Creation of lsass Dump with Taskmgr

name: Creation of lsass Dump with Taskmgr
id: b2fbe95a-9c62-4c12-8a29-24b97e84c0cd
version: 15
creation_date: '2019-12-11'
modification_date: '2026-10-02'
author: Michael Haag, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: |-
    The following analytic detects the creation of an lsass.exe process dump using Windows Task Manager.
    It leverages Sysmon EventID 11 to identify file creation events where the target filename matches *lsass*.dmp.
    This activity is significant because creating an lsass dump can be a precursor to credential theft, as the dump file contains sensitive information such as user passwords.
data_source:
    - Sysmon EventID 11
search: |-
    `sysmon`
    EventID=11
    process_name=taskmgr.exe
    file_path=*lsass*.dmp

    | stats count min(_time) as firstTime
                  max(_time) as lastTime
      BY action dest
         file_name file_path
         process_name process_guid process_id
         user_id vendor_product

    | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
    | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
    | `creation_of_lsass_dump_with_taskmgr_filter`
how_to_implement: This search requires Sysmon Logs and a Sysmon configuration, which includes EventCode 11 for detecting file create of lsass.dmp. This search uses an input macro named `sysmon`. We strongly recommend that you specify your environment-specific configurations (index, source, sourcetype, etc.) for Windows Sysmon logs. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk environment. The search also uses a post-filter macro designed to filter out known false positives.
known_false_positives: Administrators can create memory dumps for debugging purposes, but memory dumps of the LSASS process would be unusual.
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1003.001/T1003.001.md#atomic-test-5---dump-lsassexe-memory-using-windows-task-manager
    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/001/
    - https://2017.zeronights.org/wp-content/uploads/materials/ZN17_Kheirkhabarov_Hunting_for_Credentials_Dumping_in_Windows_Environment.pdf
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/388942adbd9641f4dfdcf079d7efe9a75ec0ac43/atomics/T1003.001/T1003.001.yaml#L122
drilldown_searches:
    - name: View the detection results for - "$dest$"
      search: '%original_detection_search% | search  dest = "$dest$"'
      earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
      latest_offset: $info_max_time$
    - name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$dest$"
      search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$dest$") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
      earliest_offset: 7d
      latest_offset: "0"
finding:
    title: The process [$process_name$] was identified on endpoint [$dest$] writing [$file_path$] to disk.
    entity:
        field: dest
        type: system
        score: 50
threat_objects:
    - field: file_path
      type: file_path
analytic_story:
    - Credential Dumping
    - CISA AA22-257A
    - Cactus Ransomware
    - Seashell Blizzard
    - Scattered Lapsus$ Hunters
asset_type: Windows
atomic_guid:
    - dea6c349-f1c6-44f3-87a1-1ed33a59a607
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1003.001
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
    - name: True Positive Test
      attack_data:
        - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
          source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
          sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog
      test_type: unit