Detect Remote Access Software Usage Process

Description

The following analytic detects the execution of known remote access software within the environment. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and parent processes mapped to the Endpoint data model. We then compare with with a list of known remote access software shipped as a lookup file - remote_access_software.

Query · spl

| tstats `security_content_summariesonly`
  count min(_time) as firstTime
        max(_time) as lastTime
        values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process

FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes WHERE

[
  | inputlookup remote_access_software
  | search file_name!=""
  | rename file_name as Processes.process_name
  | table Processes.process_name
]

Processes.dest!="unknown"
Processes.user!="unknown"

BY Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec
   Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path
   Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id
   Processes.process_integrity_level Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.user Processes.user_id
   Processes.vendor_product

| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`

| lookup local=t remote_access_software file_name AS process_name OUTPUT app as signature, category, reference, description

| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`

| `remote_access_software_usage_exceptions`

| `detect_remote_access_software_usage_process_filter`

Implementation guide

The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the Processes node of the Endpoint data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process. The "exceptions" macro leverages both an Assets and Identities lookup, as well as a KVStore collection called "remote_software_exceptions" that lets you track and maintain device- based exceptions for this set of detections.

Known false positives

  • It is possible that legitimate remote access software is used within the environment. Ensure that the lookup is reviewed and updated with any additional remote access software that is used within the environment. Known false positives can be added to the remote_access_software_usage_exception.csv lookup to globally suppress these situations across all remote access content

Analyst notes

Known false positives: It is possible that legitimate remote access software is used within the environment. Ensure that the lookup is reviewed and updated with any additional remote access software that is used within the environment. Known false positives can be added to the remote_access_software_usage_exception.csv lookup to globally suppress these situations across all remote access content

Raw source Detect Remote Access Software Usage Process · SPL
Esc
Published by splunk/security_content ↗, licensed under Apache 2.0 ↗. Reproduced here unmodified. 
name: Detect Remote Access Software Usage Process
id: ffd5e001-2e34-48f4-97a2-26dc4bb08178
version: 19
creation_date: '2024-03-06'
modification_date: '2026-10-19'
author: Steven Dick, Sebastian Wurl, Onur Mustafa Erdogan, Splunk
status: production
type: Anomaly
description: |-
    The following analytic detects the execution of known remote access software within the environment.
    It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and parent processes mapped to the Endpoint data model. We then compare with with a list of known remote access software shipped as a lookup file - remote_access_software.
data_source:
    - Sysmon EventID 1
    - Windows Event Log Security 4688
    - CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2
search: |
    | tstats `security_content_summariesonly`
      count min(_time) as firstTime
            max(_time) as lastTime
            values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process

    FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes WHERE

    [
      | inputlookup remote_access_software
      | search file_name!=""
      | rename file_name as Processes.process_name
      | table Processes.process_name
    ]

    Processes.dest!="unknown"
    Processes.user!="unknown"

    BY Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec
       Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path
       Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id
       Processes.process_integrity_level Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.user Processes.user_id
       Processes.vendor_product

    | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`

    | lookup local=t remote_access_software file_name AS process_name OUTPUT app as signature, category, reference, description

    | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
    | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`

