Linux Usermod Root UID Set


Description

The following analytic detects the use of usermod to set a user's UID to 0. This functionally sets the user as a root user with full permissions. This approach can be used to bypass regular privilege escalation mechanisms, giving the attacker full control over the system while appearing as a regular user in most monitoring tools.

Query · spl

| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
WHERE Processes.process_name="usermod"
  AND (Processes.process IN ("* -u 0 *", "* -u 0") OR Processes.process="*--uid 0*")
BY Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name
   Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid
   Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path
   Processes.process Processes.process_current_directory Processes.process_exec
   Processes.process_guid Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id
   Processes.process_integrity_level Processes.process_name Processes.process_path
   Processes.user Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `linux_usermod_root_uid_set_filter`

Implementation guide

The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the Processes node of the Endpoint data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.

Known false positives

  • Setting a user's UID to 0 is extremely rare in legitimate administration — there is almost no valid operational reason to create a second root-equivalent account this way. False positives are expected to be very low. Verify any alert against change management records before dismissing.

Analyst notes

Known false positives: Setting a user's UID to 0 is extremely rare in legitimate administration — there is almost no valid operational reason to create a second root-equivalent account this way. False positives are expected to be very low. Verify any alert against change management records before dismissing.

Raw source Linux Usermod Root UID Set · SPL
Esc
Published by splunk/security_content ↗, licensed under Apache 2.0 ↗. Reproduced here unmodified.
name: Linux Usermod Root UID Set
id: fe143ad6-ef29-4571-be14-0cd08a32ff34
version: 1
creation_date: '2026-07-08'
modification_date: '2026-07-08'
author: Raven Tait, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: The following analytic detects the use of usermod to set a user's UID to 0. This functionally sets the user as a root user with full permissions. This approach can be used to bypass regular privilege escalation mechanisms, giving the attacker full control over the system while appearing as a regular user in most monitoring tools.
data_source:
    - Sysmon for Linux EventID 1
search: |-
    | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
    as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    WHERE Processes.process_name="usermod"
      AND (Processes.process IN ("* -u 0 *", "* -u 0") OR Processes.process="*--uid 0*")
    BY Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name
       Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid
       Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path
       Processes.process Processes.process_current_directory Processes.process_exec
       Processes.process_guid Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id
       Processes.process_integrity_level Processes.process_name Processes.process_path
       Processes.user Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product
    | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
    | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
    | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
    | `linux_usermod_root_uid_set_filter`
how_to_implement: The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint` data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.
known_false_positives: Setting a user's UID to 0 is extremely rare in legitimate administration — there is almost no valid operational reason to create a second root-equivalent account this way. False positives are expected to be very low. Verify any alert against change management records before dismissing.
references:
    - https://github.com/Aegrah/PANIX
drilldown_searches:
    - earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
      latest_offset: $info_max_time$
      name: View the detection results for - "$user$" and "$dest$"
      search: '%original_detection_search% | search  user = "$user$" dest = "$dest$"'
    - name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$user$" and "$dest$"
      search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$user$", "$dest$") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
      earliest_offset: 7d
      latest_offset: '0'
finding:
    title: Linux Usermod Root UID Set identified on $dest$ by $user$ via $process_name$
    entity:
        field: user
        type: user
        score: 50
intermediate_findings:
    entities:
        - field: dest
          type: system
          score: 50
          message: Potential Usermod Root UID Set by $user$ on $dest$ via $process_name$.
threat_objects:
    - field: parent_process_name
      type: parent_process_name
    - field: process_name
      type: process_name
analytic_story:
    - Linux Privilege Escalation
    - Linux Post-Exploitation
    - Linux Persistence Techniques
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1098
    - T1078
    - T1548.001
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
    - name: True Positive Test
      test_type: unit
      attack_data:
        - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1098/linux_usermod_root_uid_set/snapattack_linux.log
          source: Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational
          sourcetype: sysmon:linux

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