Linux File Created In Kernel Driver Directory


Description

The following analytic detects the creation of files in the Linux kernel/driver directory. It leverages filesystem data to identify new files in this critical directory. This activity is significant because the kernel/driver directory is typically reserved for kernel modules, and unauthorized file creation here can indicate a rootkit installation. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to gain high-level privileges, potentially compromising the entire system by executing code at the kernel level.

Query · spl

| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem
  WHERE Filesystem.file_path IN ("*/kernel/drivers/*")
  BY Filesystem.action Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_access_time
     Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_hash Filesystem.file_modify_time
     Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.file_acl
     Filesystem.file_size Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.process_id
     Filesystem.user Filesystem.vendor_product
| `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `linux_file_created_in_kernel_driver_directory_filter`

Implementation guide

To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the file name, file path, and process_guid executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.

Known false positives

  • Administrator or network operator can create file in this folders for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.

Analyst notes

Known false positives: Administrator or network operator can create file in this folders for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.

Raw source Linux File Created In Kernel Driver Directory · SPL
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Published by splunk/security_content ↗, licensed under Apache 2.0 ↗. Reproduced here unmodified.
name: Linux File Created In Kernel Driver Directory
id: b85bbeec-6326-11ec-9311-acde48001122
version: 11
creation_date: '2022-01-05'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
status: production
type: Anomaly
description: The following analytic detects the creation of files in the Linux kernel/driver directory. It leverages filesystem data to identify new files in this critical directory. This activity is significant because the kernel/driver directory is typically reserved for kernel modules, and unauthorized file creation here can indicate a rootkit installation. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to gain high-level privileges, potentially compromising the entire system by executing code at the kernel level.
data_source:
    - Sysmon for Linux EventID 11
search: |-
    | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem
      WHERE Filesystem.file_path IN ("*/kernel/drivers/*")
      BY Filesystem.action Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_access_time
         Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_hash Filesystem.file_modify_time
         Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.file_acl
         Filesystem.file_size Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.process_id
         Filesystem.user Filesystem.vendor_product
    | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)`
    | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
    | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
    | `linux_file_created_in_kernel_driver_directory_filter`
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the file name, file path, and process_guid executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you can use the Add-on for Linux Sysmon from Splunkbase.
known_false_positives: Administrator or network operator can create file in this folders for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.
references:
    - https://docs.fedoraproject.org/en-US/fedora/rawhide/system-administrators-guide/kernel-module-driver-configuration/Working_with_Kernel_Modules/
    - https://security.stackexchange.com/questions/175953/how-to-load-a-malicious-lkm-at-startup
    - https://0x00sec.org/t/kernel-rootkits-getting-your-hands-dirty/1485
drilldown_searches:
    - name: View the detection results for - "$dest$"
      search: '%original_detection_search% | search  dest = "$dest$"'
      earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
      latest_offset: $info_max_time$
    - name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$dest$"
      search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$dest$") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
      earliest_offset: 7d
      latest_offset: "0"
intermediate_findings:
    entities:
        - field: dest
          type: system
          score: 20
          message: A file $file_name$ is created in $file_path$ on $dest$
analytic_story:
    - Linux Privilege Escalation
    - Linux Persistence Techniques
    - Linux Rootkit
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1547.006
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
    - name: True Positive Test
      attack_data:
        - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.006/loading_linux_kernel_module/sysmon_linux.log
          source: Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational
          sourcetype: sysmon:linux
      test_type: unit

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