AWS IAM Assume Role Policy Brute Force


Description

The following analytic detects multiple failed attempts to assume an AWS IAM role, indicating a potential brute force attack. It leverages AWS CloudTrail logs to identify MalformedPolicyDocumentException errors with a status of failure and filters out legitimate AWS services. This activity is significant as repeated failures to assume roles can indicate an adversary attempting to guess role names, which is a precursor to unauthorized access. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access to AWS resources, potentially compromising sensitive data and services.

Query · spl

`cloudtrail` (errorCode=MalformedPolicyDocumentException) status=failure (userAgent!=*.amazonaws.com)
  | rename user_name as user
  | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(requestParameters.policyName) as policy_name
    BY src, user, vendor_account
       vendor_region, vendor_product, signature,
       dest, errorCode
  | where count >= 2
  | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
  | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
  | `aws_iam_assume_role_policy_brute_force_filter`

Implementation guide

The Splunk AWS Add-on and Splunk App for AWS is required to utilize this data. The search requires AWS CloudTrail logs. Set the where count greater than a value to identify suspicious activity in your environment.

Known false positives

  • This detection will require tuning to provide high fidelity detection capabilties. Tune based on src addresses (corporate offices, VPN terminations) or by groups of users.

Analyst notes

Known false positives: This detection will require tuning to provide high fidelity detection capabilties. Tune based on src addresses (corporate offices, VPN terminations) or by groups of users.

Raw source AWS IAM Assume Role Policy Brute Force · SPL
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Published by splunk/security_content ↗, licensed under Apache 2.0 ↗. Reproduced here unmodified.
name: AWS IAM Assume Role Policy Brute Force
id: f19e09b0-9308-11eb-b7ec-acde48001122
version: 10
creation_date: '2021-04-06'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Michael Haag, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: The following analytic detects multiple failed attempts to assume an AWS IAM role, indicating a potential brute force attack. It leverages AWS CloudTrail logs to identify `MalformedPolicyDocumentException` errors with a status of `failure` and filters out legitimate AWS services. This activity is significant as repeated failures to assume roles can indicate an adversary attempting to guess role names, which is a precursor to unauthorized access. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access to AWS resources, potentially compromising sensitive data and services.
data_source:
    - AWS CloudTrail
search: |-
    `cloudtrail` (errorCode=MalformedPolicyDocumentException) status=failure (userAgent!=*.amazonaws.com)
      | rename user_name as user
      | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(requestParameters.policyName) as policy_name
        BY src, user, vendor_account
           vendor_region, vendor_product, signature,
           dest, errorCode
      | where count >= 2
      | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
      | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
      | `aws_iam_assume_role_policy_brute_force_filter`
how_to_implement: The Splunk AWS Add-on and Splunk App for AWS is required to utilize this data. The search requires AWS CloudTrail logs. Set the `where count` greater than a value to identify suspicious activity in your environment.
known_false_positives: This detection will require tuning to provide high fidelity detection capabilties. Tune based on src addresses (corporate offices, VPN terminations) or by groups of users.
references:
    - https://www.praetorian.com/blog/aws-iam-assume-role-vulnerabilities/
    - https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/assume-worst-aws-assume-role-enumeration/
    - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/aws-iam-brute-force-of-assume-role-policy.html
drilldown_searches:
    - name: View the detection results for - "$user$"
      search: '%original_detection_search% | search  user = "$user$"'
      earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
      latest_offset: $info_max_time$
    - name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$user$"
      search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$user$") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
      earliest_offset: 7d
      latest_offset: "0"
finding:
    title: User $user$ has caused multiple failures with errorCode $errorCode$, which potentially means adversary is attempting to identify a role name.
    entity:
        field: user
        type: user
        score: 50
threat_objects:
    - field: src
      type: ip_address
analytic_story:
    - AWS IAM Privilege Escalation
asset_type: AWS Account
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1580
    - T1110
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: cloud
security_domain: access
tests:
    - name: True Positive Test
      attack_data:
        - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1580/aws_iam_assume_role_policy_brute_force/aws_iam_assume_role_policy_brute_force.json
          sourcetype: aws:cloudtrail
          source: aws_cloudtrail
      test_type: unit

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