Windows Command and Scripting Interpreter Hunting Path Traversal
Description
The following analytic identifies path traversal command-line executions, leveraging data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. It detects patterns in command-line arguments indicative of path traversal techniques, such as multiple instances of "/..", "\..", or "\\..". This activity is significant as it often indicates attempts to evade defenses by executing malicious code, such as through msdt.exe. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, potentially leading to system compromise, data exfiltration, or further lateral movement within the network.
Query · spl
| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where
Processes.process IN ("*\\..*", "*//..*", "*\..*", "*/..*")
by Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process
Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.parent_process_id
Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path Processes.process
Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id
Processes.process_integrity_level Processes.process_name Processes.process_path
Processes.user Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product
| `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| eval count_of_pattern1 = (mvcount(split(process,"/.."))-1)
| eval count_of_pattern2 = (mvcount(split(process,"\.."))-1)
| eval count_of_pattern3 = (mvcount(split(process,"\\.."))-1)
| eval count_of_pattern4 = (mvcount(split(process,"//.."))-1)
| search count_of_pattern1 > 1
OR
count_of_pattern2 > 1
OR
count_of_pattern3 > 1
OR
count_of_pattern4 > 1
| `windows_command_and_scripting_interpreter_hunting_path_traversal_filter`
Implementation guide
The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection
and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related
telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search,
you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process.
Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must
be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to
the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the Processes node of the Endpoint
data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field
names and speed up the data modeling process.
Known false positives
- False positives may vary depending on the score you want to check.
Analyst notes
Known false positives: False positives may vary depending on the score you want to check.