Cisco NVM - Suspicious File Download via Headless Browser

Description

This analytic identifies the use of Chromium-based browsers (like Microsoft Edge) running in headless mode with the --dump-dom argument. This behavior has been observed in attack campaigns such as DUCKTAIL, where browsers are automated to stealthily download content from the internet using direct URLs or suspicious hosting platforms. The detection focuses on identifying connections to known file-sharing domains or direct IPs extracted from command-line arguments and cross-checks those against the destination of the flow. Since it leverages Cisco Network Visibility Module telemetry, the rule triggers only if a network connection is made.

Query · spl

`cisco_network_visibility_module_flowdata`

 ``` Usually the initiator of the connection is the child process, meaning the parent will contain the suspicious command.```

 (
   parent_process_name IN ("brave.exe", "chrome.exe", "msedge.exe", "opera.exe", "vivaldi.exe")
   OR
   process_name IN ("brave.exe", "chrome.exe", "msedge.exe", "opera.exe", "vivaldi.exe")
 )
 (
   (parent_process_arguments="*--headless*" parent_process_arguments="*--dump-dom*")
   OR
   (process_arguments="*--headless*" process_arguments="*--dump-dom*")
 )
 NOT dest IN (
         "10.0.0.0/8", "172.16.0.0/12", "192.168.0.0/16", "100.64.0.0/10",
         "127.0.0.0/8", "169.254.0.0/16", "192.0.0.0/24", "192.0.0.0/29", "192.0.0.8/32",
         "192.0.0.9/32", "192.0.0.10/32", "192.0.0.170/32", "192.0.0.171/32", "192.0.2.0/24",
         "192.31.196.0/24", "192.52.193.0/24", "192.88.99.0/24", "224.0.0.0/4", "192.175.48.0/24",
         "198.18.0.0/15", "198.51.100.0/24", "203.0.113.0/24", "240.0.0.0/4", "::1"
         )

 ``` In order to avoid matching with any public IP, we extract the IP value from the CommandLine and filter on it```

 | rex field=parent_process_arguments "(?i)\\b(?:https?|ftp)://(?<extracted_ip_parent>(?:\\d{1,3}\\.){3}\\d{1,3})"
 | rex field=process_arguments "(?i)\\b(?:https?|ftp)://(?<extracted_ip_child>(?:\\d{1,3}\\.){3}\\d{1,3})"
 | eval direct_ip_match=if(dest == extracted_ip_child, 1, if(dest == extracted_ip_parent, 1, 0))

 | where (
     dest_hostname IN (
         "*.githubusercontent.com*", "*anonfiles.com*", "*cdn.discordapp.com*", "*ddns.net*",
         "*dl.dropboxusercontent.com*", "*ghostbin.co*", "*glitch.me*", "*gofile.io*",
         "*hastebin.com*", "*mediafire.com*", "*mega.nz*", "*onrender.com*", "*pages.dev*",
         "*paste.ee*", "*pastebin.*", "*pastetext.net*", "*privatlab.*",
         "*send.exploit.in*", "*sendspace.com*", "*storage.googleapis.com*",
         "*storjshare.io*", "*supabase.co*", "*temp.sh*", "*transfer.sh*", "*trycloudflare.com*",
         "*ufile.io*", "*w3spaces.com*", "*workers.dev*"
     )
     OR direct_ip_match = 1
   )

 | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
         values(parent_process_arguments) as parent_process_arguments
         values(process_arguments) as process_arguments
         values(parent_process_hash) as parent_process_hash
         values(process_hash) as process_hash
         values(module_name_list) as module_name_list
         values(module_hash_list) as module_hash_list
         values(dest_port) as dest_port
         values(aliul) as additional_logged_in_users_list
         values(dest_hostname) as dest_hostname
         by src dest parent_process_path parent_process_name parent_process_integrity_level process_path process_name process_integrity_level process_id transport
 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
 | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
 | table
   parent_process_integrity_level parent_process_path parent_process_name parent_process_arguments parent_process_hash
   process_integrity_level process_path process_name process_arguments process_hash process_id
   additional_logged_in_users_list module_name_list module_hash_list
   src dest_hostname dest dest_port transport firstTime lastTime
 | `cisco_nvm___suspicious_file_download_via_headless_browser_filter`

