Cross-source coverage

T1200 / ATT&CK

Hardware Additions

15 rules across 3 sources.

From MITRE ATT&CK 19.2

Adversaries may physically introduce computer accessories, networking hardware, or other computing devices into a system or network that can be used as a vector to gain access. Rather than just connecting and distributing payloads via removable storage (i.e. Replication Through Removable Media), more robust hardware additions can be used to introduce new functionalities and/or features into a system that can then be abused.

While public references of usage by threat actors are scarce, many red teams/penetration testers leverage hardware additions for initial access. Commercial and open source products can be leveraged with capabilities such as passive network tapping, network traffic modification (i.e. Adversary-in-the-Middle), keystroke injection, kernel memory reading via DMA, addition of new wireless access points to an existing network, and others.

Tactics
Initial Access
Platforms
Windows · Linux · macOS
Telemetry
WinEventLog:SecurityWinEventLog:SysmonWinEventLog:Systemwineventlog:dhcpauditd:SYSCALLlinux:syslogNSM:Flowmacos:unifiedlog

How MITRE says to detect it DET0069

Detect unauthorized or suspicious Hardware Additions (USB/Thunderbolt/Network)

Windows Analytic 0185

Chain: (1) a new external device is recognized by Windows (USB/Thunderbolt/PCIe) or a new block device appears; (2) within a short window, the same user/session spawns processes or the OS mounts a new volume; (3) optional follow-on activity such as HID keystroke injection, DMA driver load, or new network interface MAC on DHCP. Correlate Security EID 6416 / Kernel-PnP with sysmon and DHCP/network metadata.

  • WinEventLog:Security EventCode=6416
  • WinEventLog:Sysmon EventCode=1
  • WinEventLog:Sysmon EventCode=6
  • WinEventLog:Sysmon EventCode=7
  • WinEventLog:Sysmon EventCode=11
  • WinEventLog:Sysmon EventCode=3, 22
  • WinEventLog:System Kernel-PnP 410/400 device install, disk added
  • wineventlog:dhcp DHCP Lease Granted

Linux Analytic 0186

Chain: (1) udev / kernel logs show hot-plug (USB/Thunderbolt/PCIe); (2) block device created by udisks/diskarbitration; (3) optional: new network interface or DHCP lease observed. Correlate /var/log/messages|syslog, auditd SYSCALL open/creat on /dev, and DHCP/Zeek.

  • auditd:SYSCALL mknod,open,openat
  • linux:syslog usb * new|thunderbolt|pci .* added|block.*: new .* device
  • NSM:Flow LEASE_GRANTED

macOS Analytic 0187

Chain: (1) unified logs report IOUSBHost/IOThunderbolt device arrival; (2) diskarbitrationd attaches a new volume; (3) optional: config profile manipulation or new network interface MAC obtains a lease. Correlate unifiedlogs (subsystems: IOUSBHost, IOKit, diskarbitrationd), FSEvents, and DHCP/Zeek.

  • macos:unifiedlog Device attached|enumerated VID/PID
  • macos:unifiedlog mounted|appeared|DA: disk* attached
  • NSM:Flow MAC not in allow-list acquiring IP (DHCP)

splunk/security_content

10 rules
Detection Severity Format
Detect ARP Poisoning Undefined SPL
Detect IPv6 Network Infrastructure Threats Undefined SPL
Detect Port Security Violation Undefined SPL
Detect Rogue DHCP Server Undefined SPL
Detect Traffic Mirroring Undefined SPL
Linux Auditd Hardware Addition Swapoff Undefined SPL
Linux Hardware Addition SwapOff Undefined SPL
Windows Process Executed From Removable Media Undefined SPL
Windows USBSTOR Registry Key Modification Undefined SPL
Windows WPDBusEnum Registry Key Modification Undefined SPL

SigmaHQ/sigma

3 rules
Detection Severity Format
Device Installation Blocked Medium Sigma
External Disk Drive Or USB Storage Device Was Recognized By The System Low Sigma
USB Device Plugged Low Sigma

Azure/Azure-Sentinel

2 rules
Detection Severity Format
BadUSB HID injection PowerShell via Windows Run dialog Undefined KQL
BadUSB LOLBIN execution via certutil (HID injection via Run dialog) Undefined KQL

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