Microsoft Intune Bulk Wipe


Description

The following analytic detects a high volume of "wipe ManagedDevice" events from the Intune admin portal (5+ per hour by default). It leverages Intune audit logs to identify when this action is triggered. This activity is significant beacuse the "wipe ManagedDevice" action factory resets devices connected to your Microsoft Intune tenant. If confirmed malicious, an attacker can abuse this action to perform a large-scale data wiping attack against your managed endpoints.

Query · spl

`azure_monitor_activity`
operationName="wipe ManagedDevice"
| rename identity as user
         resultType as result
| fillnull
| table _time action command dest user src
        vendor_account vendor_product change_type
        properties.Targets.*

| stats min(_time) as firstTime
        max(_time) as lastTime
        values(*) as *
  count by user

| where count >= 5
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `microsoft_intune_bulk_wipe_filter`

Implementation guide

The Splunk Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services add-on is required to ingest Intune audit logs via Azure EventHub. To configure this logging, visit Intune > Tenant administration > Diagnostic settings > Add diagnostic settings & send events to the activity audit event hub. Deploy as an event-based detection rule for quick deployment. Adjust the count threshold according to expected activity in your environment.

Known false positives

  • Legitimate adminstrative usage of the "wipe ManagedDevice" action might trigger this detection. This action is typically used for offboarding endpoints or in response to a lost or stolen device.

Analyst notes

Known false positives: Legitimate adminstrative usage of the "wipe ManagedDevice" action might trigger this detection. This action is typically used for offboarding endpoints or in response to a lost or stolen device.

Raw source Microsoft Intune Bulk Wipe · SPL
Esc
Published by splunk/security_content ↗, licensed under Apache 2.0 ↗. Reproduced here unmodified.
name: Microsoft Intune Bulk Wipe
id: c3f48aa9-878e-443f-8889-e42a11a9bea9
version: 2
creation_date: '2026-04-15'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Jake Enea
status: production
type: TTP
description: |-
    The following analytic detects a high volume of "wipe ManagedDevice" events from the Intune admin portal (5+ per hour by default).
    It leverages Intune audit logs to identify when this action is triggered. This activity is significant beacuse the "wipe ManagedDevice" action factory resets devices connected to your Microsoft Intune tenant.
    If confirmed malicious, an attacker can abuse this action to perform a large-scale data wiping attack against your managed endpoints.
data_source:
    - Azure Monitor Activity
search: |-
    `azure_monitor_activity`
    operationName="wipe ManagedDevice"
    | rename identity as user
             resultType as result
    | fillnull
    | table _time action command dest user src
            vendor_account vendor_product change_type
            properties.Targets.*

    | stats min(_time) as firstTime
            max(_time) as lastTime
            values(*) as *
      count by user

    | where count >= 5
    | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
    | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
    | `microsoft_intune_bulk_wipe_filter`
how_to_implement: |-
    The Splunk Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services add-on is required to ingest Intune audit logs via Azure EventHub.
    To configure this logging, visit Intune > Tenant administration > Diagnostic settings > Add diagnostic settings & send events to the activity audit event hub.
    Deploy as an event-based detection rule for quick deployment.
    Adjust the count threshold according to expected activity in your environment.
known_false_positives: |-
    Legitimate adminstrative usage of the "wipe ManagedDevice" action might trigger this detection.
    This action is typically used for offboarding endpoints or in response to a lost or stolen device.
references:
    - https://www.lumos.com/blog/stryker-hack
    - https://www.covertswarm.com/post/swarm-intelligence-strykers-intune-wipe-proves-your-bcdr-plan-has-a-single-point-of-failure
    - https://www.wwt.com/blog/how-the-stryker-intune-wipe-incident-highlights-a-critical-gap-in-endpoint-control
drilldown_searches:
    - name: View the detection results for - "$user$"
      search: '%original_detection_search% | search  user = "$user$"'
      earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
      latest_offset: $info_max_time$
    - name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$user$"
      search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$user$") starthoursago=168  | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
      earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
      latest_offset: $info_max_time$
    - name: View sign-in activity +/-1 hour surrounding the detection for - "$user$"
      search: '`azure_monitor_aad` category=SignInLogs properties.userPrincipalName="$user$"'
      earliest_offset: 1h
      latest_offset: 1h
finding:
    title: Bulk wipe action executed by user $user$ on $dest$
    entity:
        field: user
        type: user
        score: 50
analytic_story:
    - Azure Active Directory Account Takeover
asset_type: Azure Tenant
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1561.001
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: cloud
security_domain: threat
tests:
    - name: True Positive Test
      attack_data:
        - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1561.001/microsoft_intune_bulk_wipe/microsoft_intune_bulk_wipe.log
          sourcetype: azure:monitor:activity
          source: Azure AD
      test_type: unit

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