Cross-source coverage

T1011.001 / ATT&CK

Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium: Exfiltration Over Bluetooth

1 rule across 1 source.

From MITRE ATT&CK 19.2

Adversaries may attempt to exfiltrate data over Bluetooth rather than the command and control channel. If the command and control network is a wired Internet connection, an adversary may opt to exfiltrate data using a Bluetooth communication channel.

Adversaries may choose to do this if they have sufficient access and proximity. Bluetooth connections might not be secured or defended as well as the primary Internet-connected channel because it is not routed through the same enterprise network.

Tactics
Exfiltration
Platforms
Linux · macOS · Windows
Telemetry
WinEventLog:SystemWinEventLog:Sysmonauditd:SYSCALLlinux:sysloglinux:osquerymacos:unifiedlogmacos:osquery

How MITRE says to detect it DET0554

Detection of Bluetooth-Based Data Exfiltration

Windows Analytic 1531

Detection of non-interactive or suspicious processes accessing Bluetooth interfaces and transmitting outbound traffic following file access or staging activity.

  • WinEventLog:System EventCode=8001
  • WinEventLog:Sysmon EventCode=11
  • WinEventLog:Sysmon EventCode=1

Linux Analytic 1532

Use of hcitool, bluetoothctl, or rfcomm to initialize Bluetooth connection paired with recent file reads by the same user or session.

  • auditd:SYSCALL None
  • linux:syslog None
  • linux:osquery None

macOS Analytic 1533

Observation of `blueutil`/`networksetup` commands or low-level APIs toggling Bluetooth or initiating transfers, especially if paired with recent large file read activity by non-GUI processes.

  • macos:unifiedlog None
  • macos:osquery None
  • macos:osquery None

View on attack.mitre.org ↗

elastic/detection-rules

1 rule
Detection Severity Format
Spike in Bytes Sent to an External Device via Airdrop Low Elastic TOML

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