    | `remote_access_software_usage_exceptions`

    | `detect_remote_access_software_usage_process_filter`
how_to_implement: |-
    The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related
    telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name,
    and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology
    Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint` data model. Use the Splunk Common
    Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process. The "exceptions" macro leverages both an Assets and Identities
    lookup, as well as a KVStore collection called "remote_software_exceptions" that lets you track and maintain device- based exceptions for this set of detections.
known_false_positives: |-
    It is possible that legitimate remote access software is used within the environment. Ensure that the lookup is reviewed and updated with any additional
    remote access software that is used within the environment. Known false positives can be added to the remote_access_software_usage_exception.csv lookup
    to globally suppress these situations across all remote access content
references:
    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1219/
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2022/08/08/bumblebee-roasts-its-way-to-domain-admin/
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2022/11/28/emotet-strikes-again-lnk-file-leads-to-domain-wide-ransomware/
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/388942adbd9641f4dfdcf079d7efe9a75ec0ac43/atomics/T1219/T1219.yaml#L5
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/388942adbd9641f4dfdcf079d7efe9a75ec0ac43/atomics/T1219/T1219.yaml#L95
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/388942adbd9641f4dfdcf079d7efe9a75ec0ac43/atomics/T1219/T1219.yaml#L222
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/388942adbd9641f4dfdcf079d7efe9a75ec0ac43/atomics/T1219/T1219.yaml#L250
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/388942adbd9641f4dfdcf079d7efe9a75ec0ac43/atomics/T1219/T1219.yaml#L287
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/388942adbd9641f4dfdcf079d7efe9a75ec0ac43/atomics/T1219/T1219.yaml#L314
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/388942adbd9641f4dfdcf079d7efe9a75ec0ac43/atomics/T1219/T1219.yaml#L342
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/388942adbd9641f4dfdcf079d7efe9a75ec0ac43/atomics/T1219/T1219.yaml#L371
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/388942adbd9641f4dfdcf079d7efe9a75ec0ac43/atomics/T1219/T1219.yaml#L452
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/388942adbd9641f4dfdcf079d7efe9a75ec0ac43/atomics/T1219/T1219.yaml#L483
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/388942adbd9641f4dfdcf079d7efe9a75ec0ac43/atomics/T1219/T1219.yaml#L509
drilldown_searches:
    - name: View the detection results for - "$dest$" and "$user$"
      search: '%original_detection_search% | search  dest = "$dest$" user = "$user$"'
      earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
      latest_offset: $info_max_time$
    - name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$dest$" and "$user$"
      search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$dest$", "$user$") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
      earliest_offset: 7d
      latest_offset: "0"
    - name: Investigate processes on $dest$
      search: '| from datamodel:Endpoint.Processes| search dest=$dest$ process_name=$process_name$'
      earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
      latest_offset: $info_max_time$
intermediate_findings:
    entities:
        - field: dest
          type: system
          score: 20
          message: A process [$process_name$] for a known remote access software [$signature$] was identified on [$dest$] by [$user$].
        - field: user
          type: user
          score: 20
          message: A process [$process_name$] for a known remote access software [$signature$] was identified on [$dest$] by [$user$].
threat_objects:
    - field: process_name
      type: process_name
    - field: signature
      type: signature
analytic_story:
    - Insider Threat
    - Command And Control
    - Ransomware
    - Gozi Malware
    - CISA AA24-241A
    - Remote Monitoring and Management Software
    - Cactus Ransomware
    - Seashell Blizzard
    - Scattered Spider
    - Interlock Ransomware
    - GhostRedirector IIS Module and Rungan Backdoor
    - Scattered Lapsus$ Hunters
    - Storm-0501 Ransomware
asset_type: Endpoint
atomic_guid:
    - 8ca3b96d-8983-4a7f-b125-fc98cc0a2aa0
    - d03683ec-aae0-42f9-9b4c-534780e0f8e1
    - 0ae9e327-3251-465a-a53b-485d4e3f58fa
    - fbff3f1f-b0bf-448e-840f-7e1687affdce
    - ecca999b-e0c8-40e8-8416-ad320b146a75
    - 19acf63b-55c4-4b6a-8552-00a8865105c8
    - 42e51815-a6cc-4c75-b970-3f0ff54b610e
    - b1b8128b-c5d4-4de9-bf70-e60419274562
    - b025c580-029e-4023-888d-a42710d76934
    - 3e1858ee-3550-401c-86ec-5e70ed79295b
    - 1aea6d15-70f1-4b4e-8b02-397b5d5ffe75
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1219
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
    - name: True Positive Test
      attack_data:
        - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1219/screenconnect/screenconnect_sysmon.log
          source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
          sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog
        - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1219/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
          source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
          sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog
      description: PORTED MANUAL TEST - This detection uses A&I lookups from Enterprise Security.
      test_type: experimental

Detection rules belong to the projects that publish them and remain under their own licenses. This site indexes and links to them; it claims no rights in them.