Cross-source coverage
T1222.001 / ATT&CK
File and Directory Permissions Modification: Windows Permissions
25 rules across 4 sources.
From MITRE ATT&CK 19.2
Adversaries may modify file or directory permissions/attributes to evade access control lists (ACLs) and access protected files. File and directory permissions are commonly managed by ACLs configured by the file or directory owner, or users with the appropriate permissions. File and directory ACL implementations vary by platform, but generally explicitly designate which users or groups can perform which actions (read, write, execute, etc.).
Windows implements file and directory ACLs as Discretionary Access Control Lists (DACLs). Similar to a standard ACL, DACLs identifies the accounts that are allowed or denied access to a securable object. When an attempt is made to access a securable object, the system checks the access control entries in the DACL in order. If a matching entry is found, access to the object is granted. Otherwise, access is denied.
Adversaries can interact with the DACLs using built-in Windows commands, such as icacls, cacls, takeown, and attrib, which can grant adversaries higher permissions on specific files and folders. Further, PowerShell provides cmdlets that can be used to retrieve or modify file and directory DACLs. Specific file and directory modifications may be a required step for many techniques, such as establishing Persistence via Accessibility Features, Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts, or tainting/hijacking other instrumental binary/configuration files via Hijack Execution Flow.
- Tactics
- Defense Impairment
- Platforms
- Windows
- Telemetry
-
WinEventLog:SecurityWinEventLog:SysmonWinEventLog:PowerShellWinEventLog:WMI
How MITRE says to detect it DET0418
Windows DACL Manipulation Behavioral Chain Detection Strategy
Windows Analytic 1177
Multi-stage Windows DACL manipulation behavioral chain: (1) Process creation of permission-modifying utilities (icacls.exe, takeown.exe, attrib.exe, cacls.exe) or PowerShell ACL cmdlets, (2) Command-line analysis revealing privilege escalation intent through suspicious parameters (/grant, /takeown, /T, Set-Acl), (3) DACL modification events (4670) correlating with process execution, (4) Subsequent file access attempts (4663) indicating successful permission bypass, (5) Potential follow-on persistence or lateral movement activities
WinEventLog:SecurityEventCode=4688WinEventLog:SecurityEventCode=4663, 4670, 4656WinEventLog:SecurityEventCode=4663, 4656, 4658WinEventLog:SysmonEventCode=11WinEventLog:PowerShellEventCode=4103, 4104, 4105, 4106WinEventLog:WMIEventCode=5857, 5858, 5860, 5861
splunk/security_content
17 rules| Detection | Severity | Format |
|---|---|---|
| Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe | Undefined | SPL |
| Windows AD Dangerous Deny ACL Modification | Undefined | SPL |
| Windows AD Dangerous Group ACL Modification | Undefined | SPL |
| Windows AD Dangerous User ACL Modification | Undefined | SPL |
| Windows AD DCShadow Privileges ACL Addition | Undefined | SPL |
| Windows AD Domain Root ACL Deletion | Undefined | SPL |
| Windows AD Domain Root ACL Modification | Undefined | SPL |
| Windows AD GPO New CSE Addition | Undefined | SPL |
| Windows AD Hidden OU Creation | Undefined | SPL |
| Windows AD Object Owner Updated | Undefined | SPL |
+ 7 more from splunk/security_content → showing the 10 highest-severity
SigmaHQ/sigma
5 rules| Detection | Severity | Format |
|---|---|---|
| AD Object WriteDAC Access | Critical | Sigma |
| WannaCry Ransomware Activity | Critical | Sigma |
| File or Folder Permissions Modifications | Medium | Sigma |
| Potentially Suspicious NTFS Symlink Behavior Modification | Medium | Sigma |
| Suspicious Recursive Takeown | Medium | Sigma |
elastic/detection-rules
2 rules| Detection | Severity | Format |
|---|---|---|
| System File Ownership Change | Medium | Elastic TOML |
| Adding Hidden File Attribute via Attrib | Low | Elastic TOML |
elastic/protections-artifacts
1 rule| Detection | Severity | Format |
|---|---|---|
| System Boot Files Permission Change | Undefined | Elastic TOML |