Windows CMD Evasive Patterns Through Native Commands


Description

The following analytic detects cmd.exe being used to evade defenses with nothing but built-in commands, a pattern frequently seen in ClickFix-style social engineering and malware loader activity. Adversaries abuse native cmd.exe features such as call combined with variable assignment to assemble commands piece by piece, hiding the real payload from static inspection and string-based detections. They also chain native utilities such as timeout and del to erase the dropped executable shortly after it has run, which removes evidence and complicates forensic analysis. Because these techniques need no additional tooling, they let attackers blend into routine command shell activity. If confirmed malicious, this could indicate a staged loader concealing its intent or cleaning up after execution.

Query · spl

| tstats `security_content_summariesonly`
  count min(_time) as firstTime
        max(_time) as lastTime

FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes WHERE

(
    Processes.process_name=cmd.exe
    OR
    Processes.original_file_name=Cmd.Exe
)
Processes.process IN ("*call *", "*timeout *")
NOT Processes.user IN ("SYSTEM", "*\\SYSTEM")

by Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name
   Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid
   Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path
   Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid Processes.process_hash
   Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level Processes.process_name Processes.process_path
   Processes.user Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product

| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`

| eval process_lower=lower(process)

| eval call_set_obfuscation=if(
    like(process_lower, "%call %")
    AND match(process, "(?i)set\\s+[\\x22\\x27]?[\\w\\-\\_]+\\s?\\="), 1, 0)

| eval timeout_self_deletion=if(
    like(process_lower, "%timeout %")
    AND like(process_lower, "%del %")
    AND (like(process_lower, "% /f%") OR like(process_lower, "% /q%"))
    AND like(process_lower, "% exit%"), 1, 0)

| where call_set_obfuscation=1 OR timeout_self_deletion=1

| fields - process_lower

| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `windows_cmd_evasive_patterns_through_native_commands_filter`

Implementation guide

The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the Processes node of the Endpoint data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.

Known false positives

  • Legitimate batch scripts and installers may use call with variable assignment, or may delete themselves after a delay using timeout and del. Filter by parent process, user or script path as needed.

Analyst notes

Known false positives: Legitimate batch scripts and installers may use call with variable assignment, or may delete themselves after a delay using timeout and del. Filter by parent process, user or script path as needed.

Raw source Windows CMD Evasive Patterns Through Native Commands · SPL
Esc
Published by splunk/security_content ↗, licensed under Apache 2.0 ↗. Reproduced here unmodified.
name: Windows CMD Evasive Patterns Through Native Commands
id: e4202c26-f5d1-4c72-91f7-e551338be9a4
version: 1
creation_date: '2026-11-12'
modification_date: '2026-11-12'
author: Onur Mustafa Erdogan, Splunk
status: production
type: Anomaly
description: |
    The following analytic detects cmd.exe being used to evade defenses with nothing but built-in commands, a pattern frequently seen in ClickFix-style social engineering and malware loader activity.
    Adversaries abuse native cmd.exe features such as call combined with variable assignment to assemble commands piece by piece, hiding the real payload from static inspection and string-based detections.
    They also chain native utilities such as timeout and del to erase the dropped executable shortly after it has run, which removes evidence and complicates forensic analysis.
    Because these techniques need no additional tooling, they let attackers blend into routine command shell activity.
    If confirmed malicious, this could indicate a staged loader concealing its intent or cleaning up after execution.
data_source:
    - Sysmon EventID 1
    - Windows Event Log Security 4688
    - CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2
search: |
    | tstats `security_content_summariesonly`
      count min(_time) as firstTime
            max(_time) as lastTime

    FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes WHERE

    (
        Processes.process_name=cmd.exe
        OR
        Processes.original_file_name=Cmd.Exe
    )
    Processes.process IN ("*call *", "*timeout *")
    NOT Processes.user IN ("SYSTEM", "*\\SYSTEM")

    by Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name
       Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid
       Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path
       Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid Processes.process_hash
       Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level Processes.process_name Processes.process_path
       Processes.user Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product

    | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`

    | eval process_lower=lower(process)

    | eval call_set_obfuscation=if(
        like(process_lower, "%call %")
        AND match(process, "(?i)set\\s+[\\x22\\x27]?[\\w\\-\\_]+\\s?\\="), 1, 0)

    | eval timeout_self_deletion=if(
        like(process_lower, "%timeout %")
        AND like(process_lower, "%del %")
        AND (like(process_lower, "% /f%") OR like(process_lower, "% /q%"))
        AND like(process_lower, "% exit%"), 1, 0)

    | where call_set_obfuscation=1 OR timeout_self_deletion=1

    | fields - process_lower

    | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
    | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
    | `windows_cmd_evasive_patterns_through_native_commands_filter`
how_to_implement: |
    The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed.
    To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process.
    Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions.
    These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product.
    The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint` data model.
    Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field
    names and speed up the data modeling process.
known_false_positives: |
    Legitimate batch scripts and installers may use call with variable assignment, or may
    delete themselves after a delay using timeout and del. Filter by parent process, user or
    script path as needed.
references:
    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/010/
    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/004/
    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/003/
    - https://www.huntress.com/blog/clickfix-castleloader-backgroundfix
    - https://www.esentire.com/blog/amatera-stealer-4-0-2-beta-whats-new-in-this-variant
drilldown_searches:
    - name: View the detection results for - "$user$" and "$dest$"
      search: '%original_detection_search% | search  user = "$user$" dest = "$dest$"'
      earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
      latest_offset: $info_max_time$
    - name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$user$" and "$dest$"
      search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$user$", "$dest$") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
      earliest_offset: 7d
      latest_offset: "0"
intermediate_findings:
    entities:
        - field: dest
          type: system
          score: 30
          message: Evasive cmd.exe command line [$process$] was executed by [$parent_process_name$] on endpoint [$dest$] by user [$user$].
        - field: user
          type: user
          score: 30
          message: Evasive cmd.exe command line [$process$] was executed by [$parent_process_name$] on endpoint [$dest$] by user [$user$].
threat_objects:
    - field: process
      type: process
    - field: parent_process_name
      type: parent_process_name
analytic_story:
    - Fake CAPTCHA Campaigns
    - Deobfuscate-Decode Files or Information
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1027.010
    - T1070.004
    - T1059.003
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
    - name: True Positive Test
      attack_data:
        - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1027.010/windows_cmd_evasive_commands/windows_cmd_evasive_commands.log
          source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
          sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog
      test_type: unit

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