AWS Anomalous Secrets Manager Batch Retrieval


Description

The following analytic detects an AWS principal making more than 10 distinct successful Secrets Manager BatchGetSecretValue API calls within one hour. It groups calls by AWS account and user identity ARN and deduplicates CloudTrail events by event ID. Repeated batch retrieval may indicate bulk access to secrets using a compromised identity, although legitimate automation can produce similar activity.

Query · spl

`cloudtrail`
eventName="BatchGetSecretValue"
eventSource="secretsmanager.amazonaws.com"

| eval user_arn='userIdentity.arn',
       vendor_account=recipientAccountId

| where isnotnull(user_arn) AND isnotnull(vendor_account)
    AND (isnull(errorCode) OR errorCode="" OR lower(errorCode)="success")

| eval event_key=coalesce(eventID, md5(_raw))

| dedup event_key

| eval event_time=_time

| sort 0 + _time

| streamstats time_window=1h count AS rolling_batch_request_count
    min(event_time) AS window_start
    BY vendor_account user_arn

| eventstats max(eval(if(rolling_batch_request_count>10, event_time, null()))) AS qualifying_end
    BY vendor_account user_arn

| eventstats min(eval(if(event_time=qualifying_end, window_start, null()))) AS qualifying_start
    BY vendor_account user_arn

| where isnotnull(qualifying_start)
        AND event_time>=qualifying_start
        AND event_time<=qualifying_end

| stats count AS batch_request_count
        values(sourceIPAddress) AS src
        values(userAgent) AS user_agent
        values(awsRegion) AS vendor_region
        earliest(event_time) AS firstTime
        latest(event_time) AS lastTime

  BY vendor_account user_arn

| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `aws_anomalous_secrets_manager_batch_retrieval_filter`

Implementation guide

Ingest AWS CloudTrail management events into Splunk using the aws:cloudtrail sourcetype.

Known false positives

  • Legitimate administrators, deployment systems, credential-rotation services, incident-response tooling, or newly deployed applications may use BatchGetSecretValue for the first time. A principal may trigger the detection again when it has not used the API during the preceding seven days. Review the principal, source IP address, user agent, account, region, requested secret identifiers, and surrounding CloudTrail activity to determine whether the request was authorized.

Analyst notes

Known false positives: Legitimate administrators, deployment systems, credential-rotation services, incident-response tooling, or newly deployed applications may use BatchGetSecretValue for the first time. A principal may trigger the detection again when it has not used the API during the preceding seven days. Review the principal, source IP address, user agent, account, region, requested secret identifiers, and surrounding CloudTrail activity to determine whether the request was authorized.

Raw source AWS Anomalous Secrets Manager Batch Retrieval · SPL
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Published by splunk/security_content ↗, licensed under Apache 2.0 ↗. Reproduced here unmodified.
name: AWS Anomalous Secrets Manager Batch Retrieval
id: 93646bda-291b-4a59-a926-19f08e26f7cd
version: 1
creation_date: '2026-09-29'
modification_date: '2026-09-29'
author: Maria Jose Erquiaga, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: >-
    The following analytic detects an AWS principal making more than 10 distinct successful Secrets Manager BatchGetSecretValue API calls within
    one hour.
    It groups calls by AWS account and user identity ARN and deduplicates CloudTrail events by event ID.
    Repeated batch retrieval may indicate bulk access to secrets using a compromised identity, although legitimate automation can produce similar activity.
data_source:
    - AWS CloudTrail
search: |-
    `cloudtrail`
    eventName="BatchGetSecretValue"
    eventSource="secretsmanager.amazonaws.com"

    | eval user_arn='userIdentity.arn',
           vendor_account=recipientAccountId

    | where isnotnull(user_arn) AND isnotnull(vendor_account)
        AND (isnull(errorCode) OR errorCode="" OR lower(errorCode)="success")

    | eval event_key=coalesce(eventID, md5(_raw))

    | dedup event_key

    | eval event_time=_time

    | sort 0 + _time

    | streamstats time_window=1h count AS rolling_batch_request_count
        min(event_time) AS window_start
        BY vendor_account user_arn

    | eventstats max(eval(if(rolling_batch_request_count>10, event_time, null()))) AS qualifying_end
        BY vendor_account user_arn

    | eventstats min(eval(if(event_time=qualifying_end, window_start, null()))) AS qualifying_start
        BY vendor_account user_arn

    | where isnotnull(qualifying_start)
            AND event_time>=qualifying_start
            AND event_time<=qualifying_end

    | stats count AS batch_request_count
            values(sourceIPAddress) AS src
            values(userAgent) AS user_agent
            values(awsRegion) AS vendor_region
            earliest(event_time) AS firstTime
            latest(event_time) AS lastTime

      BY vendor_account user_arn

    | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
    | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
    | `aws_anomalous_secrets_manager_batch_retrieval_filter`
how_to_implement: |-
    Ingest AWS CloudTrail management events into Splunk using the aws:cloudtrail sourcetype.
known_false_positives: |-
    Legitimate administrators, deployment systems, credential-rotation services, incident-response tooling, or newly deployed applications may use BatchGetSecretValue for the first time.
    A principal may trigger the detection again when it has not used the API during the preceding seven days.
    Review the principal, source IP address, user agent, account, region, requested secret identifiers, and surrounding CloudTrail activity to determine whether the request was authorized.
references:
    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/006/
    - https://docs.aws.amazon.com/secretsmanager/latest/apireference/API_BatchGetSecretValue.html
    - https://docs.aws.amazon.com/secretsmanager/latest/userguide/cloudtrail_log_entries.html
    - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/8.19/aws-secrets-manager-rapid-secrets-retrieval.html
drilldown_searches:
    - name: View detection results for - "$user_arn$"
      search: '%original_detection_search% | search user_arn="$user_arn$" vendor_account="$vendor_account$"'
      earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
      latest_offset: $info_max_time$
    - name: View Secrets Manager activity for the last 7 days for - "$user_arn$"
      search: '`cloudtrail` eventSource="secretsmanager.amazonaws.com" | eval user_arn=''userIdentity.arn'', vendor_account=recipientAccountId | where (isnull(errorCode) OR errorCode="" OR lower(errorCode)="success") | search user_arn="$user_arn$" vendor_account="$vendor_account$" | table _time user_arn vendor_account eventName sourceIPAddress userAgent awsRegion requestParameters'
      earliest_offset: 7d
      latest_offset: "0"
    - name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$user_arn$"
      search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object="$user_arn$" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
      earliest_offset: 7d
      latest_offset: "0"
finding:
    title: The identity [$user_arn$] made [$batch_request_count$] successful AWS Secrets Manager BatchGetSecretValue requests within one hour
    entity:
        field: user_arn
        type: user
        score: 40
threat_objects:
    - field: src
      type: ip_address
analytic_story:
    - AWS Identity and Access Management Account Takeover
asset_type: AWS Account
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1555.006
product:
    - Splunk Cloud
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
category: cloud
security_domain: threat
tests:
    - name: True Positive Test
      attack_data:
        - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1555.006/aws_anomalous_secrets_manager_batch_retrieval/aws_anomalous_secrets_manager_batch_retrieval.json
          source: aws_cloudtrail
          sourcetype: aws:cloudtrail
      test_type: unit

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