Cross-source coverage

T1055.012 / ATT&CK

Process Injection: Process Hollowing

12 rules across 5 sources.

From MITRE ATT&CK 19.2

Adversaries may inject malicious code into suspended and hollowed processes in order to evade process-based defenses. Process hollowing is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process.

Process hollowing is commonly performed by creating a process in a suspended state then unmapping/hollowing its memory, which can then be replaced with malicious code. A victim process can be created with native Windows API calls such as CreateProcess, which includes a flag to suspend the processes primary thread. At this point the process can be unmapped using APIs calls such as ZwUnmapViewOfSection or NtUnmapViewOfSection before being written to, realigned to the injected code, and resumed via VirtualAllocEx, WriteProcessMemory, SetThreadContext, then ResumeThread respectively.

This is very similar to Thread Local Storage but creates a new process rather than targeting an existing process. This behavior will likely not result in elevated privileges since the injected process was spawned from (and thus inherits the security context) of the injecting process. However, execution via process hollowing may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.

Platforms
Windows
Telemetry
WinEventLog:Sysmonetw:Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-Process

How MITRE says to detect it DET0382

Detection Strategy for Process Hollowing on Windows

Windows Analytic 1076

Detects adversary use of suspended process creation, using the CREATE_SUSPENDED flag via CreateProcess, followed by unmapping the memory of the child process (NtUnmapViewOfSection) and replacing it with malicious code via VirtualAllocEx/WriteProcessMemory, then SetThreadContext and ResumeThread to begin execution within the hollowed process.

  • WinEventLog:Sysmon EventCode=1
  • WinEventLog:Sysmon EventCode=10
  • WinEventLog:Sysmon EventCode=8
  • etw:Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-Process NtUnmapViewOfSection, VirtualAllocEx, WriteProcessMemory, SetThreadContext, ResumeThread

SigmaHQ/sigma

5 rules
Detection Severity Format
HackTool - CACTUSTORCH Remote Thread Creation High Sigma
HackTool - HollowReaper Execution High Sigma
Potential Pikabot Hollowing Activity High Sigma
Uncommon Svchost Command Line Parameter High Sigma
Potential Process Hollowing Activity Medium Sigma

elastic/detection-rules

4 rules
Detection Severity Format
Suspicious Endpoint Security Parent Process Medium Elastic TOML
Suspicious Process Creation CallTrace Medium Elastic TOML
Unusual Parent-Child Relationship Medium Elastic TOML
Unusual Service Host Child Process - Childless Service Medium Elastic TOML

Wazuh Core Ruleset

1 rule
Detection Severity Format
Possible code injection by on · win.eventdata.targetImage = (?i)(synchost\.exe|svchost\.exe) Low Wazuh XML

elastic/protections-artifacts

1 rule
Detection Severity Format
Suspicious Parent-Child Relationship Undefined Elastic TOML

splunk/security_content

1 rule
Detection Severity Format
PowerShell PInvoke Process Injection API Chain Undefined SPL

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