Azure AD Temporary Access Pass Created


Description

The following analytic detects the creation of a Temporary Access Pass (TAP) for an Azure AD user. It leverages Azure Active Directory AuditLogs to identify the "Create Temporary Access Pass method for user" operation. TAPs are time-limited passcodes that bypass all authentication requirements including MFA and FIDO2 - an attacker who creates a TAP for a compromised account can sign in from any location without any additional factor. If confirmed malicious, this activity provides an attacker with an unchallenged authentication path into the affected account.

Query · spl

`azure_monitor_aad`
category=AuditLogs
operationName="Create Temporary Access Pass method for user"
properties.result="success"

| rename properties.* as *
| rename initiatedBy.user.userPrincipalName as initiatedBy
| rename initiatedBy.app.displayName as initiatedByApp

| eval actor = coalesce(initiatedBy, initiatedByApp)

| rename targetResources{}.userPrincipalName as targetUser
| rename userAgent as user_agent

| fillnull

| stats count min(_time) as firstTime
              max(_time) as lastTime
  BY dest user src vendor_account vendor_product user_agent
     actor targetUser signature

| rename actor as user

| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `azure_ad_temporary_access_pass_created_filter`

Implementation guide

You must install the latest version of Splunk Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services from Splunkbase (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/3110/#/details). You must be ingesting Azure Active Directory events into your Splunk environment through an EventHub. This analytic was written to be used with the azure:monitor:aad sourcetype leveraging the AuditLogs log category.

Known false positives

  • IT administrators legitimately create TAPs for users who are locked out or onboarding a new passwordless authentication method. The key differentiators are the actor and timing -- a helpdesk account creating a TAP for a user who just reported a lockout is expected; an unfamiliar actor creating a TAP outside business hours or for a high-privilege account warrants investigation.

Analyst notes

Known false positives: IT administrators legitimately create TAPs for users who are locked out or onboarding a new passwordless authentication method. The key differentiators are the actor and timing -- a helpdesk account creating a TAP for a user who just reported a lockout is expected; an unfamiliar actor creating a TAP outside business hours or for a high-privilege account warrants investigation.

Raw source Azure AD Temporary Access Pass Created · SPL
Esc
Published by splunk/security_content ↗, licensed under Apache 2.0 ↗. Reproduced here unmodified.
name: Azure AD Temporary Access Pass Created
id: f820b423-7299-4bb6-9bf3-860bd475cddb
version: 1
creation_date: '2026-05-20'
modification_date: '2026-11-03'
author: descambiado
status: production
type: TTP
description: |
    The following analytic detects the creation of a Temporary Access Pass (TAP) for an Azure AD user.
    It leverages Azure Active Directory AuditLogs to identify the "Create Temporary Access Pass method for user" operation.
    TAPs are time-limited passcodes that bypass all authentication requirements including MFA and FIDO2 - an attacker who
    creates a TAP for a compromised account can sign in from any location without any additional factor.
    If confirmed malicious, this activity provides an attacker with an unchallenged authentication path into the affected account.
data_source:
    - Azure Active Directory
search: |-
    `azure_monitor_aad`
    category=AuditLogs
    operationName="Create Temporary Access Pass method for user"
    properties.result="success"

    | rename properties.* as *
    | rename initiatedBy.user.userPrincipalName as initiatedBy
    | rename initiatedBy.app.displayName as initiatedByApp

    | eval actor = coalesce(initiatedBy, initiatedByApp)

    | rename targetResources{}.userPrincipalName as targetUser
    | rename userAgent as user_agent

    | fillnull

    | stats count min(_time) as firstTime
                  max(_time) as lastTime
      BY dest user src vendor_account vendor_product user_agent
         actor targetUser signature

    | rename actor as user

    | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
    | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
    | `azure_ad_temporary_access_pass_created_filter`
how_to_implement: |
    You must install the latest version of Splunk Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services from Splunkbase
    (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/3110/#/details). You must be ingesting Azure Active Directory
    events into your Splunk environment through an EventHub. This analytic was written to be used with
    the azure:monitor:aad sourcetype leveraging the AuditLogs log category.
known_false_positives: |
    IT administrators legitimately create TAPs for users who are locked out or onboarding a new passwordless
    authentication method. The key differentiators are the actor and timing -- a helpdesk account creating
    a TAP for a user who just reported a lockout is expected; an unfamiliar actor creating a TAP outside
    business hours or for a high-privilege account warrants investigation.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/authentication/howto-authentication-temporary-access-pass
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/authentication/concept-authentication-methods
    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/006/
    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/004/
drilldown_searches:
    - name: View the detection results for - "$targetUser$"
      search: '%original_detection_search% | search  targetUser = "$targetUser$"'
      earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
      latest_offset: $info_max_time$
    - name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$user$"
      search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$user$") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
      earliest_offset: 7d
      latest_offset: "0"
finding:
    title: User [$user$] has created Temporary Access Pass for [$targetUser$] from [$src$]
    entity:
        field: user
        type: user
        score: 50
intermediate_findings:
    entities:
        - field: targetUser
          type: user
          score: 50
          message: User [$user$] has created Temporary Access Pass for [$targetUser$] from [$src$]
analytic_story:
    - Azure Active Directory Persistence
    - Azure Active Directory Account Takeover
asset_type: Azure Active Directory
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1556.006
    - T1078.004
    - T1586.003
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: cloud
security_domain: identity
tests:
    - name: True Positive Test
      attack_data:
        - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1556.006/azure_ad_temporary_access_pass/azure-audit.log
          source: Azure AD
          sourcetype: azure:monitor:aad
      test_type: unit

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