Cross-source coverage
T1555.004 / ATT&CK
Credentials from Password Stores: Windows Credential Manager
20 rules across 5 sources.
From MITRE ATT&CK 19.2
Adversaries may acquire credentials from the Windows Credential Manager. The Credential Manager stores credentials for signing into websites, applications, and/or devices that request authentication through NTLM or Kerberos in Credential Lockers (previously known as Windows Vaults).
The Windows Credential Manager separates website credentials from application or network credentials in two lockers. As part of Credentials from Web Browsers, Internet Explorer and Microsoft Edge website credentials are managed by the Credential Manager and are stored in the Web Credentials locker. Application and network credentials are stored in the Windows Credentials locker.
Credential Lockers store credentials in encrypted .vcrd files, located under %Systemdrive%\Users\\[Username]\AppData\Local\Microsoft\\[Vault/Credentials]\. The encryption key can be found in a file named Policy.vpol, typically located in the same folder as the credentials.
Adversaries may list credentials managed by the Windows Credential Manager through several mechanisms. vaultcmd.exe is a native Windows executable that can be used to enumerate credentials stored in the Credential Locker through a command-line interface. Adversaries may also gather credentials by directly reading files located inside of the Credential Lockers. Windows APIs, such as CredEnumerateA, may also be absued to list credentials managed by the Credential Manager.
Adversaries may also obtain credentials from credential backups. Credential backups and restorations may be performed by running rundll32.exe keymgr.dll KRShowKeyMgr then selecting the “Back up...” button on the “Stored User Names and Passwords” GUI.
Password recovery tools may also obtain plain text passwords from the Credential Manager.
- Tactics
- Credential Access
- Platforms
- Windows
- Telemetry
-
WinEventLog:SecurityWinEventLog:Sysmon
How MITRE says to detect it DET0134
Detect Suspicious Access to Windows Credential Manager
Windows Analytic 0378
Detects unauthorized access to Windows Credential Manager through anomalous process execution (vaultcmd.exe, rundll32.exe keymgr.dll), suspicious API calls (CredEnumerateA), or direct file access to Credential Locker files. Correlates process creation with subsequent file reads of.vcrd/.vpol files under user Credential Locker directories.
WinEventLog:SecurityEventCode=4688WinEventLog:SysmonEventCode=10WinEventLog:SysmonEventCode=15
elastic/protections-artifacts
10 rules| Detection | Severity | Format |
|---|---|---|
| Access to Windows Passwords Vault by Unusual Process | Undefined | Elastic TOML |
| Access to Windows Passwords Vault via Powershell | Undefined | Elastic TOML |
| Potential Credential Access via Windows Credential History | Undefined | Elastic TOML |
| Potential Discovery of DPAPI Master Keys | Undefined | Elastic TOML |
| Potential Discovery of Windows Credential Manager Store | Undefined | Elastic TOML |
| PowerShell Script with Passwords Vault Access Capability | Undefined | Elastic TOML |
| Sensitive File Access by an Unsigned Process | Undefined | Elastic TOML |
| Suspicious Access to Windows Vault Files | Undefined | Elastic TOML |
| Suspicious Vault Client Image Load | Undefined | Elastic TOML |
| Suspicious Vault Files Access via RPC | Undefined | Elastic TOML |
SigmaHQ/sigma
4 rules| Detection | Severity | Format |
|---|---|---|
| Suspicious Key Manager Access | High | Sigma |
| Access To Windows Credential History File By Uncommon Applications | Medium | Sigma |
| Access To Windows DPAPI Master Keys By Uncommon Applications | Medium | Sigma |
| Windows Credential Manager Access via VaultCmd | Medium | Sigma |
elastic/detection-rules
4 rules| Detection | Severity | Format |
|---|---|---|
| Potential Invoke-Mimikatz PowerShell Script | Critical | Elastic TOML |
| Potential Credential Access via Trusted Developer Utility | High | Elastic TOML |
| Multiple Vault Web Credentials Read | Medium | Elastic TOML |
| Searching for Saved Credentials via VaultCmd | Medium | Elastic TOML |
socfortress/Wazuh-Rules
1 rule| Detection | Severity | Format |
|---|---|---|
| Sysmon - Event 7: Image loaded by · vaultcli.dll Loaded (T1555.004) | High | Wazuh XML |
splunk/security_content
1 rule| Detection | Severity | Format |
|---|---|---|
| Windows Credentials Access via VaultCli Module | Undefined | SPL |