MacOS Log Removal


Description

Detects the deletion or modification of logs on MacOS systems by identifying execution of the rm command with command-line arguments referencing system.log or audit-related paths. Adversaries may remove or alter log files to cover their tracks and hinder detection and forensic analysis. This behavior commonly occurs during post-exploitation cleanup.

Query · spl

| tstats `security_content_summariesonly`
  count min(_time) as firstTime
        max(_time) as lastTime

from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where

Processes.process = "*system.log*"
AND
(
    (Processes.process = "*rm *")
    OR
    (
        Processes.process = "*audit*"
        Processes.process = "* -s *"
    )
)

by Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process_id
   Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid
   Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id
   Processes.process_current_directory Processes.process_name
   Processes.process_path Processes.user
   Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product

| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `macos_log_removal_filter`

Implementation guide

This detection uses osquery and endpoint security on MacOS. Follow the link in references, which describes how to setup process auditing in MacOS with endpoint security and osquery. Also the TA-OSquery must be deployed across your indexers and universal forwarders in order to have the osquery data populate the data models.

Known false positives

  • Legitimate log rotation or administrative cleanup of system or audit logs.

Analyst notes

Known false positives: Legitimate log rotation or administrative cleanup of system or audit logs.

Raw source MacOS Log Removal · SPL
Esc
Published by splunk/security_content ↗, licensed under Apache 2.0 ↗. Reproduced here unmodified.
name: MacOS Log Removal
id: a7f2e891-3c4d-4a1b-9e6f-2b8d0c5a1f3e
version: 3
creation_date: '2026-04-14'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Raven Tait, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: |-
    Detects the deletion or modification of logs on MacOS systems by identifying execution of the rm command with command-line arguments referencing system.log or audit-related paths.
    Adversaries may remove or alter log files to cover their tracks and hinder detection and forensic analysis. This behavior commonly occurs during post-exploitation cleanup.
data_source:
    - Osquery Results
search: |-
    | tstats `security_content_summariesonly`
      count min(_time) as firstTime
            max(_time) as lastTime

    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where

    Processes.process = "*system.log*"
    AND
    (
        (Processes.process = "*rm *")
        OR
        (
            Processes.process = "*audit*"
            Processes.process = "* -s *"
        )
    )

    by Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process_id
       Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid
       Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id
       Processes.process_current_directory Processes.process_name
       Processes.process_path Processes.user
       Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product

    | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
    | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
    | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
    | `macos_log_removal_filter`
how_to_implement: |-
    This detection uses osquery and endpoint security on MacOS. Follow the link in references, which describes how to setup process auditing in MacOS with endpoint security and osquery.
    Also the [TA-OSquery](https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/8574) must be deployed across your indexers and universal forwarders in order to have the osquery data populate the data models.
known_false_positives: |-
    Legitimate log rotation or administrative cleanup of system or audit logs.
references:
    - https://osquery.readthedocs.io/en/stable/deployment/process-auditing/
drilldown_searches:
    - name: View the detection results for - "$user$" and "$dest$"
      search: '%original_detection_search% | search  user = "$user$" dest = "$dest$"'
      earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
      latest_offset: $info_max_time$
    - name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$user$" and "$dest$"
      search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$user$", "$dest$") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
      earliest_offset: 7d
      latest_offset: "0"
finding:
    title: Log removal or modification on $dest$ by $user$
    entity:
        field: user
        type: user
        score: 55
intermediate_findings:
    entities:
        - field: dest
          type: system
          score: 55
          message: Log removal or modification on $dest$ by $user$
threat_objects:
    - field: process
      type: process
analytic_story:
    - MacOS Post-Exploitation
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1070
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
    - name: True Positive Test
      attack_data:
        - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1070/osquery_log_removal/osquery.log
          source: osquery
          sourcetype: osquery:results
      test_type: unit

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