Cross-source coverage

T1098.005 / ATT&CK

Account Manipulation: Device Registration

26 rules across 3 sources.

From MITRE ATT&CK 19.2

Adversaries may register a device to an adversary-controlled account. Devices may be registered in a multifactor authentication (MFA) system, which handles authentication to the network, or in a device management system, which handles device access and compliance.

MFA systems, such as Duo or Okta, allow users to associate devices with their accounts in order to complete MFA requirements. An adversary that compromises a user’s credentials may enroll a new device in order to bypass initial MFA requirements and gain persistent access to a network. In some cases, the MFA self-enrollment process may require only a username and password to enroll the account's first device or to enroll a device to an inactive account.

Similarly, an adversary with existing access to a network may register a device or a virtual machine to Entra ID and/or its device management system, Microsoft Intune, in order to access sensitive data or resources while bypassing conditional access policies.

Devices registered in Entra ID may be able to conduct Internal Spearphishing campaigns via intra-organizational emails, which are less likely to be treated as suspicious by the email client. Additionally, an adversary may be able to perform a Service Exhaustion Flood on an Entra ID tenant by registering a large number of devices.

Platforms
Windows · Identity Provider
Telemetry
azure:auditApplicationLog:EntraIDPortalWinEventLog:SecurityApplicationLog:Intune/MDM Logs

How MITRE says to detect it DET0036

Suspicious Device Registration via Entra ID or MFA Platform

Identity Provider Analytic 0103

Adversary registers new devices to compromised user accounts to bypass MFA or conditional access policies via Azure Entra ID, Okta, or Duo self-enrollment portals.

  • azure:audit Operation IN ("Add device", "Add registered users to device", "Add registered owner to device")
  • ApplicationLog:EntraIDPortal DeviceRegistration events
  • azure:audit New device object creation

Windows Analytic 0104

Adversary registers a Windows device to Entra ID or bypasses conditional access by adding device via Intune registration pipeline using stolen credentials.

  • WinEventLog:Security Device Object Creation
  • ApplicationLog:Intune/MDM Logs Enrollment events (e.g., MDMDeviceRegistration)

elastic/detection-rules

19 rules
Detection Severity Format
AWS IAM Virtual MFA Device Registration Attempt with Session Token High Elastic TOML
Entra ID AiTM Phishing-Kit Chain Detected High Elastic TOML
Entra ID Device Registration with ROADtools Default OS Build High Elastic TOML
Entra ID Device with ROADtools Default OS Build (Entity Analytics) High Elastic TOML
Entra ID Microsoft Authentication Broker DRS Sign-In from Suspicious ASN High Elastic TOML
Entra ID Protection User Alert and Device Registration High Elastic TOML
Google Workspace Device Registration After OAuth from Suspicious ASN High Elastic TOML
M365 Identity OAuth Flow by User Sign-in to Device Registration High Elastic TOML
Entra ID ADRS Token Request by Microsoft Authentication Broker Medium Elastic TOML
Entra ID Device Registration with Phishing Kit Default OS Build Medium Elastic TOML

+ 9 more from elastic/detection-rules → showing the 10 highest-severity

splunk/security_content

6 rules
Detection Severity Format
Azure AD New MFA Method Registered Undefined SPL
O365 New MFA Method Registered Undefined SPL
Okta New Device Enrolled on Account Undefined SPL
PingID Mismatch Auth Source and Verification Response Undefined SPL
PingID New MFA Method After Credential Reset Undefined SPL
PingID New MFA Method Registered For User Undefined SPL

SigmaHQ/sigma

1 rule
Detection Severity Format
Windows LAPS Credential Dump From Entra ID High Sigma

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