Cross-source coverage
T1546.015 / ATT&CK
Event Triggered Execution: Component Object Model Hijacking
24 rules across 6 sources.
From MITRE ATT&CK 19.2
Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by hijacked references to Component Object Model (COM) objects. COM is a system within Windows to enable interaction between software components through the operating system. References to various COM objects are stored in the Registry.
Adversaries may use the COM system to insert malicious code that can be executed in place of legitimate software through hijacking the COM references and relationships as a means for persistence. Hijacking a COM object requires a change in the Registry to replace a reference to a legitimate system component which may cause that component to not work when executed. When that system component is executed through normal system operation the adversary's code will be executed instead. An adversary is likely to hijack objects that are used frequently enough to maintain a consistent level of persistence, but are unlikely to break noticeable functionality within the system as to avoid system instability that could lead to detection.
One variation of COM hijacking involves abusing Type Libraries (TypeLibs), which provide metadata about COM objects, such as their interfaces and methods. Adversaries may modify Registry keys associated with TypeLibs to redirect legitimate COM object functionality to malicious scripts or payloads. Unlike traditional COM hijacking, which commonly uses local DLLs, this variation may leverage the "script:" moniker to execute remote scripts hosted on external servers. This approach enables stealthy execution of code while maintaining persistence, as the remote payload would be automatically downloaded whenever the hijacked COM object is accessed.
- Tactics
- Privilege Escalation · Persistence
- Platforms
- Windows
- Telemetry
-
WinEventLog:SecurityWinEventLog:Sysmon
How MITRE says to detect it DET0481
Windows COM Hijacking Detection via Registry and DLL Load Correlation
Windows Analytic 1323
Correlate suspicious registry modifications to known COM object CLSIDs with subsequent DLL loads or unexpected binary execution paths. Detect placement of COM CLSID entries under HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Classes\CLSID\ overriding default HKLM paths. Flag anomalous DLL loads traced back to hijacked COM registry changes.
WinEventLog:SecurityEventCode=4657WinEventLog:SysmonEventCode=1WinEventLog:SysmonEventCode=7
SigmaHQ/sigma
9 rules| Detection | Severity | Format |
|---|---|---|
| COM Object Hijacking Via Modification Of Default System CLSID Default Value | High | Sigma |
| Potential PSFactoryBuffer COM Hijacking | High | Sigma |
| Rundll32 Registered COM Objects | High | Sigma |
| SOURGUM Actor Behaviours | High | Sigma |
| COM Hijacking via TreatAs | Medium | Sigma |
| Potential COM Object Hijacking Via TreatAs Subkey - Registry | Medium | Sigma |
| Potential Persistence Using DebugPath | Medium | Sigma |
| Potential Persistence Via Scrobj.dll COM Hijacking | Medium | Sigma |
| Suspicious GetTypeFromCLSID ShellExecute | Medium | Sigma |
elastic/protections-artifacts
6 rules| Detection | Severity | Format |
|---|---|---|
| Component Object Model Registry Modification by a Low Reputation Process | Undefined | Elastic TOML |
| COM to .NET Redirection via Registry | Undefined | Elastic TOML |
| Registry or File Modification from Suspicious Memory | Undefined | Elastic TOML |
| Suspicious Component Object Model Registry Modification | Undefined | Elastic TOML |
| Unsigned DLL loaded by Rundll32 via COM | Undefined | Elastic TOML |
| WaaSMedicSvc COM Type Lib Hijack | Undefined | Elastic TOML |
splunk/security_content
3 rules| Detection | Severity | Format |
|---|---|---|
| Powershell COM Hijacking InprocServer32 Modification | Undefined | SPL |
| Powershell Execute COM Object | Undefined | SPL |
| Windows COM Hijacking InprocServer32 Modification | Undefined | SPL |
Wazuh Core Ruleset
2 rules| Detection | Severity | Format |
|---|---|---|
| COM Hijacking evidence found in registry under suspicious binary is · win.eventdata.details = (?i)AppData | Critical | Wazuh XML |
| Possible COM Hijacking evidence found in registry under binary is · win.eventdata.targetObject = (?i)CLSID.*LocalServer | Low | Wazuh XML |
elastic/detection-rules
2 rules| Detection | Severity | Format |
|---|---|---|
| Potential RemoteMonologue Attack | Medium | Elastic TOML |
| Component Object Model Hijacking | Low | Elastic TOML |
socfortress/Wazuh-Rules
2 rules| Detection | Severity | Format |
|---|---|---|
| Powershell script: COM CLSID object execution detected | High | Wazuh XML |
| Powershell script: COM InProcServer32 hijacking detected | High | Wazuh XML |