Windows EventLog Recon Activity Using Log Query Utilities
Description
This analytic detects EventLog reconnaissance activity using utilities such as wevtutil.exe, wmic.exe, PowerShell cmdlets like Get-WinEvent, or WMI queries targeting Win32_NTLogEvent. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line arguments. These tools are often used by adversaries to extract usernames, IP addresses, session data, and event information for credential access or situational awareness during lateral movement. While these utilities are legitimate, execution with specific arguments or targeting sensitive logs like Security, PowerShell, or specific EventIDs (e.g., 4624, 4778) can indicate malicious intent. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow an attacker to extract sensitive info and potentially have leveraged access or move laterally.
Query · spl
| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process
min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
where (
(
(
Processes.process_name IN ("powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe", "powershell_ise.exe")
OR
Processes.original_file_name IN ("PowerShell.EXE", "pwsh.dll", "powershell_ise.EXE")
)
Processes.process IN ("*Get-WinEvent*", "*Get-EventLog*", "*EventLogQuery*", "*.ReadEvent(*")
)
OR
(
(
Processes.process_name = wevtutil.exe
OR
Processes.original_file_name = wevtutil.exe
)
Processes.process IN ("* qe *", "* query-events *")
)
OR
(
(
Processes.process_name = wmic.exe
OR
Processes.original_file_name = wmic.exe
)
Processes.process IN ("*ntevent*")
)
OR
(
Processes.process="*Win32_NTLogEvent*"
Processes.process="*EventCode*"
)
OR
(
Processes.process IN ("*PsLogList*", "*Eventquery*")
)
)
by
Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec
Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name
Processes.parent_process_path Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid
Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level Processes.process_name
Processes.process_path Processes.user Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `windows_eventlog_recon_activity_using_log_query_utilities_filter`
Implementation guide
The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection
and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related
telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search,
you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process.
Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must
be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to
the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the Processes node of the Endpoint
data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field
names and speed up the data modeling process.
Known false positives
- System administrators or monitoring tools may legitimately use these utilities to gather logs for troubleshooting or auditing. Filter known admin behavior or monitoring solutions as needed.
Analyst notes
Known false positives: System administrators or monitoring tools may legitimately use these utilities to gather logs for troubleshooting or auditing. Filter known admin behavior or monitoring solutions as needed.