Cross-source coverage
T1098.005 / ATT&CK
Account Manipulation: Device Registration
26 rules across 3 sources.
From MITRE ATT&CK 19.2
Adversaries may register a device to an adversary-controlled account. Devices may be registered in a multifactor authentication (MFA) system, which handles authentication to the network, or in a device management system, which handles device access and compliance.
MFA systems, such as Duo or Okta, allow users to associate devices with their accounts in order to complete MFA requirements. An adversary that compromises a user’s credentials may enroll a new device in order to bypass initial MFA requirements and gain persistent access to a network. In some cases, the MFA self-enrollment process may require only a username and password to enroll the account's first device or to enroll a device to an inactive account.
Similarly, an adversary with existing access to a network may register a device or a virtual machine to Entra ID and/or its device management system, Microsoft Intune, in order to access sensitive data or resources while bypassing conditional access policies.
Devices registered in Entra ID may be able to conduct Internal Spearphishing campaigns via intra-organizational emails, which are less likely to be treated as suspicious by the email client. Additionally, an adversary may be able to perform a Service Exhaustion Flood on an Entra ID tenant by registering a large number of devices.
- Tactics
- Persistence · Privilege Escalation
- Platforms
- Windows · Identity Provider
- Telemetry
-
azure:auditApplicationLog:EntraIDPortalWinEventLog:SecurityApplicationLog:Intune/MDM Logs
How MITRE says to detect it DET0036
Suspicious Device Registration via Entra ID or MFA Platform
Identity Provider Analytic 0103
Adversary registers new devices to compromised user accounts to bypass MFA or conditional access policies via Azure Entra ID, Okta, or Duo self-enrollment portals.
azure:auditOperation IN ("Add device", "Add registered users to device", "Add registered owner to device")ApplicationLog:EntraIDPortalDeviceRegistration eventsazure:auditNew device object creation
Windows Analytic 0104
Adversary registers a Windows device to Entra ID or bypasses conditional access by adding device via Intune registration pipeline using stolen credentials.
WinEventLog:SecurityDevice Object CreationApplicationLog:Intune/MDM LogsEnrollment events (e.g., MDMDeviceRegistration)
elastic/detection-rules
19 rules| Detection | Severity | Format |
|---|---|---|
| AWS IAM Virtual MFA Device Registration Attempt with Session Token | High | Elastic TOML |
| Entra ID AiTM Phishing-Kit Chain Detected | High | Elastic TOML |
| Entra ID Device Registration with ROADtools Default OS Build | High | Elastic TOML |
| Entra ID Device with ROADtools Default OS Build (Entity Analytics) | High | Elastic TOML |
| Entra ID Microsoft Authentication Broker DRS Sign-In from Suspicious ASN | High | Elastic TOML |
| Entra ID Protection User Alert and Device Registration | High | Elastic TOML |
| Google Workspace Device Registration After OAuth from Suspicious ASN | High | Elastic TOML |
| M365 Identity OAuth Flow by User Sign-in to Device Registration | High | Elastic TOML |
| Entra ID ADRS Token Request by Microsoft Authentication Broker | Medium | Elastic TOML |
| Entra ID Device Registration with Phishing Kit Default OS Build | Medium | Elastic TOML |
+ 9 more from elastic/detection-rules → showing the 10 highest-severity
splunk/security_content
6 rules| Detection | Severity | Format |
|---|---|---|
| Azure AD New MFA Method Registered | Undefined | SPL |
| O365 New MFA Method Registered | Undefined | SPL |
| Okta New Device Enrolled on Account | Undefined | SPL |
| PingID Mismatch Auth Source and Verification Response | Undefined | SPL |
| PingID New MFA Method After Credential Reset | Undefined | SPL |
| PingID New MFA Method Registered For User | Undefined | SPL |
SigmaHQ/sigma
1 rule| Detection | Severity | Format |
|---|---|---|
| Windows LAPS Credential Dump From Entra ID | High | Sigma |