Windows For Loop Usage Within Cmd.exe To Execute Commands


Description

The following analytic identifies the use of a for /f loop with the delims= option within cmd.exe, a technique commonly used to parse and extract data from the output of other commands. Adversaries and malicious scripts leverage this pattern to programmatically process command output for discovery, data extraction, or execution purposes while evading simpler detection logic.

Query · spl

| tstats `security_content_summariesonly`
  count min(_time) as firstTime
        max(_time) as lastTime

FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes WHERE

Processes.parent_process="*for /f*"
Processes.parent_process="*delims=*"
NOT Processes.user="SYSTEM"
NOT Processes.user="*$"
NOT Processes.parent_process IN (
    "*__VIARelease*",
    "*:\\Program Files\\Microsoft SQL Server\\*",
    "*^| findstr *"
)

by Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name
   Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec
   Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.parent_process_id
   Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path
   Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid
   Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id
   Processes.process_integrity_level Processes.process_name
   Processes.process_path Processes.user Processes.user_id
   Processes.vendor_product

| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `windows_for_loop_usage_within_cmd_exe_to_execute_commands_filter`

Implementation guide

The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the Processes node of the Endpoint data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.

Known false positives

  • Administrators or power users may use `for /f` loops with `delims=` in legitimate scripts for automation or troubleshooting purposes.

Analyst notes

Known false positives: Administrators or power users may use for /f loops with delims= in legitimate scripts for automation or troubleshooting purposes.

Raw source Windows For Loop Usage Within Cmd.exe To Execute Commands · SPL
Esc
Published by splunk/security_content ↗, licensed under Apache 2.0 ↗. Reproduced here unmodified.
name: Windows For Loop Usage Within Cmd.exe To Execute Commands
id: a4ce9079-fc8f-4749-982a-13197c8cf977
version: 1
creation_date: '2026-09-16'
modification_date: '2026-09-16'
author: Onur Mustafa Erdogan, Splunk
status: production
type: Anomaly
description: |-
    The following analytic identifies the use of a `for /f` loop with the `delims=` option within `cmd.exe`, a technique commonly used to parse and extract data from the output of other commands.
    Adversaries and malicious scripts leverage this pattern to programmatically process command output for discovery, data extraction, or execution purposes while evading simpler detection logic.
data_source:
    - Sysmon EventID 1
    - CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2
search: |-
    | tstats `security_content_summariesonly`
      count min(_time) as firstTime
            max(_time) as lastTime

    FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes WHERE

    Processes.parent_process="*for /f*"
    Processes.parent_process="*delims=*"
    NOT Processes.user="SYSTEM"
    NOT Processes.user="*$"
    NOT Processes.parent_process IN (
        "*__VIARelease*",
        "*:\\Program Files\\Microsoft SQL Server\\*",
        "*^| findstr *"
    )

    by Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name
       Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec
       Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.parent_process_id
       Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path
       Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid
       Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id
       Processes.process_integrity_level Processes.process_name
       Processes.process_path Processes.user Processes.user_id
       Processes.vendor_product

    | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
    | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
    | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
    | `windows_for_loop_usage_within_cmd_exe_to_execute_commands_filter`
how_to_implement: |-
    The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents.
    These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent
    is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process
    name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs
    must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product.
    The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint` data model. Use the Splunk
    Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.
known_false_positives: |-
    Administrators or power users may use `for /f` loops with `delims=` in legitimate scripts for automation or troubleshooting purposes.
references:
    - https://packetwatch.com/resources/threat-profile/clickfix-abuses-finger-to-deliver-castleloader
drilldown_searches:
    - name: View the detection results for - "$dest$"
      search: '%original_detection_search% | search  dest = "$dest$"'
      earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
      latest_offset: $info_max_time$
    - name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$dest$"
      search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$dest$") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
      earliest_offset: 7d
      latest_offset: '0'
intermediate_findings:
    entities:
        - field: dest
          type: system
          score: 20
          message: The [$process_name$] utility was invoked with a For loop via the Command Line [$process$] on [$dest$].
threat_objects:
    - field: process
      type: process
    - field: parent_process_name
      type: parent_process_name
analytic_story:
    - Compromised Windows Host
    - Fake CAPTCHA Campaigns
    - Living Off The Land
    - Suspicious Command-Line Executions
    - Windows Post-Exploitation
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1059.003
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
    - name: True Positive Test
      attack_data:
        - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.003/cmd_for_loop/cmd_for_loop.log
          source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
          sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog
      test_type: unit

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