Implementation guide

This search requires Network Visibility Module logs, which includes the flow data sourcetype. This search uses an input macro named cisco_network_visibility_module_flowdata. We strongly recommend that you specify your environment-specific configurations (index, source, sourcetype, etc.) for Cisco Network Visibility Module logs. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk environment. The search also uses a post-filter macro designed to filter out known false positives. The logs are to be ingested using the Splunk Add-on for Cisco Endpoint Security Analytics (CESA) (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/4221).

Known false positives

  • Some internal automation frameworks may invoke Chromium browsers in headless mode to programmatically access internal services or webpages. These tools may occasionally download legitimate resources as part of their normal behavior. Tuning based on command-line patterns or known dest hostnames may be required to avoid noise.

Analyst notes

Known false positives: Some internal automation frameworks may invoke Chromium browsers in headless mode to programmatically access internal services or webpages. These tools may occasionally download legitimate resources as part of their normal behavior. Tuning based on command-line patterns or known dest hostnames may be required to avoid noise.

Raw source Cisco NVM - Suspicious File Download via Headless Browser · SPL
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Published by splunk/security_content ↗, licensed under Apache 2.0 ↗. Reproduced here unmodified. 
name: Cisco NVM - Suspicious File Download via Headless Browser
id: cd0e816f-f67d-4dbe-a153-480b546e867e
version: 6
creation_date: '2025-07-01'
modification_date: '2026-07-14'
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: |
    This analytic identifies the use of Chromium-based browsers (like Microsoft Edge) running in headless mode with the `--dump-dom` argument.
    This behavior has been observed in attack campaigns such as DUCKTAIL, where browsers are automated to stealthily download content from the internet using direct URLs or suspicious hosting platforms.
    The detection focuses on identifying connections to known file-sharing domains or direct IPs extracted from command-line arguments and cross-checks those against the destination of the flow.
    Since it leverages Cisco Network Visibility Module telemetry, the rule triggers only if a network connection is made.
data_source:
    - Cisco Network Visibility Module Flow Data
search: |
    `cisco_network_visibility_module_flowdata`

     ``` Usually the initiator of the connection is the child process, meaning the parent will contain the suspicious command.```

     (
       parent_process_name IN ("brave.exe", "chrome.exe", "msedge.exe", "opera.exe", "vivaldi.exe")
       OR
       process_name IN ("brave.exe", "chrome.exe", "msedge.exe", "opera.exe", "vivaldi.exe")
     )
     (
       (parent_process_arguments="*--headless*" parent_process_arguments="*--dump-dom*")
       OR
       (process_arguments="*--headless*" process_arguments="*--dump-dom*")
     )
     NOT dest IN (
             "10.0.0.0/8", "172.16.0.0/12", "192.168.0.0/16", "100.64.0.0/10",
             "127.0.0.0/8", "169.254.0.0/16", "192.0.0.0/24", "192.0.0.0/29", "192.0.0.8/32",
             "192.0.0.9/32", "192.0.0.10/32", "192.0.0.170/32", "192.0.0.171/32", "192.0.2.0/24",
             "192.31.196.0/24", "192.52.193.0/24", "192.88.99.0/24", "224.0.0.0/4", "192.175.48.0/24",
             "198.18.0.0/15", "198.51.100.0/24", "203.0.113.0/24", "240.0.0.0/4", "::1"
             )

