Windows Unusual File Creation in Confluence Directory


Description

Detects executable file formats being created within the Confluence main directory. This can be indicative of exploitation of the Confluence web services to stage malware. This won't catch adversaries who modify the output location outside the Confluence directory when exploiting.

Query · spl

| tstats `security_content_summariesonly`
  count min(_time) as firstTime
        max(_time) as lastTime

from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where

Filesystem.file_path="*\\Atlassian\\Confluence\\*"
Filesystem.file_path IN (
    "*.bat",
    "*.cmd",
    "*.dat",
    "*.dll",
    "*.exe",
    "*.msc",
    "*.ps1",
    "*.vbe",
    "*.vbs"
)

by Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.process_path
   Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.process_id Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.action
   Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.user Filesystem.vendor_product

| `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `windows_unusual_file_creation_in_confluence_directory_filter`

Implementation guide

The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the Processes node of the Endpoint data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.

Known false positives

  • Some legitimate administrative or development activities may create executable files in the Confluence directory. Review and filter based on approved maintenance processes.

Analyst notes

Known false positives: Some legitimate administrative or development activities may create executable files in the Confluence directory. Review and filter based on approved maintenance processes.

Raw source Windows Unusual File Creation in Confluence Directory · SPL
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Published by splunk/security_content ↗, licensed under Apache 2.0 ↗. Reproduced here unmodified.
name: Windows Unusual File Creation in Confluence Directory
id: aa9d80d9-ed47-44da-aceb-2909ca4dc19e
version: 2
creation_date: '2021-09-02'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Raven Tait, Splunk
status: production
type: Anomaly
description: |-
    Detects executable file formats being created within the Confluence main directory.
    This can be indicative of exploitation of the Confluence web services to stage malware.
    This won't catch adversaries who modify the output location outside the Confluence directory when exploiting.
data_source:
    - Sysmon EventID 11
search: |-
    | tstats `security_content_summariesonly`
      count min(_time) as firstTime
            max(_time) as lastTime

    from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where

    Filesystem.file_path="*\\Atlassian\\Confluence\\*"
    Filesystem.file_path IN (
        "*.bat",
        "*.cmd",
        "*.dat",
        "*.dll",
        "*.exe",
        "*.msc",
        "*.ps1",
        "*.vbe",
        "*.vbs"
    )

    by Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.process_path
       Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.process_id Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.action
       Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.user Filesystem.vendor_product

    | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)`
    | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
    | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
    | `windows_unusual_file_creation_in_confluence_directory_filter`
how_to_implement: The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint` data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.
known_false_positives: Some legitimate administrative or development activities may create executable files in the Confluence directory. Review and filter based on approved maintenance processes.
drilldown_searches:
    - earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
      latest_offset: $info_max_time$
      name: View the detection results for - "$user$" and "$dest$"
      search: '%original_detection_search% | search  user = "$user$" dest = "$dest$"'
    - name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$user$" and "$dest$"
      search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$user$", "$dest$") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
      earliest_offset: 7d
      latest_offset: "0"
intermediate_findings:
    entities:
        - field: dest
          type: system
          score: 20
          message: Executable file created under a Confluence path at $file_path$ on $dest$.
threat_objects:
    - field: file_path
      type: file_path
analytic_story:
    - Confluence Data Center and Confluence Server Vulnerabilities
    - CVE-2023-22515 Privilege Escalation Vulnerability Confluence Data Center and Server
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1190
    - T1608.001
    - T1608.002
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
    - name: True Positive Test
      attack_data:
        - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/snapattack/snapattack.log
          source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
          sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog
      test_type: unit

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