Malicious Powershell Executed As A Service


Description

The following analytic identifies the execution of malicious PowerShell commands or payloads via the Windows SC.exe utility. It detects this activity by analyzing Windows System logs (EventCode 7045) and filtering for specific PowerShell-related patterns in the ImagePath field. This behavior is significant because it indicates potential abuse of the Windows Service Control Manager to run unauthorized or harmful scripts, which could lead to system compromise. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, escalate privileges, or maintain persistence within the environment.

Query · spl

`wineventlog_system`
EventCode=7045
| eval l_ImagePath=lower(ImagePath)
| regex l_ImagePath="powershell[.\s]|powershell_ise[.\s]|pwsh[.\s]|psexec[.\s]"
| regex l_ImagePath="-nop[rofile\s]+|-w[indowstyle]*\s+hid[den]*|-noe[xit\s]+|-enc[odedcommand\s]+"
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    by EventCode ImagePath ServiceName StartType
       ServiceType AccountName UserID dest
| rename UserID as user
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `malicious_powershell_executed_as_a_service_filter`

Implementation guide

To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows System logs with the Service name, Service File Name Service Start type, and Service Type from your endpoints.

Known false positives

  • Creating a hidden powershell service is rare and could key off of those instances.

Analyst notes

Known false positives: Creating a hidden powershell service is rare and could key off of those instances.

Raw source Malicious Powershell Executed As A Service · SPL
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Published by splunk/security_content ↗, licensed under Apache 2.0 ↗. Reproduced here unmodified.
name: Malicious Powershell Executed As A Service
id: 8e204dfd-cae0-4ea8-a61d-e972a1ff2ff8
version: 13
creation_date: '2021-04-13'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Ryan Becwar
status: production
type: TTP
description: The following analytic identifies the execution of malicious PowerShell commands or payloads via the Windows SC.exe utility. It detects this activity by analyzing Windows System logs (EventCode 7045) and filtering for specific PowerShell-related patterns in the ImagePath field. This behavior is significant because it indicates potential abuse of the Windows Service Control Manager to run unauthorized or harmful scripts, which could lead to system compromise. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, escalate privileges, or maintain persistence within the environment.
data_source:
    - Windows Event Log System 7045
search: |-
    `wineventlog_system`
    EventCode=7045
    | eval l_ImagePath=lower(ImagePath)
    | regex l_ImagePath="powershell[.\s]|powershell_ise[.\s]|pwsh[.\s]|psexec[.\s]"
    | regex l_ImagePath="-nop[rofile\s]+|-w[indowstyle]*\s+hid[den]*|-noe[xit\s]+|-enc[odedcommand\s]+"
    | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
        by EventCode ImagePath ServiceName StartType
           ServiceType AccountName UserID dest
    | rename UserID as user
    | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
    | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
    | `malicious_powershell_executed_as_a_service_filter`
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows System logs with the Service name, Service File Name Service Start type, and Service Type from your endpoints.
known_false_positives: Creating a hidden powershell service is rare and could key off of those instances.
references:
    - https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/pdfs/dosfuscation-report.pdf
    - http://az4n6.blogspot.com/2017/
    - https://www.danielbohannon.com/blog-1/2017/3/12/powershell-execution-argument-obfuscation-how-it-can-make-detection-easier
drilldown_searches:
    - name: View the detection results for - "$dest$" and "$user$"
      search: '%original_detection_search% | search  dest = "$dest$" user = "$user$"'
      earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
      latest_offset: $info_max_time$
    - name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$dest$" and "$user$"
      search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$dest$", "$user$") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
      earliest_offset: 7d
      latest_offset: "0"
finding:
    title: Identifies the abuse the Windows SC.exe to execute malicious powerShell as a service $ImagePath$ by $user$ on $dest$
    entity:
        field: user
        type: user
        score: 50
intermediate_findings:
    entities:
        - field: dest
          type: system
          score: 50
          message: Identifies the abuse the Windows SC.exe to execute malicious powerShell as a service $ImagePath$ by $user$ on $dest$
analytic_story:
    - Compromised Windows Host
    - Rhysida Ransomware
    - Malicious PowerShell
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1569.002
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
    - name: True Positive Test
      attack_data:
        - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1569.002/malicious_powershell_executed_as_a_service/windows-xml.log
          source: XmlWinEventLog:System
          sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog
      test_type: unit

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