Cross-source coverage

T1132.001 / ATT&CK

Data Encoding: Standard Encoding

7 rules across 4 sources.

From MITRE ATT&CK 19.2

Adversaries may encode data with a standard data encoding system to make the content of command and control traffic more difficult to detect. Command and control (C2) information can be encoded using a standard data encoding system that adheres to existing protocol specifications. Common data encoding schemes include ASCII, Unicode, hexadecimal, Base64, and MIME. Some data encoding systems may also result in data compression, such as gzip.

Platforms
ESXi · Linux · macOS · Windows
Telemetry
WinEventLog:SecurityWinEventLog:SysmonWinEventLog:PowerShellM365Defender:DeviceNetworkEventsauditd:SYSCALLNSM:Flowmacos:unifiedlogPF:Logsesxi:shellesxi:hostdNSX:FlowLogs

How MITRE says to detect it DET0124

Behavior-chain detection for T1132.001 Data Encoding: Standard Encoding (Base64/Hex/MIME) across Windows, Linux, macOS, ESXi

Windows Analytic 0345

Process invokes a standard encoder (e.g., PowerShell -enc, certutil -encode, base64 via.NET/Invoke-Expression) or emits long Base64/hex literals → shortly followed by outbound network egress with high bytes_out:bytes_in ratio or HTTP headers/payloads containing Base64/MIME blocks.

  • WinEventLog:Security EventCode=4688
  • WinEventLog:Sysmon EventCode=3, 22
  • WinEventLog:PowerShell EventCode=4103, 4104, 4105, 4106
  • M365Defender:DeviceNetworkEvents NetworkConnection: bytes_sent >> bytes_received anomaly

Linux Analytic 0346

Shell/utility (base64, xxd -p, od, openssl enc -base64, python/perl base64 libraries) encodes data → subsequent outbound connections (curl/wget/bash TCP, socat, python requests) with high asymmetry or Base64/MIME blobs in HTTP/DNS payloads.

  • auditd:SYSCALL execve of base64|openssl|xxd|python|perl with arguments matching Base64 flags
  • WinEventLog:Sysmon EventCode=3, 22
  • NSM:Flow http: HTTP body or headers contain long Base64 sections; gzip/deflate + Base64

macOS Analytic 0347

Processes use base64/xxd/openssl/python Objective‑C APIs to encode data (seen in EndpointSecurity exec events or Unified Logs) → quick outbound connections with large bytes_out or HTTP POSTs carrying Base64/MIME bodies.

  • macos:unifiedlog process command line contains base64, -enc, openssl enc -base64
  • PF:Logs outbound flows with bytes_out >> bytes_in
  • NSM:Flow http: HTTP body contains long Base64 sections

ESXi Analytic 0348

ESXi shell (BusyBox) or VMware utilities (openssl, python if present) used to Base64/hex encode data from datastore or config files → followed by abnormal egress from the host (NSX/flow logs) with asymmetric bytes_out or HTTPS posts to non-management endpoints.

  • esxi:shell commands containing base64, openssl enc -base64, xxd -p
  • esxi:hostd unexpected script/command invocations via hostd
  • NSX:FlowLogs network_flow: bytes_out >> bytes_in to external
  • NSM:Flow http: Base64/MIME looking payloads from ESXi host IP

SigmaHQ/sigma

4 rules
Detection Severity Format
DNS Exfiltration and Tunneling Tools Execution High Sigma
Gzip Archive Decode Via PowerShell Medium Sigma
Suspicious FromBase64String Usage On Gzip Archive - Process Creation Medium Sigma
Suspicious FromBase64String Usage On Gzip Archive - Ps Script Medium Sigma

elastic/detection-rules

1 rule
Detection Severity Format
Base16 or Base32 Encoding/Decoding Activity Medium Elastic TOML

elastic/protections-artifacts

1 rule
Detection Severity Format
Empire Stager Execution Undefined Elastic TOML

socfortress/Wazuh-Rules

1 rule
Detection Severity Format
curl POST with base64-like subdomain detected — possible data exfiltration (T1568.003) High Wazuh XML

Detection rules belong to the projects that publish them and remain under their own licenses. This site indexes and links to them; it claims no rights in them.