Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases
Description
The following analytic detects registry activity related to the creation of application compatibility shims. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, specifically monitoring registry paths associated with AppCompatFlags. This activity is significant because attackers can use shims to bypass security controls, achieve persistence, or escalate privileges. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to maintain long-term access, execute arbitrary code, or manipulate application behavior, posing a severe risk to the integrity and security of the affected systems.
Query · spl
| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_path=*CurrentVersion\\AppCompatFlags\\Custom* OR Registry.registry_path=*CurrentVersion\\AppCompatFlags\\InstalledSDB*) by Registry.action Registry.dest Registry.process_guid Registry.process_id Registry.registry_hive Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_type Registry.status Registry.user Registry.vendor_product | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | where isnotnull(registry_value_data) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `registry_keys_for_creating_shim_databases_filter`
Implementation guide
To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the registry value name, registry path, and registry value data from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 2.0 of the official Sysmon TA. https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709
Known false positives
- There are many legitimate applications that leverage shim databases for compatibility purposes for legacy applications
Analyst notes
Known false positives: There are many legitimate applications that leverage shim databases for compatibility purposes for legacy applications