Cross-source coverage
T1070.003 / ATT&CK
Indicator Removal: Clear Command History
From MITRE ATT&CK 19.2
In addition to clearing system logs, an adversary may clear the command history of a compromised account to conceal the actions undertaken during an intrusion. Various command interpreters keep track of the commands users type in their terminal so that users can retrace what they've done.
On Linux and macOS, these command histories can be accessed in a few different ways. While logged in, this command history is tracked in a file pointed to by the environment variable HISTFILE. When a user logs off a system, this information is flushed to a file in the user's home directory called ~/.bash_history. The benefit of this is that it allows users to go back to commands they've used before in different sessions. Adversaries may delete their commands from these logs by manually clearing the history (history -c) or deleting the bash history file rm ~/.bash_history.
Adversaries may also leverage a Network Device CLI on network devices to clear command history data (clear logging and/or clear history). On ESXi servers, command history may be manually removed from the /var/log/shell.log file.
On Windows hosts, PowerShell has two different command history providers: the built-in history and the command history managed by the PSReadLine module. The built-in history only tracks the commands used in the current session. This command history is not available to other sessions and is deleted when the session ends.
The PSReadLine command history tracks the commands used in all PowerShell sessions and writes them to a file ($env:APPDATA\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\PSReadLine\ConsoleHost_history.txt by default). This history file is available to all sessions and contains all past history since the file is not deleted when the session ends.
Adversaries may run the PowerShell command Clear-History to flush the entire command history from a current PowerShell session. This, however, will not delete/flush the ConsoleHost_history.txt file. Adversaries may also delete the ConsoleHost_history.txt file or edit its contents to hide PowerShell commands they have run.
- Tactics
- Stealth
- Platforms
- ESXi · Linux · macOS · Network Devices · Windows
- Telemetry
-
auditd:SYSCALLmacos:unifiedlogfs:fsusageWinEventLog:PowerShellWinEventLog:SysmonWinEventLog:Securityesxi:shellnetworkdevice:syslog
How MITRE says to detect it DET0165
Behavioral Detection of Command History Clearing
Linux Analytic 0467
Detects adversary behavior clearing command history via `history -c`, deletion or modification of ~/.bash_history, or manipulation of the HISTFILE environment variable post-login.
auditd:SYSCALLexecveauditd:SYSCALLPATH
macOS Analytic 0468
Detects adversary clearing shell history using `history -c` or deleting/altering ~/.zsh_history or ~/.bash_history. Focus on sessions with missing or wiped history.
macos:unifiedlogprocessfs:fsusageunlink, write
Windows Analytic 0469
Detects PowerShell `Clear-History` invocation or deletion of `ConsoleHost_history.txt` to erase past PowerShell session history.
WinEventLog:PowerShellEventCode=4103, 4104, 4105, 4106WinEventLog:SysmonEventCode=23WinEventLog:SecurityEventCode=4663, 4670, 4656
ESXi Analytic 0470
Detects modification or truncation of `/var/log/shell.log` used to persist ESXi shell command history. Especially suspicious shortly after login or config changes.
esxi:shell/var/log/shell.log
Network Devices Analytic 0471
Detects use of `clear history` or `clear logging` commands on network device CLI to remove past activity logs.
networkdevice:syslogCLI command audit
SigmaHQ/sigma
9 rules| Detection | Severity | Format |
|---|---|---|
| Cisco Clear Logs | High | Sigma |
| Clearing Windows Console History | High | Sigma |
| Disable Powershell Command History | High | Sigma |
| Linux Command History Tampering | High | Sigma |
| RunMRU Registry Key Deletion | High | Sigma |
| RunMRU Registry Key Deletion - Registry | High | Sigma |
| Clear PowerShell History - PowerShell | Medium | Sigma |
| Clear PowerShell History - PowerShell Module | Medium | Sigma |
| Suspicious IO.FileStream | Medium | Sigma |
socfortress/Wazuh-Rules
6 ruleselastic/detection-rules
4 rules| Detection | Severity | Format |
|---|---|---|
| Shell Command-Line History Deletion Detected via Defend for Containers | High | Elastic TOML |
| Shell History Clearing via Environment Variables | High | Elastic TOML |
| Clearing Windows Console History | Medium | Elastic TOML |
| Tampering of Shell Command-Line History | Medium | Elastic TOML |
elastic/protections-artifacts
4 rules| Detection | Severity | Format |
|---|---|---|
| Clearing of Shell History via Environment Variables | Undefined | Elastic TOML |
| Deletion of Shell History File | Undefined | Elastic TOML |
| Suspicious PowerShell Console History Deletion | Undefined | Elastic TOML |
| Tampering of Bash Command-Line History | Undefined | Elastic TOML |
splunk/security_content
2 rules| Detection | Severity | Format |
|---|---|---|
| Windows ConsoleHost History File Deletion | Undefined | SPL |
| Windows Powershell History File Deletion | Undefined | SPL |