Source overview
SigmaHQ/sigma
Canonical Sigma rule repository — platform-agnostic detections that convert to 40+ SIEMs.
sigmahq-sigma
· Sigma
· upstream repo ↗
· Detection Rule License 1.1
How detections work here
A Sigma rule does not execute. It is a backend-agnostic description of a detection, compiled to a target query language — Splunk SPL, Elasticsearch, Sentinel KQL, and a few dozen others — by a converter before it runs anywhere.
That indirection is the whole point and the whole risk. The rule you read here is not the query that will run in your SIEM; the query depends on the backend and on the field mapping you give it. Two organizations deploying the same rule can end up with materially different searches.
How rules are written
YAML, with a stable shape:
title: DNS Query To Ufile.io
status: test
description: Detects DNS queries to "ufile.io" ...
tags:
- attack.exfiltration
- attack.t1567.002
logsource:
product: windows
category: dns_query
detection:
selection:
QueryName|contains: 'ufile.io'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- DNS queries for "ufile" are not malicious by nature ...
level: low
logsource— product, category and/or service. This declares what telemetry the rule assumes, and it is where most deployment failure lives: a rule is only as deployable as your ability to map its logsource onto your own data.detection— one or more named selections, plus aconditioncombining them withand/or/not,all of,1 of. Field modifiers (|contains,|startswith,|re) do the matching work.levelandstatusare declared explicitly rather than inferred, which is unusual across this index and makes Sigma one of the few sources where the status distribution on this page means something.
What fires an alert
Whatever the compiled query matches in your backend. Sigma itself defines no threshold, no window and no aggregation beyond what the condition expresses.
falsepositives is a first-class field, and it is worth reading before
deployment — the authors usually name the benign software that will trip the
rule.
Reading a rule on this site
The rule's detection block is shown as its logic and falsepositives as
tuning notes. ATT&CK comes from tags in attack.t1567.002 form, normalized to
the technique IDs used across this site.
The index covers rules/ (3,132), rules-emerging-threats/ (457),
rules-threat-hunting/ (139), rules-placeholder/ (17) and
rules-compliance/ (3). Upstream's deprecated/ and unsupported/
directories are deliberately not ingested, so unlike some sources here, nothing
in this ruleset is retired content.
Gotchas
- A Sigma rule is not portable for free. It looks universally applicable because it names no product, but converting it still needs a field mapping for your backend. "Supported by Sigma" is not "works in your SIEM".
- Rules under
rules-placeholder/contain values you are expected to replace with environment-specific ones. They will not work as shipped — that is by design, not a defect. status: testis by far the most common value here, notstable. It reflects SigmaHQ's review process rather than a judgment that the rule is unreliable.
Severity
- Critical 168
- High 1689
- Medium 1496
- Low 339
- Informational 28
Status
- Test 3295
- Experimental 325
- Stable 100
Platforms
windows 2839 Linux 246 azure 131 macos 75 aws 58 gcp 26 okta 24 opencanary 24 +22 more
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