Cross-source coverage

T1550.004 / ATT&CK

Use Alternate Authentication Material: Web Session Cookie

6 rules across 3 sources.

From MITRE ATT&CK 19.2

Adversaries can use stolen session cookies to authenticate to web applications and services. This technique bypasses some multi-factor authentication protocols since the session is already authenticated.

Authentication cookies are commonly used in web applications, including cloud-based services, after a user has authenticated to the service so credentials are not passed and re-authentication does not need to occur as frequently. Cookies are often valid for an extended period of time, even if the web application is not actively used. After the cookie is obtained through Steal Web Session Cookie or Web Cookies, the adversary may then import the cookie into a browser they control and is then able to use the site or application as the user for as long as the session cookie is active. Once logged into the site, an adversary can access sensitive information, read email, or perform actions that the victim account has permissions to perform.

There have been examples of malware targeting session cookies to bypass multi-factor authentication systems.

Platforms
IaaS · Office Suite · SaaS
Telemetry
AWS:CloudTrailm365:unifiedsaas:okta

How MITRE says to detect it DET0074

Detect Use of Stolen Web Session Cookies Across Platforms

IaaS Analytic 0201

Anomalous access to cloud web applications using session tokens without corresponding MFA/credential validation, often from unusual locations or device fingerprints.

  • AWS:CloudTrail SessionToken used without preceding MFA or login event
  • AWS:CloudTrail ConsoleLogin

SaaS Analytic 0202

Session cookie reuse on unmanaged browsers, devices, or client types deviating from user baseline (e.g., switching from Chrome to curl).

  • m365:unified SessionId reused from different device/browser fingerprint
  • saas:okta session.impersonation.start

Office Suite Analytic 0203

Web session tokens reused in native Office apps (e.g., Outlook, Teams) without associated token refresh or login behavior on the endpoint.

  • m365:unified UserLoggedIn

View on attack.mitre.org ↗

elastic/detection-rules

4 rules
Detection Severity Format
Okta AiTM Session Cookie Replay High Elastic TOML
Entra ID OAuth User Impersonation to Microsoft Graph Medium Elastic TOML
Multiple Device Token Hashes for Single Okta Session Medium Elastic TOML
Multiple Okta Sessions Detected for a Single User Medium Elastic TOML

chronicle/detection-rules

1 rule
Detection Severity Format
okta_multiple_failed_requests_to_access_applications Medium YARA-L

splunk/security_content

1 rule
Detection Severity Format
Okta Multiple Failed Requests to Access Applications Undefined SPL

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