Cross-source coverage

T1185 / ATT&CK

Browser Session Hijacking

13 rules across 3 sources.

From MITRE ATT&CK 19.2

Adversaries may take advantage of security vulnerabilities and inherent functionality in browser software to change content, modify user-behaviors, and intercept information as part of various browser session hijacking techniques.

A specific example is when an adversary injects software into a browser that allows them to inherit cookies, HTTP sessions, and SSL client certificates of a user then use the browser as a way to pivot into an authenticated intranet. Executing browser-based behaviors such as pivoting may require specific process permissions, such as SeDebugPrivilege and/or high-integrity/administrator rights.

Another example involves pivoting browser traffic from the adversary's browser through the user's browser by setting up a proxy which will redirect web traffic. This does not alter the user's traffic in any way, and the proxy connection can be severed as soon as the browser is closed. The adversary assumes the security context of whichever browser process the proxy is injected into. Browsers typically create a new process for each tab that is opened and permissions and certificates are separated accordingly. With these permissions, an adversary could potentially browse to any resource on an intranet, such as Sharepoint or webmail, that is accessible through the browser and which the browser has sufficient permissions. Browser pivoting may also bypass security provided by 2-factor authentication.

Tactics
Collection
Platforms
Windows
Telemetry
WinEventLog:SecurityWinEventLog:Sysmon

How MITRE says to detect it DET0507

Detect browser session hijacking via privilege, handle access, and remote thread into browsers

Windows Analytic 1398

Adversary gains high integrity or special privileges (e.g., SeDebugPrivilege), locates a running browser process, opens it with write/inject rights, and modifies it (e.g., CreateRemoteThread / DLL load) to inherit cookies/tokens or establish a browser pivot. Optional step: create a new logon session or use explicit credentials, then drive the victim browser to intranet resources.

  • WinEventLog:Security EventCode=4672
  • WinEventLog:Security EventCode=4673
  • WinEventLog:Security EventCode=4624, 4648
  • WinEventLog:Sysmon EventCode=10
  • WinEventLog:Sysmon EventCode=8
  • WinEventLog:Sysmon EventCode=7
  • WinEventLog:Sysmon EventCode=3, 22

splunk/security_content

9 rules
Detection Severity Format
ASL AWS Concurrent Sessions From Different Ips Undefined SPL
AWS Concurrent Sessions From Different Ips Undefined SPL
Azure AD Concurrent Sessions From Different Ips Undefined SPL
O365 Concurrent Sessions From Different Ips Undefined SPL
Windows Browser Process Launched with Unusual Flags Undefined SPL
Windows Chrome Auto-Update Disabled via Registry Undefined SPL
Windows Chrome Enable Extension Loading via Command-Line Undefined SPL
Windows Chrome Extension Allowed Registry Modification Undefined SPL
Windows Chromium Process Loaded Extension via Command-Line Undefined SPL

SigmaHQ/sigma

2 rules
Detection Severity Format
Potential Data Stealing Via Chromium Headless Debugging High Sigma
Browser Started with Remote Debugging Medium Sigma

elastic/detection-rules

2 rules
Detection Severity Format
Browser Process Spawned from an Unusual Parent High Elastic TOML
Manual Loading of a Suspicious Chromium Extension High Elastic TOML

Detection rules belong to the projects that publish them and remain under their own licenses. This site indexes and links to them; it claims no rights in them.