Cross-source coverage

T1546.015 / ATT&CK

Event Triggered Execution: Component Object Model Hijacking

24 rules across 6 sources.

From MITRE ATT&CK 19.2

Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by hijacked references to Component Object Model (COM) objects. COM is a system within Windows to enable interaction between software components through the operating system. References to various COM objects are stored in the Registry.

Adversaries may use the COM system to insert malicious code that can be executed in place of legitimate software through hijacking the COM references and relationships as a means for persistence. Hijacking a COM object requires a change in the Registry to replace a reference to a legitimate system component which may cause that component to not work when executed. When that system component is executed through normal system operation the adversary's code will be executed instead. An adversary is likely to hijack objects that are used frequently enough to maintain a consistent level of persistence, but are unlikely to break noticeable functionality within the system as to avoid system instability that could lead to detection.

One variation of COM hijacking involves abusing Type Libraries (TypeLibs), which provide metadata about COM objects, such as their interfaces and methods. Adversaries may modify Registry keys associated with TypeLibs to redirect legitimate COM object functionality to malicious scripts or payloads. Unlike traditional COM hijacking, which commonly uses local DLLs, this variation may leverage the "script:" moniker to execute remote scripts hosted on external servers. This approach enables stealthy execution of code while maintaining persistence, as the remote payload would be automatically downloaded whenever the hijacked COM object is accessed.

Platforms
Windows
Telemetry
WinEventLog:SecurityWinEventLog:Sysmon

How MITRE says to detect it DET0481

Windows COM Hijacking Detection via Registry and DLL Load Correlation

Windows Analytic 1323

Correlate suspicious registry modifications to known COM object CLSIDs with subsequent DLL loads or unexpected binary execution paths. Detect placement of COM CLSID entries under HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Classes\CLSID\ overriding default HKLM paths. Flag anomalous DLL loads traced back to hijacked COM registry changes.

  • WinEventLog:Security EventCode=4657
  • WinEventLog:Sysmon EventCode=1
  • WinEventLog:Sysmon EventCode=7

SigmaHQ/sigma

9 rules
Detection Severity Format
COM Object Hijacking Via Modification Of Default System CLSID Default Value High Sigma
Potential PSFactoryBuffer COM Hijacking High Sigma
Rundll32 Registered COM Objects High Sigma
SOURGUM Actor Behaviours High Sigma
COM Hijacking via TreatAs Medium Sigma
Potential COM Object Hijacking Via TreatAs Subkey - Registry Medium Sigma
Potential Persistence Using DebugPath Medium Sigma
Potential Persistence Via Scrobj.dll COM Hijacking Medium Sigma
Suspicious GetTypeFromCLSID ShellExecute Medium Sigma

elastic/protections-artifacts

6 rules
Detection Severity Format
Component Object Model Registry Modification by a Low Reputation Process Undefined Elastic TOML
COM to .NET Redirection via Registry Undefined Elastic TOML
Registry or File Modification from Suspicious Memory Undefined Elastic TOML
Suspicious Component Object Model Registry Modification Undefined Elastic TOML
Unsigned DLL loaded by Rundll32 via COM Undefined Elastic TOML
WaaSMedicSvc COM Type Lib Hijack Undefined Elastic TOML

splunk/security_content

3 rules
Detection Severity Format
Powershell COM Hijacking InprocServer32 Modification Undefined SPL
Powershell Execute COM Object Undefined SPL
Windows COM Hijacking InprocServer32 Modification Undefined SPL

Wazuh Core Ruleset

2 rules
Detection Severity Format
COM Hijacking evidence found in registry under suspicious binary is · win.eventdata.details = (?i)AppData Critical Wazuh XML
Possible COM Hijacking evidence found in registry under binary is · win.eventdata.targetObject = (?i)CLSID.*LocalServer Low Wazuh XML

elastic/detection-rules

2 rules
Detection Severity Format
Potential RemoteMonologue Attack Medium Elastic TOML
Component Object Model Hijacking Low Elastic TOML

socfortress/Wazuh-Rules

2 rules
Detection Severity Format
Powershell script: COM CLSID object execution detected High Wazuh XML
Powershell script: COM InProcServer32 hijacking detected High Wazuh XML

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