifiedProperties{}.NewValue', 1) | eval roleDescription = mvindex('ModifiedProperties{}.NewValue', 2) | eval dest_user = mvindex('Target{}.ID', 0) | search userType = \"ServicePrincipal\" | eval src_user = user | fillnull | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by signature dest user src vendor_account vendor_product dest_user roleId roleValue roleDescription | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_admin_consent_bypassed_by_service_principal_filter`"
how_to_implement: You must install the Splunk Microsoft Office 365 Add-on and ingest Office 365 management activity events.
known_false_positives: Service Principals are sometimes configured to legitimately bypass the consent process for purposes of automation. Filter as needed.
references:
    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/003/
    - https://msrc.microsoft.com/blog/2024/01/microsoft-actions-following-attack-by-nation-state-actor-midnight-blizzard/
    - https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2024/01/25/midnight-blizzard-guidance-for-responders-on-nation-state-attack/
    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/002/
    - https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2024/01/25/midnight-blizzard-guidance-for-responders-on-nation-state-attack/
    - https://winsmarts.com/how-to-grant-admin-consent-to-an-api-programmatically-e32f4a100e9d
drilldown_searches:
    - name: View the detection results for - "$dest_user$"
      search: '%original_detection_search% | search  dest_user = "$dest_user$"'
      earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
      latest_offset: $info_max_time$
    - name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$dest_user$"
      search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$dest_user$") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
      earliest_offset: 7d
      latest_offset: "0"
finding:
    title: Service principal $user$ bypassed the admin consent process and granted permissions to $dest_user$
    entity:
        field: dest_user
        type: user
        score: 50
analytic_story:
    - Office 365 Persistence Mechanisms
asset_type: O365 Tenant
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1098.003
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: cloud
security_domain: identity
tests:
    - name: True Positive Test
      attack_data:
        - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1098.003/o365_bypass_admin_consent/o365_bypass_admin_consent.log
          source: o365
          sourcetype: o365:management:activity
      test_type: unit

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