Ping Sleep Batch Command


Description

The following analytic identifies the execution of ping sleep batch commands. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process and parent process command-line details. This activity is significant as it indicates an attempt to delay malicious code execution, potentially evading detection or sandbox analysis. If confirmed malicious, this technique allows attackers to bypass security measures, making it harder to detect and analyze their activities, thereby increasing the risk of prolonged unauthorized access and potential data exfiltration.

Query · spl

| tstats `security_content_summariesonly`
  count min(_time) as firstTime
        max(_time) as lastTime

FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes WHERE
(
    Processes.parent_process= "*ping*"
    Processes.parent_process = *-n*
    Processes.parent_process IN (
        "*& *",
        "*&*",
        "*&C:*",
        "*>*",
        "*>*"
    )
)
OR
(
    (
        Processes.process_name= "ping.exe"
        OR
        Processes.original_file_name= "ping.exe"
    )
    Processes.process = *-n*
    Processes.process IN (
        "*& *",
        "*&*",
        "*&C:*",
        "*>*",
        "*>*"
    )
)

BY Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name
   Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec
   Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.parent_process_id
   Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path
   Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid
   Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level
   Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.user
   Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product

| `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `ping_sleep_batch_command_filter`

Implementation guide

The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the Processes node of the Endpoint data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.

Known false positives

  • Administrator or network operator may execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.

Analyst notes

Known false positives: Administrator or network operator may execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.

Raw source Ping Sleep Batch Command · SPL
Esc
Published by splunk/security_content ↗, licensed under Apache 2.0 ↗. Reproduced here unmodified.
name: Ping Sleep Batch Command
id: ce058d6c-79f2-11ec-b476-acde48001122
version: 16
creation_date: '2022-01-20'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
status: production
type: Anomaly
description: |-
    The following analytic identifies the execution of ping sleep batch commands.
    It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process and parent process command-line details.
    This activity is significant as it indicates an attempt to delay malicious code execution, potentially evading detection or sandbox analysis.
    If confirmed malicious, this technique allows attackers to bypass security measures, making it harder to detect and analyze their activities, thereby increasing the risk of prolonged unauthorized access and potential data exfiltration.
data_source:
    - Sysmon EventID 1
    - CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2
search: |-
    | tstats `security_content_summariesonly`
      count min(_time) as firstTime
            max(_time) as lastTime

    FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes WHERE
    (
        Processes.parent_process= "*ping*"
        Processes.parent_process = *-n*
        Processes.parent_process IN (
            "*& *",
            "*&*",
            "*&C:*",
            "*>*",
            "*>*"
        )
    )
    OR
    (
        (
            Processes.process_name= "ping.exe"
            OR
            Processes.original_file_name= "ping.exe"
        )
        Processes.process = *-n*
        Processes.process IN (
            "*& *",
            "*&*",
            "*&C:*",
            "*>*",
            "*>*"
        )
    )

    BY Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name
       Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec
       Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.parent_process_id
       Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path
       Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid
       Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level
       Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.user
       Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product

    | `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")`
    | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
    | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
    | `ping_sleep_batch_command_filter`
how_to_implement: The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint` data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.
known_false_positives: Administrator or network operator may execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.
references:
    - https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/
drilldown_searches:
    - name: View the detection results for - "$user$" and "$dest$"
      search: '%original_detection_search% | search  user = "$user$" dest = "$dest$"'
      earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
      latest_offset: $info_max_time$
    - name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$user$" and "$dest$"
      search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$user$", "$dest$") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
      earliest_offset: 7d
      latest_offset: "0"
intermediate_findings:
    entities:
        - field: user
          type: user
          score: 20
          message: suspicious $process$ commandline run on $dest$
        - field: dest
          type: system
          score: 20
          message: suspicious $process$ commandline run on $dest$
analytic_story:
    - Warzone RAT
    - Quasar RAT
    - Data Destruction
    - Meduza Stealer
    - WhisperGate
    - BlackByte Ransomware
    - Void Manticore
    - Gh0st RAT
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1497.003
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
    - name: True Positive Test
      attack_data:
        - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1497.003/ping_sleep/sysmon.log
          source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
          sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog
      test_type: unit

Detection rules belong to the projects that publish them and remain under their own licenses. This site indexes and links to them; it claims no rights in them.