Windows Run Key Self Registration From User Writable Path


Description

The following analytic detects a binary located in a user-writable directory (C:\Users, C:\ProgramData or C:\PerfLogs) that registers itself for persistence by writing its own path into a CurrentVersion Run registry key. This activity is significant because malware delivered through ClickFix-style remote MSI installations (such as NodeJS based loaders or DeElevate64.exe) commonly drops its payload into the user profile and then adds itself to the Run key to survive reboots. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to maintain persistent access to the endpoint every time the user logs in.

Query · spl

`sysmon`
EventCode=13
registry_path = "*\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run*"
process_path IN ("*:\\Users\\*", "*:\\ProgramData\\*", "*:\\PerfLogs\\*")
NOT process_name IN (
        "Amazon WorkDocs Companion.exe",
        "Balto.exe",
        "GoToForTeams.exe",
        "IWDesktop.exe",
        "JTTray.exe",
        "Microsoft.SharePoint.exe",
        "OfficeAtHandForTeams.exe",
        "OneDrive.Sync.Service.exe",
        "opera.exe",
        "Print to Fax.exe",
        "QSHelper.exe",
        "RingCentralForTeams.exe",
        "UniKeyNT.exe"
    )

| where lower(process_path)=lower(replace(registry_value_data,"[\x22\x27]",""))

| stats count min(_time) as firstTime
              max(_time) as lastTime
  by dest user process_guid process_id process_name process_path
     registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data
     vendor_product

| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `windows_run_key_self_registration_from_user_writable_path_filter`

Implementation guide

This search requires Sysmon logs with a Sysmon configuration that includes EventID 13 (Registry value set) for the CurrentVersion Run keys. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 2.0 of the official Sysmon TA. This search uses an input macro named sysmon. We strongly recommend that you specify your environment-specific configurations (index, source, sourcetype, etc.) for Windows Sysmon logs. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk environment. The search also uses a post-filter macro designed to filter out known false positives. Update the process name exclusion list with software in your environment that legitimately registers itself in the Run key.

Known false positives

  • Per-user installed software (for example collaboration clients, browsers, VPN clients and updaters) commonly installs into the user profile and registers itself in the Run key. Such software will be returned by this analytic and should be added to the process name exclusion list after validation.

Analyst notes

Known false positives: Per-user installed software (for example collaboration clients, browsers, VPN clients and updaters) commonly installs into the user profile and registers itself in the Run key. Such software will be returned by this analytic and should be added to the process name exclusion list after validation.

Raw source Windows Run Key Self Registration From User Writable Path · SPL
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Published by splunk/security_content ↗, licensed under Apache 2.0 ↗. Reproduced here unmodified.
name: Windows Run Key Self Registration From User Writable Path
id: d45cc449-f293-4b09-9f7c-611a01e159f4
version: 1
creation_date: '2026-11-12'
modification_date: '2026-11-12'
author: Onur Mustafa Erdogan, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: |
    The following analytic detects a binary located in a user-writable directory
    (C:\Users, C:\ProgramData or C:\PerfLogs) that registers itself for persistence by
    writing its own path into a CurrentVersion Run registry key. This activity is significant
    because malware delivered through ClickFix-style remote MSI installations (such as
    NodeJS based loaders or DeElevate64.exe) commonly drops its payload into the user
    profile and then adds itself to the Run key to survive reboots. If confirmed malicious,
    this could allow an attacker to maintain persistent access to the endpoint every time
    the user logs in.
data_source:
    - Sysmon EventID 13
search: |
    `sysmon`
    EventCode=13
    registry_path = "*\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run*"
    process_path IN ("*:\\Users\\*", "*:\\ProgramData\\*", "*:\\PerfLogs\\*")
    NOT process_name IN (
            "Amazon WorkDocs Companion.exe",
            "Balto.exe",
            "GoToForTeams.exe",
            "IWDesktop.exe",
            "JTTray.exe",
            "Microsoft.SharePoint.exe",
            "OfficeAtHandForTeams.exe",
            "OneDrive.Sync.Service.exe",
            "opera.exe",
            "Print to Fax.exe",
            "QSHelper.exe",
            "RingCentralForTeams.exe",
            "UniKeyNT.exe"
        )

    | where lower(process_path)=lower(replace(registry_value_data,"[\x22\x27]",""))

    | stats count min(_time) as firstTime
                  max(_time) as lastTime
      by dest user process_guid process_id process_name process_path
         registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data
         vendor_product

    | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
    | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
    | `windows_run_key_self_registration_from_user_writable_path_filter`
how_to_implement: |
    This search requires Sysmon logs with a Sysmon configuration that includes EventID 13 (Registry value set) for the CurrentVersion Run keys.
    If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 2.0 of the official Sysmon TA.
    This search uses an input macro named `sysmon`. We strongly recommend that you specify your environment-specific configurations (index, source, sourcetype, etc.) for Windows Sysmon logs.
    Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk environment.
    The search also uses a post-filter macro designed to filter out known false positives.
    Update the process name exclusion list with software in your environment that legitimately registers itself in the Run key.
known_false_positives: |
    Per-user installed software (for example collaboration clients, browsers, VPN clients and updaters) commonly installs into the user profile and registers itself in the Run key.
    Such software will be returned by this analytic and should be added to the process name exclusion list after validation.
references:
    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/001/
    - https://www.huntress.com/blog/the-evolving-tradecraft-of-clickfix
drilldown_searches:
    - name: View the detection results for - "$dest$"
      search: '%original_detection_search% | search  dest = "$dest$"'
      earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
      latest_offset: $info_max_time$
    - name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$dest$"
      search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$dest$") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
      earliest_offset: 7d
      latest_offset: "0"
finding:
    title: '[$process_name$] on endpoint [$dest$] registered itself in the Run key [$registry_path$] for persistence.'
    entity:
        field: dest
        type: system
        score: 50
threat_objects:
    - field: process_path
      type: file_path
    - field: registry_value_name
      type: registry_value_name
analytic_story:
    - Windows Persistence Techniques
    - Fake CAPTCHA Campaigns
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1547.001
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
    - name: True Positive Test
      attack_data:
        - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.001/windows_self_persistence/windows_self_persistence.log
          source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
          sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog
      test_type: unit

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