Azure AD Temporary Access Pass Created
Description
The following analytic detects the creation of a Temporary Access Pass (TAP) for an Azure AD user. It leverages Azure Active Directory AuditLogs to identify the "Create Temporary Access Pass method for user" operation. TAPs are time-limited passcodes that bypass all authentication requirements including MFA and FIDO2 - an attacker who creates a TAP for a compromised account can sign in from any location without any additional factor. If confirmed malicious, this activity provides an attacker with an unchallenged authentication path into the affected account.
Query · spl
`azure_monitor_aad`
category=AuditLogs
operationName="Create Temporary Access Pass method for user"
properties.result="success"
| rename properties.* as *
| rename initiatedBy.user.userPrincipalName as initiatedBy
| rename initiatedBy.app.displayName as initiatedByApp
| eval actor = coalesce(initiatedBy, initiatedByApp)
| rename targetResources{}.userPrincipalName as targetUser
| rename userAgent as user_agent
| fillnull
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime
max(_time) as lastTime
BY dest user src vendor_account vendor_product user_agent
actor targetUser signature
| rename actor as user
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `azure_ad_temporary_access_pass_created_filter`
Implementation guide
You must install the latest version of Splunk Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services from Splunkbase (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/3110/#/details). You must be ingesting Azure Active Directory events into your Splunk environment through an EventHub. This analytic was written to be used with the azure:monitor:aad sourcetype leveraging the AuditLogs log category.
Known false positives
- IT administrators legitimately create TAPs for users who are locked out or onboarding a new passwordless authentication method. The key differentiators are the actor and timing -- a helpdesk account creating a TAP for a user who just reported a lockout is expected; an unfamiliar actor creating a TAP outside business hours or for a high-privilege account warrants investigation.
Analyst notes
Known false positives: IT administrators legitimately create TAPs for users who are locked out or onboarding a new passwordless authentication method. The key differentiators are the actor and timing -- a helpdesk account creating a TAP for a user who just reported a lockout is expected; an unfamiliar actor creating a TAP outside business hours or for a high-privilege account warrants investigation.