Cross-source coverage

T1036.007 / ATT&CK

Masquerading: Double File Extension

6 rules across 3 sources.

From MITRE ATT&CK 19.2

Adversaries may abuse a double extension in the filename as a means of masquerading the true file type. A file name may include a secondary file type extension that may cause only the first extension to be displayed (ex: File.txt.exe may render in some views as just File.txt). However, the second extension is the true file type that determines how the file is opened and executed. The real file extension may be hidden by the operating system in the file browser (ex: explorer.exe), as well as in any software configured using or similar to the system’s policies.

Adversaries may abuse double extensions to attempt to conceal dangerous file types of payloads. A very common usage involves tricking a user into opening what they think is a benign file type but is actually executable code. Such files often pose as email attachments and allow an adversary to gain Initial Access into a user’s system via Spearphishing Attachment then User Execution. For example, an executable file attachment named Evil.txt.exe may display as Evil.txt to a user. The user may then view it as a benign text file and open it, inadvertently executing the hidden malware.

Common file types, such as text files (.txt,.doc, etc.) and image files (.jpg,.gif, etc.) are typically used as the first extension to appear benign. Executable extensions commonly regarded as dangerous, such as.exe,.lnk,.hta, and.scr, often appear as the second extension and true file type.

Tactics
Stealth
Platforms
Windows
Telemetry
WinEventLog:Sysmon

How MITRE says to detect it DET0366

Detection Strategy for Double File Extension Masquerading

Windows Analytic 1033

Detects adversary behavior where a file with a benign-looking first extension (e.g.,.txt,.jpg) ends with a dangerous second extension (e.g.,.exe,.scr), and is subsequently executed. The behavior chain includes file creation with misleading naming and user or system-initiated process execution from the disguised file.

  • WinEventLog:Sysmon EventCode=1
  • WinEventLog:Sysmon EventCode=11

SigmaHQ/sigma

3 rules
Detection Severity Format
Suspicious Double Extension Files High Sigma
Suspicious Parent Double Extension File Execution High Sigma
Suspicious LNK Double Extension File Created Medium Sigma

elastic/protections-artifacts

2 rules
Detection Severity Format
Evasion via File Name Masquerading Undefined Elastic TOML
Process Execution with Unusual File Extension Undefined Elastic TOML

elastic/detection-rules

1 rule
Detection Severity Format
Executable File Creation with Multiple Extensions Medium Elastic TOML

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