Windows Routing and Remote Access Service Registry Key Change


Description

This analytic identifies the modification of the Windows RemoteAccess Registry Entry. This technique can be used by malware, adversaries, threat actors and red teamers to gain persistence on a system by tampering with the key to add a custom DLL to be loaded. This technique was also observed to be used by Gh0st RAT malware. Upon seeing this behavior, it is recommended to review the system services events especially the remote access services.

Query · spl

| tstats `security_content_summariesonly`
  count min(_time) as firstTime
        max(_time) as lastTime

FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE

Registry.registry_path="*\\Services\\RemoteAccess\\RouterManagers\\Ip*"
Registry.action=modified

by Registry.action Registry.dest Registry.process_guid
   Registry.process_id Registry.registry_hive
   Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name
   Registry.registry_value_data Registry.registry_value_name
   Registry.registry_value_type Registry.status
   Registry.user Registry.vendor_product

| `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `windows_routing_and_remote_access_service_registry_key_change_filter`

Implementation guide

To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the Endpoint datamodel in the Registry node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.

Known false positives

  • There are legitimate reasons for changing this registry key/value. Investigate the change and its source and apply appropriate filters as needed.

Analyst notes

Known false positives: There are legitimate reasons for changing this registry key/value. Investigate the change and its source and apply appropriate filters as needed.

Raw source Windows Routing and Remote Access Service Registry Key Change · SPL
Esc
Published by splunk/security_content ↗, licensed under Apache 2.0 ↗. Reproduced here unmodified.
name: Windows Routing and Remote Access Service Registry Key Change
id: a93df51e-e612-40b7-a105-33e288160575
version: 3
creation_date: '2022-04-18'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
status: production
type: Anomaly
description: |-
    This analytic identifies the modification of the Windows RemoteAccess Registry Entry.
    This technique can be used by malware, adversaries, threat actors and red teamers to gain persistence on a system by tampering with the key to add a custom DLL to be loaded.
    This technique was also observed to be used by Gh0st RAT malware.
    Upon seeing this behavior, it is recommended to review the system services events especially the remote access services.
data_source:
    - Sysmon EventID 13
search: |-
    | tstats `security_content_summariesonly`
      count min(_time) as firstTime
            max(_time) as lastTime

    FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE

    Registry.registry_path="*\\Services\\RemoteAccess\\RouterManagers\\Ip*"
    Registry.action=modified

    by Registry.action Registry.dest Registry.process_guid
       Registry.process_id Registry.registry_hive
       Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name
       Registry.registry_value_data Registry.registry_value_name
       Registry.registry_value_type Registry.status
       Registry.user Registry.vendor_product

    | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)`
    | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
    | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
    | `windows_routing_and_remote_access_service_registry_key_change_filter`
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.
known_false_positives: |
    There are legitimate reasons for changing this registry key/value.
    Investigate the change and its source and apply appropriate filters as needed.
references:
    - https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.ghost_rat
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-rrasm/22ad9f0e-4349-43e0-92b3-37f7a9c7ca41
    - https://s7d2.scene7.com/is/content/cylance/prod/cylance-web/en-us/resources/knowledge-center/resource-library/reports/Op_Dust_Storm_Report.pdf
    - https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/the-curious-case-of-gh0st-malware/
drilldown_searches:
    - name: View the detection results for - "$dest$"
      search: '%original_detection_search% | search  dest = "$dest$"'
      earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
      latest_offset: $info_max_time$
    - name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$dest$"
      search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$dest$") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
      earliest_offset: 7d
      latest_offset: "0"
intermediate_findings:
    entities:
        - field: dest
          type: system
          score: 20
          message: Routing and Remote Access Service registry key [$registry_path$] was modified with the value [$registry_value_data$] by [$user$] on [$dest$].
threat_objects:
    - field: registry_path
      type: registry_path
analytic_story:
    - Gh0st RAT
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1112
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
    - name: True Positive Test
      attack_data:
        - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1112/remote_access_reg/remote_access_reg.log
          source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
          sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog
      test_type: unit

Detection rules belong to the projects that publish them and remain under their own licenses. This site indexes and links to them; it claims no rights in them.