Cross-source coverage
T1553.001 / ATT&CK
Subvert Trust Controls: Gatekeeper Bypass
12 rules across 4 sources.
From MITRE ATT&CK 19.2
Adversaries may modify file attributes and subvert Gatekeeper functionality to evade user prompts and execute untrusted programs. Gatekeeper is a set of technologies that act as layer of Apple’s security model to ensure only trusted applications are executed on a host. Gatekeeper was built on top of File Quarantine in Snow Leopard (10.6, 2009) and has grown to include Code Signing, security policy compliance, Notarization, and more. Gatekeeper also treats applications running for the first time differently than reopened applications.
Based on an opt-in system, when files are downloaded an extended attribute (xattr) called com.apple.quarantine (also known as a quarantine flag) can be set on the file by the application performing the download. Launch Services opens the application in a suspended state. For first run applications with the quarantine flag set, Gatekeeper executes the following functions:
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Checks extended attribute – Gatekeeper checks for the quarantine flag, then provides an alert prompt to the user to allow or deny execution.
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Checks System Policies - Gatekeeper checks the system security policy, allowing execution of apps downloaded from either just the App Store or the App Store and identified developers.
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Code Signing – Gatekeeper checks for a valid code signature from an Apple Developer ID.
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Notarization - Using the
api.apple-cloudkit.comAPI, Gatekeeper reaches out to Apple servers to verify or pull down the notarization ticket and ensure the ticket is not revoked. Users can override notarization, which will result in a prompt of executing an “unauthorized app” and the security policy will be modified.
Adversaries can subvert one or multiple security controls within Gatekeeper checks through logic errors (e.g. Exploitation for Stealth), unchecked file types, and external libraries. For example, prior to macOS 13 Ventura, code signing and notarization checks were only conducted on first launch, allowing adversaries to write malicious executables to previously opened applications in order to bypass Gatekeeper security checks.
Applications and files loaded onto the system from a USB flash drive, optical disk, external hard drive, from a drive shared over the local network, or using the curl command may not set the quarantine flag. Additionally, it is possible to avoid setting the quarantine flag using Drive-by Compromise.
- Tactics
- Defense Impairment
- Platforms
- macOS
- Telemetry
-
macos:unifiedlogmacos:osquery
How MITRE says to detect it DET0288
Detect Gatekeeper Bypass via Quarantine Flag and Trust Control Manipulation
macOS Analytic 0800
Correlates suspicious removal or modification of the com.apple.quarantine extended attribute, manipulation of LSFileQuarantineEnabled values in Info.plist, and unexpected process execution of unsigned or non-notarized binaries. Also monitors abnormal trust validation failures in unified logs and unusual activity in QuarantineEvents database entries.
macos:unifiedlogxattr -d com.apple.quarantine or similar attribute removal commandsmacos:unifiedlogTrust validation failures or bypass attempts during notarization and code signing checksmacos:osqueryChanges to LSFileQuarantineEnabled field in Info.plist
elastic/detection-rules
5 rules| Detection | Severity | Format |
|---|---|---|
| Gatekeeper Override and Execution | High | Elastic TOML |
| Suspicious Curl from macOS Application | High | Elastic TOML |
| Suspicious Outbound Network Connection via Unsigned Binary | High | Elastic TOML |
| Attempt to Disable Gatekeeper | Medium | Elastic TOML |
| Quarantine Attrib Removed by Unsigned or Untrusted Process | Medium | Elastic TOML |
elastic/protections-artifacts
5 rules| Detection | Severity | Format |
|---|---|---|
| Potential Payload Download via AppleScript Applet | Undefined | Elastic TOML |
| Quarantine Attribute Deleted via Untrusted Binary | Undefined | Elastic TOML |
| Quarantine Attribute Removal via TextEdit | Undefined | Elastic TOML |
| Quarantine Cleared via Xattr Followed by Ad-hoc Codesign | Undefined | Elastic TOML |
| Suspicious File Quarantine Removal via Find | Undefined | Elastic TOML |
SigmaHQ/sigma
1 rule| Detection | Severity | Format |
|---|---|---|
| Gatekeeper Bypass via Xattr | Low | Sigma |
splunk/security_content
1 rule| Detection | Severity | Format |
|---|---|---|
| MacOS Gatekeeper Bypass | Undefined | SPL |