     ``` In order to avoid matching with any public IP, we extract the IP value from the CommandLine and filter on it```

     | rex field=parent_process_arguments "(?i)\\b(?:https?|ftp)://(?<extracted_ip_parent>(?:\\d{1,3}\\.){3}\\d{1,3})"
     | rex field=process_arguments "(?i)\\b(?:https?|ftp)://(?<extracted_ip_child>(?:\\d{1,3}\\.){3}\\d{1,3})"
     | eval direct_ip_match=if(dest == extracted_ip_child, 1, if(dest == extracted_ip_parent, 1, 0))

     | where (
         dest_hostname IN (
             "*.githubusercontent.com*", "*anonfiles.com*", "*cdn.discordapp.com*", "*ddns.net*",
             "*dl.dropboxusercontent.com*", "*ghostbin.co*", "*glitch.me*", "*gofile.io*",
             "*hastebin.com*", "*mediafire.com*", "*mega.nz*", "*onrender.com*", "*pages.dev*",
             "*paste.ee*", "*pastebin.*", "*pastetext.net*", "*privatlab.*",
             "*send.exploit.in*", "*sendspace.com*", "*storage.googleapis.com*",
             "*storjshare.io*", "*supabase.co*", "*temp.sh*", "*transfer.sh*", "*trycloudflare.com*",
             "*ufile.io*", "*w3spaces.com*", "*workers.dev*"
         )
         OR direct_ip_match = 1
       )

     | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
             values(parent_process_arguments) as parent_process_arguments
             values(process_arguments) as process_arguments
             values(parent_process_hash) as parent_process_hash
             values(process_hash) as process_hash
             values(module_name_list) as module_name_list
             values(module_hash_list) as module_hash_list
             values(dest_port) as dest_port
             values(aliul) as additional_logged_in_users_list
             values(dest_hostname) as dest_hostname
             by src dest parent_process_path parent_process_name parent_process_integrity_level process_path process_name process_integrity_level process_id transport
     | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
     | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
     | table
       parent_process_integrity_level parent_process_path parent_process_name parent_process_arguments parent_process_hash
       process_integrity_level process_path process_name process_arguments process_hash process_id
       additional_logged_in_users_list module_name_list module_hash_list
       src dest_hostname dest dest_port transport firstTime lastTime
     | `cisco_nvm___suspicious_file_download_via_headless_browser_filter`
how_to_implement: |
    This search requires Network Visibility Module logs, which includes the flow data sourcetype.
    This search uses an input macro named `cisco_network_visibility_module_flowdata`.
    We strongly recommend that you specify your environment-specific configurations
    (index, source, sourcetype, etc.) for Cisco Network Visibility Module logs.
    Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk environment.
    The search also uses a post-filter macro designed to filter out known false positives.
    The logs are to be ingested using the Splunk Add-on for Cisco Endpoint Security Analytics (CESA) (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/4221).
known_false_positives: |
    Some internal automation frameworks may invoke Chromium browsers in headless mode to programmatically access internal services or webpages.
    These tools may occasionally download legitimate resources as part of their normal behavior.
    Tuning based on command-line patterns or known dest hostnames may be required to avoid noise.
references:
    - https://labs.withsecure.com/content/dam/labs/docs/WithSecure_Research_DUCKTAIL.pdf
    - https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/23/e/managed-xdr-investigation-of-ducktail-in-trend-micro-vision-one.html
    - https://x.com/mrd0x/status/1478234484881436672?s=12
    - https://developer.chrome.com/docs/chromium/headless
drilldown_searches:
    - name: View the detection results for - "$src$"
      search: '%original_detection_search% | search  src = "$src$"'
      earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
      latest_offset: $info_max_time$
    - name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$src$"
      search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$src$") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
      earliest_offset: 7d
      latest_offset: "0"
finding:
    title: Suspicious file download using the Chromium-based browser $parent_process_name$ via the commandline $process_arguments$. Observed on host $src$ communicating with $dest$ / $dest_hostname$
    entity:
        field: src
        type: system
        score: 50
threat_objects:
    - field: process_name
      type: process_name
analytic_story:
    - Cisco Network Visibility Module Analytics
    - BlankGrabber Stealer
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1105
    - T1059
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
    - name: True Positive Test - Cisco NVM
      attack_data:
        - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/cisco_network_visibility_module/cisco_nvm_flowdata/nvm_flowdata.log
          source: not_applicable
          sourcetype: cisco:nvm:flowdata:v2
      test_type: unit

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