Windows BITS Upload Activity


Description

This analytic detects explicit BITS upload configuration through BITSAdmin /Create or /Transfer with /Upload or /Upload-Reply, or PowerShell Start-BitsTransfer with -TransferType Upload or UploadReply. Adversaries can abuse BITS to send collected files to remote infrastructure.

Query · spl

| tstats `security_content_summariesonly`
  count min(_time) as firstTime
        max(_time) as lastTime

FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes WHERE

Processes.process="*upload*"
(
    `process_bitsadmin`
    OR
    (
        `process_powershell`
        Processes.process="*Start-BitsTransfer*"
    )
)

BY Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name
   Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid
   Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path
   Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid
   Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level
   Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.user
   Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product

| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`

| where
    (
        (
            lower(process_name)="bitsadmin.exe"
            OR
            lower(original_file_name)="bitsadmin.exe"
        )
        AND match(process, "(?i)(?:^|\s)/(?:create|transfer)\s")
        AND match(process, "(?i)(?:^|\s)/upload(?:-reply)?(?![\w-])")
    )
    OR
    (
        (
            lower(process_name) IN ("powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe", "powershell_ise.exe")
            OR
            lower(original_file_name) IN ("powershell.exe", "pwsh.dll", "powershell_ise.exe")
        )
        AND match(process, "(?i)\bStart-BitsTransfer\b")
        AND match(process, "(?i)-TransferType\\s+[\"\\x27]?Upload(?:Reply)?(?:[\"\\x27\\s;]|$)")
    )

| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `windows_bits_upload_activity_filter`

Implementation guide

The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the Processes node of the Endpoint data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.

Known false positives

  • Administrative support bundles, diagnostics, file publishing and authorized tests may explicitly upload files using BITS. Verify the job purpose and destination before tuning the filter macro. An upload command alone does not establish exfiltration.

Analyst notes

Known false positives: Administrative support bundles, diagnostics, file publishing and authorized tests may explicitly upload files using BITS. Verify the job purpose and destination before tuning the filter macro. An upload command alone does not establish exfiltration.

Raw source Windows BITS Upload Activity · SPL
Esc
Published by splunk/security_content ↗, licensed under Apache 2.0 ↗. Reproduced here unmodified.
name: Windows BITS Upload Activity
id: dd9f870b-a5c7-462e-bf0c-7022e818e9b5
version: 1
creation_date: '2026-11-10'
modification_date: '2026-11-10'
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali, Splunk
status: production
type: Anomaly
description: |-
    This analytic detects explicit BITS upload configuration through BITSAdmin /Create or /Transfer with /Upload or /Upload-Reply, or PowerShell Start-BitsTransfer with -TransferType Upload or UploadReply.
    Adversaries can abuse BITS to send collected files to remote infrastructure.
data_source:
    - Sysmon EventID 1
    - Windows Event Log Security 4688
    - CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2
search: |-
    | tstats `security_content_summariesonly`
      count min(_time) as firstTime
            max(_time) as lastTime

    FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes WHERE

    Processes.process="*upload*"
    (
        `process_bitsadmin`
        OR
        (
            `process_powershell`
            Processes.process="*Start-BitsTransfer*"
        )
    )

    BY Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name
       Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid
       Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path
       Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid
       Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level
       Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.user
       Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product

    | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`

    | where
        (
            (
                lower(process_name)="bitsadmin.exe"
                OR
                lower(original_file_name)="bitsadmin.exe"
            )
            AND match(process, "(?i)(?:^|\s)/(?:create|transfer)\s")
            AND match(process, "(?i)(?:^|\s)/upload(?:-reply)?(?![\w-])")
        )
        OR
        (
            (
                lower(process_name) IN ("powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe", "powershell_ise.exe")
                OR
                lower(original_file_name) IN ("powershell.exe", "pwsh.dll", "powershell_ise.exe")
            )
            AND match(process, "(?i)\bStart-BitsTransfer\b")
            AND match(process, "(?i)-TransferType\\s+[\"\\x27]?Upload(?:Reply)?(?:[\"\\x27\\s;]|$)")
        )

    | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
    | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
    | `windows_bits_upload_activity_filter`
how_to_implement: |-
    The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents.
    These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed.
    To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process.
    Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions.
    These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product.
    The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint` data model.
    Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.
known_false_positives: |-
    Administrative support bundles, diagnostics, file publishing and authorized tests may explicitly upload files
    using BITS. Verify the job purpose and destination before tuning the filter macro. An upload command alone
    does not establish exfiltration.
references:
    - https://securelist.com/chafer-used-remexi-malware/89538/
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/bitsadmin-create
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/bitsadmin-transfer
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/bitstransfer/start-bitstransfer
drilldown_searches:
    - name: View the detection results for - "$user$" and "$dest$"
      search: '%original_detection_search% | search  user = "$user$" dest = "$dest$"'
      earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
      latest_offset: $info_max_time$
    - name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$user$" and "$dest$"
      search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$user$", "$dest$") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
      earliest_offset: 7d
      latest_offset: "0"
intermediate_findings:
    entities:
        - field: dest
          type: system
          score: 20
          message: An instance of [$parent_process_name$] spawning [$process_name$] was identified on endpoint [$dest$] by user [$user$] attempting to configure a BITS upload with command line [$process$].
threat_objects:
    - field: parent_process_name
      type: parent_process_name
    - field: process_name
      type: process_name
analytic_story:
    - BITS Jobs
    - Living Off The Land
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1197
    - T1048
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
    - name: True Positive Test
      attack_data:
        - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1197/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
          source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
          sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog
      test_type: unit

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