Cross-source coverage

T1222.001 / ATT&CK

File and Directory Permissions Modification: Windows Permissions

25 rules across 4 sources.

From MITRE ATT&CK 19.2

Adversaries may modify file or directory permissions/attributes to evade access control lists (ACLs) and access protected files. File and directory permissions are commonly managed by ACLs configured by the file or directory owner, or users with the appropriate permissions. File and directory ACL implementations vary by platform, but generally explicitly designate which users or groups can perform which actions (read, write, execute, etc.).

Windows implements file and directory ACLs as Discretionary Access Control Lists (DACLs). Similar to a standard ACL, DACLs identifies the accounts that are allowed or denied access to a securable object. When an attempt is made to access a securable object, the system checks the access control entries in the DACL in order. If a matching entry is found, access to the object is granted. Otherwise, access is denied.

Adversaries can interact with the DACLs using built-in Windows commands, such as icacls, cacls, takeown, and attrib, which can grant adversaries higher permissions on specific files and folders. Further, PowerShell provides cmdlets that can be used to retrieve or modify file and directory DACLs. Specific file and directory modifications may be a required step for many techniques, such as establishing Persistence via Accessibility Features, Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts, or tainting/hijacking other instrumental binary/configuration files via Hijack Execution Flow.

Platforms
Windows
Telemetry
WinEventLog:SecurityWinEventLog:SysmonWinEventLog:PowerShellWinEventLog:WMI

How MITRE says to detect it DET0418

Windows DACL Manipulation Behavioral Chain Detection Strategy

Windows Analytic 1177

Multi-stage Windows DACL manipulation behavioral chain: (1) Process creation of permission-modifying utilities (icacls.exe, takeown.exe, attrib.exe, cacls.exe) or PowerShell ACL cmdlets, (2) Command-line analysis revealing privilege escalation intent through suspicious parameters (/grant, /takeown, /T, Set-Acl), (3) DACL modification events (4670) correlating with process execution, (4) Subsequent file access attempts (4663) indicating successful permission bypass, (5) Potential follow-on persistence or lateral movement activities

  • WinEventLog:Security EventCode=4688
  • WinEventLog:Security EventCode=4663, 4670, 4656
  • WinEventLog:Security EventCode=4663, 4656, 4658
  • WinEventLog:Sysmon EventCode=11
  • WinEventLog:PowerShell EventCode=4103, 4104, 4105, 4106
  • WinEventLog:WMI EventCode=5857, 5858, 5860, 5861

splunk/security_content

17 rules
Detection Severity Format
Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe Undefined SPL
Windows AD Dangerous Deny ACL Modification Undefined SPL
Windows AD Dangerous Group ACL Modification Undefined SPL
Windows AD Dangerous User ACL Modification Undefined SPL
Windows AD DCShadow Privileges ACL Addition Undefined SPL
Windows AD Domain Root ACL Deletion Undefined SPL
Windows AD Domain Root ACL Modification Undefined SPL
Windows AD GPO New CSE Addition Undefined SPL
Windows AD Hidden OU Creation Undefined SPL
Windows AD Object Owner Updated Undefined SPL

+ 7 more from splunk/security_content → showing the 10 highest-severity

SigmaHQ/sigma

5 rules
Detection Severity Format
AD Object WriteDAC Access Critical Sigma
WannaCry Ransomware Activity Critical Sigma
File or Folder Permissions Modifications Medium Sigma
Potentially Suspicious NTFS Symlink Behavior Modification Medium Sigma
Suspicious Recursive Takeown Medium Sigma

elastic/detection-rules

2 rules
Detection Severity Format
System File Ownership Change Medium Elastic TOML
Adding Hidden File Attribute via Attrib Low Elastic TOML

elastic/protections-artifacts

1 rule
Detection Severity Format
System Boot Files Permission Change Undefined Elastic TOML

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