Windows Multiple Disabled Users Failed To Authenticate Wth Kerberos


Description

The following analytic detects a single source endpoint failing to authenticate with 30 unique disabled domain users using the Kerberos protocol within 5 minutes. It leverages Windows Security Event 4768, focusing on failure code 0x12, indicating revoked credentials. This activity is significant as it may indicate a Password Spraying attack targeting disabled accounts, a tactic used by adversaries to gain initial access or elevate privileges. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access or privilege escalation within the Active Directory environment, posing a severe security risk.

Query · spl

`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4768 TargetUserName!=*$ Status=0x12
  | bucket span=5m _time
  | stats dc(TargetUserName) AS unique_accounts values(TargetUserName) as user values(dest) as dest
    BY _time, IpAddress
  | where unique_accounts > 30
  | `windows_multiple_disabled_users_failed_to_authenticate_wth_kerberos_filter`

Implementation guide

To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Domain Controller and Kerberos events. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting Audit Kerberos Authentication Service within Account Logon needs to be enabled.

Known false positives

  • A host failing to authenticate with multiple disabled domain users is not a common behavior for legitimate systems. Possible false positive scenarios include but are not limited to vulnerability scanners, multi-user systems missconfigured systems.

Analyst notes

Known false positives: A host failing to authenticate with multiple disabled domain users is not a common behavior for legitimate systems. Possible false positive scenarios include but are not limited to vulnerability scanners, multi-user systems missconfigured systems.

Raw source Windows Multiple Disabled Users Failed To Authenticate Wth Kerberos · SPL
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Published by splunk/security_content ↗, licensed under Apache 2.0 ↗. Reproduced here unmodified.
name: Windows Multiple Disabled Users Failed To Authenticate Wth Kerberos
id: 98f22d82-9d62-11eb-9fcf-acde48001122
version: 12
creation_date: '2021-04-14'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Mauricio Velazco, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: The following analytic detects a single source endpoint failing to authenticate with 30 unique disabled domain users using the Kerberos protocol within 5 minutes. It leverages Windows Security Event 4768, focusing on failure code `0x12`, indicating revoked credentials. This activity is significant as it may indicate a Password Spraying attack targeting disabled accounts, a tactic used by adversaries to gain initial access or elevate privileges. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access or privilege escalation within the Active Directory environment, posing a severe security risk.
data_source:
    - Windows Event Log Security 4768
search: |-
    `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4768 TargetUserName!=*$ Status=0x12
      | bucket span=5m _time
      | stats dc(TargetUserName) AS unique_accounts values(TargetUserName) as user values(dest) as dest
        BY _time, IpAddress
      | where unique_accounts > 30
      | `windows_multiple_disabled_users_failed_to_authenticate_wth_kerberos_filter`
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Domain Controller and Kerberos events. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Kerberos Authentication Service` within `Account Logon` needs to be enabled.
known_false_positives: A host failing to authenticate with multiple disabled domain users is not a common behavior for legitimate systems. Possible false positive scenarios include but are not limited to vulnerability scanners, multi-user systems missconfigured systems.
references:
    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/003/
drilldown_searches:
    - name: View the detection results for - "$user$"
      search: '%original_detection_search% | search  user = "$user$"'
      earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
      latest_offset: $info_max_time$
    - name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$user$"
      search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$user$") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
      earliest_offset: 7d
      latest_offset: "0"
finding:
    title: Potential Kerberos based password spraying attack from $IpAddress$
    entity:
        field: user
        type: user
        score: 50
threat_objects:
    - field: IpAddress
      type: ip_address
analytic_story:
    - Active Directory Password Spraying
    - Active Directory Kerberos Attacks
    - Volt Typhoon
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1110.003
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
    - attack_data:
        - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1110.003/purplesharp_disabled_users_kerberos_xml/windows-security.log
          source: XmlWinEventLog:Security
          sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog
      name: True Positive Test
      test_type: unit

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