Cross-source coverage
T1213.006 / ATT&CK
Data from Information Repositories: Databases
2 rules across 1 source.
From MITRE ATT&CK 19.2
Adversaries may leverage databases to mine valuable information. These databases may be hosted on-premises or in the cloud (both in platform-as-a-service and software-as-a-service environments).
Examples of databases from which information may be collected include MySQL, PostgreSQL, MongoDB, Amazon Relational Database Service, Azure SQL Database, Google Firebase, and Snowflake. Databases may include a variety of information of interest to adversaries, such as usernames, hashed passwords, personally identifiable information, and financial data. Data collected from databases may be used for Lateral Movement, Command and Control, or Exfiltration. Data exfiltrated from databases may also be used to extort victims or may be sold for profit.
- Tactics
- Collection
- Platforms
- IaaS · Linux · macOS · SaaS · Windows
- Telemetry
-
auditd:SYSCALLauditd:PATHNSM:FlowWinEventLog:SecurityWinEventLog:Sysmonmacos:unifiedlogAWS:CloudTrailAWS:VPCFlowLogssaas:Snowflakem365:unified
How MITRE says to detect it DET0242
Suspicious Database Access and Dump Activity Across Environments (T1213.006)
Linux Analytic 0676
Unusual database command-line access (e.g., `psql`, `mysql`, `mongo`) from non-admin users, occurring outside typical automation windows or without known service context. Often followed by data dumps to.sql/.csv files or outbound data transfers. Defender sees CLI tools launched interactively or by unusual parent processes, file writes to dump-like filenames, and external connections shortly after.
auditd:SYSCALLexecve: Execution of CLI tools like psql, mysql, mongo, sqlite3auditd:PATHCreation of files with extensions .sql, .csv, .sqlite, especially in user directoriesNSM:Flowhttp::post: Outbound HTTP POST from host shortly after DB export activity
Windows Analytic 0677
Database client execution (e.g., sqlcmd.exe, isql.exe) by users or from locations not tied to enterprise automation or backups. Often followed by creation of.sql/.bak/.csv files, registry artifacts for ODBC/JDBC drivers, or encrypted ZIPs. Defender sees SQL tools launched by explorer.exe, Powershell, or odd parent processes, plus file writes in user temp locations.
WinEventLog:SecurityEventCode=4688WinEventLog:SysmonEventCode=11WinEventLog:SysmonEventCode=3, 22
macOS Analytic 0678
Execution of Java-based or CLI database tools (e.g., DBeaver, Beekeeper, mysql, psql) from user profiles not tied to dev/admin roles, especially when followed by file writes and cloud sync activity. Defender correlates GUI tool launches, file write events in ~/Downloads or ~/Documents, and outbound API calls to known cloud services.
macos:unifiedlogProcess start of Java or native DB client toolsmacos:unifiedlogWrites of .sql/.csv/.xlsx files to user documents/downloadsNSM:FlowHTTPS API requests to Dropbox, iCloud, Google Drive, OneDrive shortly after DB tool usage
IaaS Analytic 0679
Database enumeration and export activity (e.g., `SELECT * FROM`, `SHOW DATABASES`) issued via ephemeral VMs, admin APIs, or cloud shell from non-monitoring accounts. Defender correlates audit logs (CloudTrail, GCP Admin, AzureDiagnostics), storage write ops, and cross-region transfers by identities not tied to DB operations.
AWS:CloudTrailrds:ExecuteStatement: Large data access via RDS or Aurora with unknown session contextAWS:CloudTrailPutObject: S3 writes with .sql/.csv extension by same identity or within 5 min of DB accessAWS:VPCFlowLogsLarge transfer volume (>20MB) from RDS IP range to external public IPs
SaaS Analytic 0680
Unusual or excessive database/table exports from SaaS database platforms (e.g., Snowflake, Firebase, BigQuery, Airtable) by users or apps not in known analytics or dev groups. Defender observes access patterns outside baseline working hours or with new query templates, and correlates those with audit logs or file downloads.
saas:SnowflakeQUERY: Large or repeated SELECT * queries to sensitive tablesm365:unifiedBulk downloads or API extractions from Microsoft-hosted data repositories (e.g., Dynamics 365)
elastic/detection-rules
2 rules| Detection | Severity | Format |
|---|---|---|
| AWS RDS Snapshot Export | High | Elastic TOML |
| AWS Secrets Manager Rapid Secrets Retrieval | Medium | Elastic TOML |