Cross-source coverage
T1055.012 / ATT&CK
Process Injection: Process Hollowing
12 rules across 5 sources.
From MITRE ATT&CK 19.2
Adversaries may inject malicious code into suspended and hollowed processes in order to evade process-based defenses. Process hollowing is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process.
Process hollowing is commonly performed by creating a process in a suspended state then unmapping/hollowing its memory, which can then be replaced with malicious code. A victim process can be created with native Windows API calls such as CreateProcess, which includes a flag to suspend the processes primary thread. At this point the process can be unmapped using APIs calls such as ZwUnmapViewOfSection or NtUnmapViewOfSection before being written to, realigned to the injected code, and resumed via VirtualAllocEx, WriteProcessMemory, SetThreadContext, then ResumeThread respectively.
This is very similar to Thread Local Storage but creates a new process rather than targeting an existing process. This behavior will likely not result in elevated privileges since the injected process was spawned from (and thus inherits the security context) of the injecting process. However, execution via process hollowing may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.
- Tactics
- Stealth · Privilege Escalation
- Platforms
- Windows
- Telemetry
-
WinEventLog:Sysmonetw:Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-Process
How MITRE says to detect it DET0382
Detection Strategy for Process Hollowing on Windows
Windows Analytic 1076
Detects adversary use of suspended process creation, using the CREATE_SUSPENDED flag via CreateProcess, followed by unmapping the memory of the child process (NtUnmapViewOfSection) and replacing it with malicious code via VirtualAllocEx/WriteProcessMemory, then SetThreadContext and ResumeThread to begin execution within the hollowed process.
WinEventLog:SysmonEventCode=1WinEventLog:SysmonEventCode=10WinEventLog:SysmonEventCode=8etw:Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-ProcessNtUnmapViewOfSection, VirtualAllocEx, WriteProcessMemory, SetThreadContext, ResumeThread
SigmaHQ/sigma
5 rules| Detection | Severity | Format |
|---|---|---|
| HackTool - CACTUSTORCH Remote Thread Creation | High | Sigma |
| HackTool - HollowReaper Execution | High | Sigma |
| Potential Pikabot Hollowing Activity | High | Sigma |
| Uncommon Svchost Command Line Parameter | High | Sigma |
| Potential Process Hollowing Activity | Medium | Sigma |
elastic/detection-rules
4 rules| Detection | Severity | Format |
|---|---|---|
| Suspicious Endpoint Security Parent Process | Medium | Elastic TOML |
| Suspicious Process Creation CallTrace | Medium | Elastic TOML |
| Unusual Parent-Child Relationship | Medium | Elastic TOML |
| Unusual Service Host Child Process - Childless Service | Medium | Elastic TOML |
Wazuh Core Ruleset
1 rule| Detection | Severity | Format |
|---|---|---|
| Possible code injection by on · win.eventdata.targetImage = (?i)(synchost\.exe|svchost\.exe) | Low | Wazuh XML |
elastic/protections-artifacts
1 rule| Detection | Severity | Format |
|---|---|---|
| Suspicious Parent-Child Relationship | Undefined | Elastic TOML |
splunk/security_content
1 rule| Detection | Severity | Format |
|---|---|---|
| PowerShell PInvoke Process Injection API Chain | Undefined | SPL |