Windows Alternate Data Stream Created Over Local Share


Description

The following analytic detects the creation of an NTFS alternate data stream (ADS) accessed over a local administrative share targeting the loopback address (127.0.0.1). It leverages Windows Security Event Logs with EventCode 5145 to identify this activity. Legitimate local processes access files directly rather than through a local SMB share. This behavior is a hallmark of the ShieldBreak exploit, which abuses a symbolic link swap through a loopback share to redirect a privileged, Defender-driven write into an alternate data stream on a system-owned file, ultimately landing attacker content in C:\Windows\System32. If confirmed malicious, this activity indicates an in-progress local privilege escalation attempt and should be investigated immediately.

Query · spl

`wineventlog_security`
EventCode=5145
IpAddress="127.0.0.1"
ObjectType="File"
| regex RelativeTargetName="(?i)\:\w+$"
| fillnull
| rename IpAddress as dest_ip
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime
              max(_time) as lastTime
  by dest dest_ip
     ShareName ShareLocalPath RelativeTargetName
     AccessMask src_user
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `windows_alternate_data_stream_created_over_local_share_filter`

Implementation guide

To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows Security Event Logs with EventCode 5145 enabled. The Windows TA is also required. Enable Object Access auditing (success/failure) for File Share in group policy so that RelativeTargetName and IpAddress are populated.

Known false positives

  • Backup, replication, or file-sync software may occasionally write alternate data streams over administrative shares. Loopback (127.0.0.1) access to a local share is rare for legitimate software, tune by ShareName or src_user as needed for your environment.

Analyst notes

Known false positives: Backup, replication, or file-sync software may occasionally write alternate data streams over administrative shares. Loopback (127.0.0.1) access to a local share is rare for legitimate software, tune by ShareName or src_user as needed for your environment.

Raw source Windows Alternate Data Stream Created Over Local Share · SPL
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Published by splunk/security_content ↗, licensed under Apache 2.0 ↗. Reproduced here unmodified.
name: Windows Alternate Data Stream Created Over Local Share
id: e974a5c9-cbe9-4b4a-8fba-b55e7dbc8259
version: 1
creation_date: '2026-08-19'
modification_date: '2026-08-19'
author: Onur Mustafa Erdogan, Splunk
status: production
type: Anomaly
description: |-
    The following analytic detects the creation of an NTFS alternate data stream (ADS) accessed over a local administrative share targeting the loopback address (127.0.0.1).
    It leverages Windows Security Event Logs with EventCode 5145 to identify this activity.
    Legitimate local processes access files directly rather than through a local SMB share.
    This behavior is a hallmark of the ShieldBreak exploit, which abuses a symbolic link swap through a loopback share to redirect a privileged, Defender-driven write into an alternate data stream on a system-owned file, ultimately landing attacker content in C:\Windows\System32.
    If confirmed malicious, this activity indicates an in-progress local privilege escalation attempt and should be investigated immediately.
data_source:
    - Windows Event Log Security 5145
search: |-
    `wineventlog_security`
    EventCode=5145
    IpAddress="127.0.0.1"
    ObjectType="File"
    | regex RelativeTargetName="(?i)\:\w+$"
    | fillnull
    | rename IpAddress as dest_ip
    | stats count min(_time) as firstTime
                  max(_time) as lastTime
      by dest dest_ip
         ShareName ShareLocalPath RelativeTargetName
         AccessMask src_user
    | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
    | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
    | `windows_alternate_data_stream_created_over_local_share_filter`
how_to_implement: |-
    To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows Security Event Logs with EventCode 5145 enabled.
    The Windows TA is also required.
    Enable Object Access auditing (success/failure) for File Share in group policy so that RelativeTargetName and IpAddress are populated.
known_false_positives: |-
    Backup, replication, or file-sync software may occasionally write alternate data streams over administrative shares.
    Loopback (127.0.0.1) access to a local share is rare for legitimate software, tune by ShareName or src_user as needed for your environment.
references:
    - https://www.cyderes.com/howler-cell/rogueplanet-windows-zero-day
    - https://www.threatlocker.com/blog/nightmareeclipse-releases-new-poc-shieldbreak-exploits-same-weakness-as-rogueplanet
drilldown_searches:
    - name: View the detection results for - "$dest$"
      search: '%original_detection_search% | search  dest = "$dest$"'
      earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
      latest_offset: $info_max_time$
    - name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$dest$"
      search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$dest$") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
      earliest_offset: 7d
      latest_offset: "0"
intermediate_findings:
    entities:
        - field: dest
          type: system
          score: 20
          message: An alternate data stream $RelativeTargetName$ was created over a loopback local share on $dest$
threat_objects:
    - field: dest
      type: system
    - field: RelativeTargetName
      type: file_path
    - field: src_user
      type: user
analytic_story:
    - RoguePlanet
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1564.004
    - T1021.002
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
    - name: True Positive Test
      attack_data:
        - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/emerging_threats/ShieldBreak/ads_over_local_share.log
          source: XmlWinEventLog:Security
          sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog
      test_type: unit

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