Cross-source coverage

T1213.006 / ATT&CK

Data from Information Repositories: Databases

2 rules across 1 source.

From MITRE ATT&CK 19.2

Adversaries may leverage databases to mine valuable information. These databases may be hosted on-premises or in the cloud (both in platform-as-a-service and software-as-a-service environments).

Examples of databases from which information may be collected include MySQL, PostgreSQL, MongoDB, Amazon Relational Database Service, Azure SQL Database, Google Firebase, and Snowflake. Databases may include a variety of information of interest to adversaries, such as usernames, hashed passwords, personally identifiable information, and financial data. Data collected from databases may be used for Lateral Movement, Command and Control, or Exfiltration. Data exfiltrated from databases may also be used to extort victims or may be sold for profit.

Tactics
Collection
Platforms
IaaS · Linux · macOS · SaaS · Windows
Telemetry
auditd:SYSCALLauditd:PATHNSM:FlowWinEventLog:SecurityWinEventLog:Sysmonmacos:unifiedlogAWS:CloudTrailAWS:VPCFlowLogssaas:Snowflakem365:unified

How MITRE says to detect it DET0242

Suspicious Database Access and Dump Activity Across Environments (T1213.006)

Linux Analytic 0676

Unusual database command-line access (e.g., `psql`, `mysql`, `mongo`) from non-admin users, occurring outside typical automation windows or without known service context. Often followed by data dumps to.sql/.csv files or outbound data transfers. Defender sees CLI tools launched interactively or by unusual parent processes, file writes to dump-like filenames, and external connections shortly after.

  • auditd:SYSCALL execve: Execution of CLI tools like psql, mysql, mongo, sqlite3
  • auditd:PATH Creation of files with extensions .sql, .csv, .sqlite, especially in user directories
  • NSM:Flow http::post: Outbound HTTP POST from host shortly after DB export activity

Windows Analytic 0677

Database client execution (e.g., sqlcmd.exe, isql.exe) by users or from locations not tied to enterprise automation or backups. Often followed by creation of.sql/.bak/.csv files, registry artifacts for ODBC/JDBC drivers, or encrypted ZIPs. Defender sees SQL tools launched by explorer.exe, Powershell, or odd parent processes, plus file writes in user temp locations.

  • WinEventLog:Security EventCode=4688
  • WinEventLog:Sysmon EventCode=11
  • WinEventLog:Sysmon EventCode=3, 22

macOS Analytic 0678

Execution of Java-based or CLI database tools (e.g., DBeaver, Beekeeper, mysql, psql) from user profiles not tied to dev/admin roles, especially when followed by file writes and cloud sync activity. Defender correlates GUI tool launches, file write events in ~/Downloads or ~/Documents, and outbound API calls to known cloud services.

  • macos:unifiedlog Process start of Java or native DB client tools
  • macos:unifiedlog Writes of .sql/.csv/.xlsx files to user documents/downloads
  • NSM:Flow HTTPS API requests to Dropbox, iCloud, Google Drive, OneDrive shortly after DB tool usage

IaaS Analytic 0679

Database enumeration and export activity (e.g., `SELECT * FROM`, `SHOW DATABASES`) issued via ephemeral VMs, admin APIs, or cloud shell from non-monitoring accounts. Defender correlates audit logs (CloudTrail, GCP Admin, AzureDiagnostics), storage write ops, and cross-region transfers by identities not tied to DB operations.

  • AWS:CloudTrail rds:ExecuteStatement: Large data access via RDS or Aurora with unknown session context
  • AWS:CloudTrail PutObject: S3 writes with .sql/.csv extension by same identity or within 5 min of DB access
  • AWS:VPCFlowLogs Large transfer volume (>20MB) from RDS IP range to external public IPs

SaaS Analytic 0680

Unusual or excessive database/table exports from SaaS database platforms (e.g., Snowflake, Firebase, BigQuery, Airtable) by users or apps not in known analytics or dev groups. Defender observes access patterns outside baseline working hours or with new query templates, and correlates those with audit logs or file downloads.

  • saas:Snowflake QUERY: Large or repeated SELECT * queries to sensitive tables
  • m365:unified Bulk downloads or API extractions from Microsoft-hosted data repositories (e.g., Dynamics 365)

elastic/detection-rules

2 rules
Detection Severity Format
AWS RDS Snapshot Export High Elastic TOML
AWS Secrets Manager Rapid Secrets Retrieval Medium Elastic TOML

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