Azure AD Federated Identity Credential Added To Service Principal


Description

The following analytic detects additions of federated identity credentials to Entra ID service principals. It leverages Azure Active Directory AuditLogs for the "Update service principal" or "Update application" operations and filters on the FederatedIdentityCredentials modifiedProperty. Workload identity federation allows external OIDC workloads such as GitHub Actions or Kubernetes to authenticate as the SP without a secret. If an attacker adds a federated credential pointing to a controlled OIDC issuer, they gain a persistent secretless authentication path into the SP that survives credential rotations and is not visible in standard secrets monitoring.

Query · spl

`azure_monitor_aad`
category=AuditLogs
operationName IN ("Update application", "Update service principal")
properties.targetResources{}.modifiedProperties{}.displayName="FederatedIdentityCredentials"

| rename properties.* as *
| rename initiatedBy.user.userPrincipalName as initiatedBy
| rename initiatedBy.app.displayName as initiatedByApp

| eval actor = coalesce(initiatedBy, initiatedByApp)

| rename targetResources{}.displayName as targetSpName
| rename userAgent as user_agent

| eval index_number=mvfind('targetResources{}.modifiedProperties{}.displayName', "FederatedIdentityCredentials")
| eval newCreds = mvindex('targetResources{}.modifiedProperties{}.newValue', index_number)
| eval oldCreds = mvindex('targetResources{}.modifiedProperties{}.oldValue', index_number)

| spath input=newCreds path={}.name output=newCredNames
| spath input=oldCreds path={}.name output=oldCredNames

| where mvcount(newCredNames) > coalesce(mvcount(oldCredNames), 0)

| fillnull value="unknown" dest src vendor_account vendor_product user_agent actor targetSpName newCreds oldCreds signature

| stats count min(_time) as firstTime
              max(_time) as lastTime
  BY dest src vendor_account vendor_product user_agent
     actor targetSpName newCreds oldCreds signature

| rename actor as user

| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `azure_ad_federated_identity_credential_added_to_service_principal_filter`

Implementation guide

You must install the latest version of Splunk Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services from Splunkbase (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/3110/#/details). You must be ingesting Azure Active Directory events into your Splunk environment through an EventHub. This analytic was written to be used with the "azure:monitor:aad sourcetype" leveraging the AuditLogs log category.

Known false positives

  • Platform engineers legitimately configure federated credentials when setting up GitHub Actions OIDC federation, Kubernetes Workload Identity, or other secretless CI/CD patterns. Validate the actor, the target SP, and whether the issuer in newCreds corresponds to a known trusted OIDC provider. Unknown issuers or overly permissive subject claims in the newCreds JSON warrant immediate investigation.

Analyst notes

Known false positives: Platform engineers legitimately configure federated credentials when setting up GitHub Actions OIDC federation, Kubernetes Workload Identity, or other secretless CI/CD patterns. Validate the actor, the target SP, and whether the issuer in newCreds corresponds to a known trusted OIDC provider. Unknown issuers or overly permissive subject claims in the newCreds JSON warrant immediate investigation.

Raw source Azure AD Federated Identity Credential Added To Service Principal · SPL
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Published by splunk/security_content ↗, licensed under Apache 2.0 ↗. Reproduced here unmodified.
name: Azure AD Federated Identity Credential Added To Service Principal
id: bfa745d4-4e43-4ff1-ad15-2f663fdf5cbf
version: 2
creation_date: '2026-05-20'
modification_date: '2026-11-05'
author: descambiado, Onur Mustafa Erdogan, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: |
    The following analytic detects additions of federated identity credentials to Entra ID service principals.
    It leverages Azure Active Directory AuditLogs for the "Update service principal" or "Update application" operations and filters on the FederatedIdentityCredentials modifiedProperty.
    Workload identity federation allows external OIDC workloads such as GitHub Actions or Kubernetes to authenticate as the SP without a secret.
    If an attacker adds a federated credential pointing to a controlled OIDC issuer, they gain a persistent secretless authentication path into the SP that survives credential rotations and is not visible in standard secrets monitoring.
data_source:
    - Azure Active Directory
search: |-
    `azure_monitor_aad`
    category=AuditLogs
    operationName IN ("Update application", "Update service principal")
    properties.targetResources{}.modifiedProperties{}.displayName="FederatedIdentityCredentials"

    | rename properties.* as *
    | rename initiatedBy.user.userPrincipalName as initiatedBy
    | rename initiatedBy.app.displayName as initiatedByApp

    | eval actor = coalesce(initiatedBy, initiatedByApp)

    | rename targetResources{}.displayName as targetSpName
    | rename userAgent as user_agent

    | eval index_number=mvfind('targetResources{}.modifiedProperties{}.displayName', "FederatedIdentityCredentials")
    | eval newCreds = mvindex('targetResources{}.modifiedProperties{}.newValue', index_number)
    | eval oldCreds = mvindex('targetResources{}.modifiedProperties{}.oldValue', index_number)

    | spath input=newCreds path={}.name output=newCredNames
    | spath input=oldCreds path={}.name output=oldCredNames

    | where mvcount(newCredNames) > coalesce(mvcount(oldCredNames), 0)

    | fillnull value="unknown" dest src vendor_account vendor_product user_agent actor targetSpName newCreds oldCreds signature

    | stats count min(_time) as firstTime
                  max(_time) as lastTime
      BY dest src vendor_account vendor_product user_agent
         actor targetSpName newCreds oldCreds signature

    | rename actor as user

    | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
    | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
    | `azure_ad_federated_identity_credential_added_to_service_principal_filter`
how_to_implement: |
    You must install the latest version of Splunk Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services from Splunkbase (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/3110/#/details).
    You must be ingesting Azure Active Directory events into your Splunk environment through an EventHub.
    This analytic was written to be used with the "azure:monitor:aad sourcetype" leveraging the AuditLogs log category.
known_false_positives: |
    Platform engineers legitimately configure federated credentials when setting up GitHub Actions OIDC federation, Kubernetes Workload Identity, or other secretless CI/CD patterns.
    Validate the actor, the target SP, and whether the issuer in newCreds corresponds to a known trusted OIDC provider.
    Unknown issuers or overly permissive subject claims in the newCreds JSON warrant immediate investigation.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/workload-id/workload-identity-federation
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/workload-id/workload-identity-federation-create-trust
    - https://docs.github.com/en/actions/security-for-github-actions/security-hardening-your-deployments/about-security-hardening-with-openid-connect
    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/001/
drilldown_searches:
    - name: View the detection results for - "$targetSpName$"
      search: '%original_detection_search% | search  targetSpName = "$targetSpName$"'
      earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
      latest_offset: $info_max_time$
    - name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$user$"
      search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$user$") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
      earliest_offset: 7d
      latest_offset: "0"
finding:
    title: User [$user$] added Federated Identity Credential to service principal [$targetSpName$] from [$src$]
    entity:
        field: user
        type: user
        score: 50
intermediate_findings:
    entities:
        - field: targetSpName
          type: user
          score: 50
          message: User [$user$] added Federated Identity Credential to service principal [$targetSpName$] from [$src$]
analytic_story:
    - Azure Active Directory Persistence
    - NOBELIUM Group
asset_type: Azure Active Directory
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1098.001
    - T1586.003
    - T1078.004
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: cloud
security_domain: identity
tests:
    - name: True Positive Test
      attack_data:
        - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1098.001/azure_ad_federated_identity_credential/azure-audit.log
          source: Azure AD
          sourcetype: azure:monitor:aad
      test_type: unit

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