Cross-source coverage

T1176.001 / ATT&CK

Software Extensions: Browser Extensions

10 rules across 4 sources.

From MITRE ATT&CK 19.2

Adversaries may abuse internet browser extensions to establish persistent access to victim systems. Browser extensions or plugins are small programs that can add functionality to and customize aspects of internet browsers. They can be installed directly via a local file or custom URL or through a browser's app store - an official online platform where users can browse, install, and manage extensions for a specific web browser. Extensions generally inherit the web browser's permissions previously granted.

Malicious extensions can be installed into a browser through malicious app store downloads masquerading as legitimate extensions, through social engineering, or by an adversary that has already compromised a system. Security can be limited on browser app stores, so it may not be difficult for malicious extensions to defeat automated scanners. Depending on the browser, adversaries may also manipulate an extension's update url to install updates from an adversary-controlled server or manipulate the mobile configuration file to silently install additional extensions.

Adversaries may abuse how chromium-based browsers load extensions by modifying or replacing the Preferences and/or Secure Preferences files to silently install malicious extensions. When the browser is not running, adversaries can alter these files, ensuring the extension is loaded, granted desired permissions, and will persist in browser sessions. This method does not require user consent and extensions are silently loaded in the background from disk or from the browser's trusted store.

Previous to macOS 11, adversaries could silently install browser extensions via the command line using the profiles tool to install malicious .mobileconfig files. In macOS 11+, the use of the profiles tool can no longer install configuration profiles; however, .mobileconfig files can be planted and installed with user interaction.

Once the extension is installed, it can browse to websites in the background, steal all information that a user enters into a browser (including credentials), and be used as an installer for a RAT for persistence.

There have also been instances of botnets using a persistent backdoor through malicious Chrome extensions for Command and Control. Adversaries may also use browser extensions to modify browser permissions and components, privacy settings, and other security controls for Stealth.

Tactics
Persistence
Platforms
Linux · Windows · macOS
Telemetry
WinEventLog:SysmonWinEventLog:Securitymacos:unifiedlogauditd:SYSCALLNSM:Flow

How MITRE says to detect it DET0044

Detecting Malicious Browser Extensions Across Platforms

Windows Analytic 0123

Installation of a new browser extension followed by suspicious file writes or outbound network connections to untrusted domains by the browser process.

  • WinEventLog:Sysmon EventCode=11
  • WinEventLog:Security EventCode=4688
  • WinEventLog:Sysmon EventCode=3, 22
  • WinEventLog:Sysmon EventCode=13, 14

macOS Analytic 0124

Installation of malicious.mobileconfig profiles or browser extension plist entries followed by abnormal browser child process activity.

  • macos:unifiedlog profiles install -type=configuration
  • macos:unifiedlog Creation or modification of browser extension .plist files
  • macos:unifiedlog Unexpected child process of Safari or Chrome

Linux Analytic 0125

Manual or scripted installation of Chrome extensions using user scripts or config files, followed by unexpected network connections from browser processes.

  • auditd:SYSCALL open
  • NSM:Flow Browser connections to known C2 or dynamic DNS domains
  • auditd:SYSCALL execve

elastic/protections-artifacts

5 rules
Detection Severity Format
Browser Native Messaging Registry Modification Undefined Elastic TOML
Chromium Extension Loaded from Unusual Parent Undefined Elastic TOML
Suspicious Browser Files Modification Undefined Elastic TOML
Suspicious Browser Preference File Modification Undefined Elastic TOML
Suspicious Browser Preferences File Modification Undefined Elastic TOML

SigmaHQ/sigma

2 rules
Detection Severity Format
Suspicious Chromium Browser Instance Executed With Custom Extension High Sigma
Chromium Browser Instance Executed With Custom Extension Medium Sigma

elastic/detection-rules

2 rules
Detection Severity Format
Manual Loading of a Suspicious Chromium Extension High Elastic TOML
Browser Extension Install Low Elastic TOML

splunk/security_content

1 rule
Detection Severity Format
Windows Disable Internet Explorer Addons Undefined SPL

Detection rules belong to the projects that publish them and remain under their own licenses. This site indexes and links to them; it claims no rights in them.