Windows Eventlog Cleared Via Wevtutil


Description

The following analytic detects the usage of wevtutil.exe with the "clear-log" parameter in order to clear the contents of logs. Clearing the event logs can be an attempt to cover tracks after malicious actions, hindering forensic investigations.

Query · spl

| tstats `security_content_summariesonly`
  count values(Processes.process) as process
        min(_time) as firstTime
        max(_time) as lastTime

FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes WHERE

Processes.process_name=wevtutil.exe
Processes.process IN ("* cl *", "*clear-log*")

```
We exclude the following strings to avoid detection overlap and double coverage since they are already covered by the "Suspicious wevtutil Usage" detection.
```
NOT Processes.process IN (
    "*/Trace*",
    "*AMSI/Debug*",
    "*Application*",
    "*CiscoSecureEndpoint*",
    "*Microsoft-Windows-BitLocker*",
    "*Microsoft-Windows-Bits*",
    "*Microsoft-Windows-CAPI2*",
    "*Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-File*",
    "*Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-Process*",
    "*Microsoft-Windows-LDAP*",
    "*Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell*",
    "*Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon*",
    "*Microsoft-Windows-TerminalServices-LocalSessionManager*",
    "*Microsoft-Windows-TerminalServices-RemoteConnectionManager*",
    "*Microsoft-Windows-WMI-Activity*",
    "*OpenSSH/*",
    "*PowerShellCore/*",
    "*Security*",
    "*Setup*",
    "*System*",
    "*Windows Firewall With Advanced Security*",
    "*Windows PowerShell*"
)

BY Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name
   Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid
   Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path
   Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid
   Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level
   Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.user
   Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product

| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `windows_eventlog_cleared_via_wevtutil_filter`

Implementation guide

The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the Processes node of the Endpoint data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.

Known false positives

  • The wevtutil.exe application is a legitimate Windows event log utility. Administrators may use it to manage Windows event logs.

Analyst notes

Known false positives: The wevtutil.exe application is a legitimate Windows event log utility. Administrators may use it to manage Windows event logs.

Raw source Windows Eventlog Cleared Via Wevtutil · SPL
Esc
Published by splunk/security_content ↗, licensed under Apache 2.0 ↗. Reproduced here unmodified.
name: Windows Eventlog Cleared Via Wevtutil
id: fdb829a8-db84-4832-b64b-3e964cd44f01
version: 8
creation_date: '2019-10-16'
modification_date: '2026-10-02'
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali, Splunk
status: production
type: Anomaly
description: |
    The following analytic detects the usage of wevtutil.exe with the "clear-log" parameter in order to clear the contents of logs.
    Clearing the event logs can be an attempt to cover tracks after malicious actions, hindering forensic investigations.
data_source:
    - Sysmon EventID 1
    - Windows Event Log Security 4688
    - CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2
search: |-
    | tstats `security_content_summariesonly`
      count values(Processes.process) as process
            min(_time) as firstTime
            max(_time) as lastTime

    FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes WHERE

    Processes.process_name=wevtutil.exe
    Processes.process IN ("* cl *", "*clear-log*")

    ```
    We exclude the following strings to avoid detection overlap and double coverage since they are already covered by the "Suspicious wevtutil Usage" detection.
    ```
    NOT Processes.process IN (
        "*/Trace*",
        "*AMSI/Debug*",
        "*Application*",
        "*CiscoSecureEndpoint*",
        "*Microsoft-Windows-BitLocker*",
        "*Microsoft-Windows-Bits*",
        "*Microsoft-Windows-CAPI2*",
        "*Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-File*",
        "*Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-Process*",
        "*Microsoft-Windows-LDAP*",
        "*Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell*",
        "*Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon*",
        "*Microsoft-Windows-TerminalServices-LocalSessionManager*",
        "*Microsoft-Windows-TerminalServices-RemoteConnectionManager*",
        "*Microsoft-Windows-WMI-Activity*",
        "*OpenSSH/*",
        "*PowerShellCore/*",
        "*Security*",
        "*Setup*",
        "*System*",
        "*Windows Firewall With Advanced Security*",
        "*Windows PowerShell*"
    )

    BY Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name
       Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid
       Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path
       Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid
       Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level
       Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.user
       Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product

    | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
    | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
    | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
    | `windows_eventlog_cleared_via_wevtutil_filter`
how_to_implement: The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint` data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.
known_false_positives: The wevtutil.exe application is a legitimate Windows event log utility. Administrators may use it to manage Windows event logs.
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1070.001/T1070.001.md
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/61080b19460f2c6431c31689d58063c5f6c1f8fb/atomics/T1070.001/T1070.001.yaml#L5
drilldown_searches:
    - name: View the detection results for - "$dest$" and "$user$"
      search: '%original_detection_search% | search  dest = "$dest$" user = "$user$"'
      earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
      latest_offset: $info_max_time$
    - name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$dest$" and "$user$"
      search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$dest$", "$user$") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
      earliest_offset: 7d
      latest_offset: "0"
intermediate_findings:
    entities:
        - field: dest
          type: system
          score: 20
          message: The EventLog was cleared using the [$process_name$] utility with the Command Line [$process$] on [$dest$] by [$user$].
threat_objects:
    - field: process
      type: process
analytic_story:
    - Windows Log Manipulation
    - Ransomware
    - Rhysida Ransomware
    - Clop Ransomware
    - CISA AA23-347A
    - ShrinkLocker
asset_type: Endpoint
atomic_guid:
    - e6abb60e-26b8-41da-8aae-0c35174b0967
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1685.005
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
    - name: True Positive Test
      attack_data:
        - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1070.001/windows_pwh_log_cleared/wevtutil_clear_log.log
          source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
          sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog
      test_type: unit

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