Windows CMD Evasive Patterns Through Native Commands
Description
The following analytic detects cmd.exe being used to evade defenses with nothing but built-in commands, a pattern frequently seen in ClickFix-style social engineering and malware loader activity. Adversaries abuse native cmd.exe features such as call combined with variable assignment to assemble commands piece by piece, hiding the real payload from static inspection and string-based detections. They also chain native utilities such as timeout and del to erase the dropped executable shortly after it has run, which removes evidence and complicates forensic analysis. Because these techniques need no additional tooling, they let attackers blend into routine command shell activity. If confirmed malicious, this could indicate a staged loader concealing its intent or cleaning up after execution.
Query · spl
| tstats `security_content_summariesonly`
count min(_time) as firstTime
max(_time) as lastTime
FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes WHERE
(
Processes.process_name=cmd.exe
OR
Processes.original_file_name=Cmd.Exe
)
Processes.process IN ("*call *", "*timeout *")
NOT Processes.user IN ("SYSTEM", "*\\SYSTEM")
by Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name
Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid
Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path
Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid Processes.process_hash
Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level Processes.process_name Processes.process_path
Processes.user Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| eval process_lower=lower(process)
| eval call_set_obfuscation=if(
like(process_lower, "%call %")
AND match(process, "(?i)set\\s+[\\x22\\x27]?[\\w\\-\\_]+\\s?\\="), 1, 0)
| eval timeout_self_deletion=if(
like(process_lower, "%timeout %")
AND like(process_lower, "%del %")
AND (like(process_lower, "% /f%") OR like(process_lower, "% /q%"))
AND like(process_lower, "% exit%"), 1, 0)
| where call_set_obfuscation=1 OR timeout_self_deletion=1
| fields - process_lower
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `windows_cmd_evasive_patterns_through_native_commands_filter`
Implementation guide
The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed.
To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process.
Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions.
These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product.
The logs must also be mapped to the Processes node of the Endpoint data model.
Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field
names and speed up the data modeling process.
Known false positives
- Legitimate batch scripts and installers may use call with variable assignment, or may delete themselves after a delay using timeout and del. Filter by parent process, user or script path as needed.
Analyst notes
Known false positives: Legitimate batch scripts and installers may use call with variable assignment, or may delete themselves after a delay using timeout and del. Filter by parent process, user or script path as needed.