Cross-source coverage
T1132.001 / ATT&CK
Data Encoding: Standard Encoding
7 rules across 4 sources.
From MITRE ATT&CK 19.2
Adversaries may encode data with a standard data encoding system to make the content of command and control traffic more difficult to detect. Command and control (C2) information can be encoded using a standard data encoding system that adheres to existing protocol specifications. Common data encoding schemes include ASCII, Unicode, hexadecimal, Base64, and MIME. Some data encoding systems may also result in data compression, such as gzip.
- Tactics
- Command and Control
- Platforms
- ESXi · Linux · macOS · Windows
- Telemetry
-
WinEventLog:SecurityWinEventLog:SysmonWinEventLog:PowerShellM365Defender:DeviceNetworkEventsauditd:SYSCALLNSM:Flowmacos:unifiedlogPF:Logsesxi:shellesxi:hostdNSX:FlowLogs
How MITRE says to detect it DET0124
Behavior-chain detection for T1132.001 Data Encoding: Standard Encoding (Base64/Hex/MIME) across Windows, Linux, macOS, ESXi
Windows Analytic 0345
Process invokes a standard encoder (e.g., PowerShell -enc, certutil -encode, base64 via.NET/Invoke-Expression) or emits long Base64/hex literals → shortly followed by outbound network egress with high bytes_out:bytes_in ratio or HTTP headers/payloads containing Base64/MIME blocks.
WinEventLog:SecurityEventCode=4688WinEventLog:SysmonEventCode=3, 22WinEventLog:PowerShellEventCode=4103, 4104, 4105, 4106M365Defender:DeviceNetworkEventsNetworkConnection: bytes_sent >> bytes_received anomaly
Linux Analytic 0346
Shell/utility (base64, xxd -p, od, openssl enc -base64, python/perl base64 libraries) encodes data → subsequent outbound connections (curl/wget/bash TCP, socat, python requests) with high asymmetry or Base64/MIME blobs in HTTP/DNS payloads.
auditd:SYSCALLexecve of base64|openssl|xxd|python|perl with arguments matching Base64 flagsWinEventLog:SysmonEventCode=3, 22NSM:Flowhttp: HTTP body or headers contain long Base64 sections; gzip/deflate + Base64
macOS Analytic 0347
Processes use base64/xxd/openssl/python Objective‑C APIs to encode data (seen in EndpointSecurity exec events or Unified Logs) → quick outbound connections with large bytes_out or HTTP POSTs carrying Base64/MIME bodies.
macos:unifiedlogprocess command line contains base64, -enc, openssl enc -base64PF:Logsoutbound flows with bytes_out >> bytes_inNSM:Flowhttp: HTTP body contains long Base64 sections
ESXi Analytic 0348
ESXi shell (BusyBox) or VMware utilities (openssl, python if present) used to Base64/hex encode data from datastore or config files → followed by abnormal egress from the host (NSX/flow logs) with asymmetric bytes_out or HTTPS posts to non-management endpoints.
esxi:shellcommands containing base64, openssl enc -base64, xxd -pesxi:hostdunexpected script/command invocations via hostdNSX:FlowLogsnetwork_flow: bytes_out >> bytes_in to externalNSM:Flowhttp: Base64/MIME looking payloads from ESXi host IP
SigmaHQ/sigma
4 rules| Detection | Severity | Format |
|---|---|---|
| DNS Exfiltration and Tunneling Tools Execution | High | Sigma |
| Gzip Archive Decode Via PowerShell | Medium | Sigma |
| Suspicious FromBase64String Usage On Gzip Archive - Process Creation | Medium | Sigma |
| Suspicious FromBase64String Usage On Gzip Archive - Ps Script | Medium | Sigma |
elastic/detection-rules
1 rule| Detection | Severity | Format |
|---|---|---|
| Base16 or Base32 Encoding/Decoding Activity | Medium | Elastic TOML |
elastic/protections-artifacts
1 rule| Detection | Severity | Format |
|---|---|---|
| Empire Stager Execution | Undefined | Elastic TOML |
socfortress/Wazuh-Rules
1 rule| Detection | Severity | Format |
|---|---|---|
| curl POST with base64-like subdomain detected — possible data exfiltration (T1568.003) | High | Wazuh XML |