Detect Remote Access Software Usage FileInfo


Description

The following analytic detects the execution of processes with file or code signing attributes from known remote access software within the environment. It leverages Sysmon EventCode 1 data and cross-references a lookup table of remote access utilities such as AnyDesk, GoToMyPC, LogMeIn, and TeamViewer. This activity is significant as adversaries often use these tools to maintain unauthorized remote access. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to persist in the environment, potentially leading to data exfiltration or further compromise of the network.

Query · spl

`sysmon` EventCode=1

[
  | inputlookup remote_access_software
  | search file_info!=""
  | rename file_info as Product
  | table Product
]

| stats count min(_time) as firstTime
              max(_time) as lastTime
              values(Company) as Company
              values(Product) as Product

  BY action dest original_file_name
     parent_process parent_process_exec parent_process_guid
     parent_process_id parent_process_name parent_process_path
     process process_exec process_guid
     process_hash process_id process_integrity_level
     process_name process_path user
     user_id vendor_product

| lookup local=t remote_access_software file_info as Product OUTPUT app as signature, category, reference, description

| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`

| `remote_access_software_usage_exceptions`

| `detect_remote_access_software_usage_fileinfo_filter`

Implementation guide

This analytic relies on Sysmon to be properly installed and utilized in the environment. Ensure that proper logging is setup for Sysmon and data is being ingested into Splunk. The "exceptions" macro leverages both an Assets and Identities lookup, as well as a KVStore collection named "remote_software_exceptions" that lets you track and maintain device-based exceptions for this set of detections.

Known false positives

  • Known or approved applications used by the organization or usage of built-in functions. Known false positives can be added to the remote_access_software_usage_exception.csv lookup to globally suppress these situations across all remote access content

Analyst notes

Known false positives: Known or approved applications used by the organization or usage of built-in functions. Known false positives can be added to the remote_access_software_usage_exception.csv lookup to globally suppress these situations across all remote access content

Raw source Detect Remote Access Software Usage FileInfo · SPL
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Published by splunk/security_content ↗, licensed under Apache 2.0 ↗. Reproduced here unmodified.
name: Detect Remote Access Software Usage FileInfo
id: ccad96d7-a48c-4f13-8b9c-9f6a31cba454
version: 17
creation_date: '2024-03-06'
modification_date: '2026-10-08'
author: Steven Dick, Onur Mustafa Erdogan, Splunk
status: production
type: Anomaly
description: |-
    The following analytic detects the execution of processes with file or code signing attributes from known remote access software within
    the environment. It leverages Sysmon EventCode 1 data and cross-references a lookup table of remote access utilities such as AnyDesk,
    GoToMyPC, LogMeIn, and TeamViewer. This activity is significant as adversaries often use these tools to maintain unauthorized remote access.
    If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to persist in the environment, potentially leading to data exfiltration or further
    compromise of the network.
data_source:
    - Sysmon EventID 1
search: |-
    `sysmon` EventCode=1

    [
      | inputlookup remote_access_software
      | search file_info!=""
      | rename file_info as Product
      | table Product
    ]

    | stats count min(_time) as firstTime
                  max(_time) as lastTime
                  values(Company) as Company
                  values(Product) as Product

      BY action dest original_file_name
         parent_process parent_process_exec parent_process_guid
         parent_process_id parent_process_name parent_process_path
         process process_exec process_guid
         process_hash process_id process_integrity_level
         process_name process_path user
         user_id vendor_product

    | lookup local=t remote_access_software file_info as Product OUTPUT app as signature, category, reference, description

    | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
    | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`

    | `remote_access_software_usage_exceptions`

    | `detect_remote_access_software_usage_fileinfo_filter`
how_to_implement: |-
    This analytic relies on Sysmon to be properly installed and utilized in the environment. Ensure that proper logging is setup for
    Sysmon and data is being ingested into Splunk. The "exceptions" macro leverages both an Assets and Identities lookup, as well as a
    KVStore collection named "remote_software_exceptions" that lets you track and maintain device-based exceptions for this set of detections.
known_false_positives: |-
    Known or approved applications used by the organization or usage of built-in functions. Known false positives can be added to the
    remote_access_software_usage_exception.csv lookup to globally suppress these situations across all remote access content
references:
    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1219/
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2022/08/08/bumblebee-roasts-its-way-to-domain-admin/
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2022/11/28/emotet-strikes-again-lnk-file-leads-to-domain-wide-ransomware/
drilldown_searches:
    - name: View the detection results for - "$dest$"
      search: '%original_detection_search% | search  dest = "$dest$"'
      earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
      latest_offset: $info_max_time$
    - name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$dest$"
      search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$dest$") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
      earliest_offset: 7d
      latest_offset: "0"
    - name: Investigate processes on $dest$
      search: '| from datamodel:Endpoint.Processes| search dest=$dest$ process_name=$process_name$'
      earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
      latest_offset: $info_max_time$
intermediate_findings:
    entities:
        - field: dest
          type: system
          score: 20
          message: Known remote access software [$signature$] was observed through file attributes of [$process_name$] process on [$dest$] by [$user$].
        - field: user
          type: user
          score: 20
          message: Known remote access software [$signature$] was observed through file attributes of [$process_name$] process on [$dest$] by [$user$].
threat_objects:
    - field: process_name
      type: process_name
    - field: signature
      type: signature
analytic_story:
    - Insider Threat
    - Command And Control
    - Ransomware
    - Gozi Malware
    - Remote Monitoring and Management Software
    - Cactus Ransomware
    - Seashell Blizzard
    - Scattered Spider
    - Interlock Ransomware
    - Scattered Lapsus$ Hunters
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1219
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
    - name: True Positive Test
      attack_data:
        - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1219/screenconnect/screenconnect_sysmon.log
          source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
          sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog
      description: PORTED MANUAL TEST - This detection uses A&I lookups from Enterprise Security.
      test_type: experimental

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