Cross-source coverage

T1555.004 / ATT&CK

Credentials from Password Stores: Windows Credential Manager

20 rules across 5 sources.

From MITRE ATT&CK 19.2

Adversaries may acquire credentials from the Windows Credential Manager. The Credential Manager stores credentials for signing into websites, applications, and/or devices that request authentication through NTLM or Kerberos in Credential Lockers (previously known as Windows Vaults).

The Windows Credential Manager separates website credentials from application or network credentials in two lockers. As part of Credentials from Web Browsers, Internet Explorer and Microsoft Edge website credentials are managed by the Credential Manager and are stored in the Web Credentials locker. Application and network credentials are stored in the Windows Credentials locker.

Credential Lockers store credentials in encrypted .vcrd files, located under %Systemdrive%\Users\\[Username]\AppData\Local\Microsoft\\[Vault/Credentials]\. The encryption key can be found in a file named Policy.vpol, typically located in the same folder as the credentials.

Adversaries may list credentials managed by the Windows Credential Manager through several mechanisms. vaultcmd.exe is a native Windows executable that can be used to enumerate credentials stored in the Credential Locker through a command-line interface. Adversaries may also gather credentials by directly reading files located inside of the Credential Lockers. Windows APIs, such as CredEnumerateA, may also be absued to list credentials managed by the Credential Manager.

Adversaries may also obtain credentials from credential backups. Credential backups and restorations may be performed by running rundll32.exe keymgr.dll KRShowKeyMgr then selecting the “Back up...” button on the “Stored User Names and Passwords” GUI.

Password recovery tools may also obtain plain text passwords from the Credential Manager.

Platforms
Windows
Telemetry
WinEventLog:SecurityWinEventLog:Sysmon

How MITRE says to detect it DET0134

Detect Suspicious Access to Windows Credential Manager

Windows Analytic 0378

Detects unauthorized access to Windows Credential Manager through anomalous process execution (vaultcmd.exe, rundll32.exe keymgr.dll), suspicious API calls (CredEnumerateA), or direct file access to Credential Locker files. Correlates process creation with subsequent file reads of.vcrd/.vpol files under user Credential Locker directories.

  • WinEventLog:Security EventCode=4688
  • WinEventLog:Sysmon EventCode=10
  • WinEventLog:Sysmon EventCode=15

elastic/protections-artifacts

10 rules
Detection Severity Format
Access to Windows Passwords Vault by Unusual Process Undefined Elastic TOML
Access to Windows Passwords Vault via Powershell Undefined Elastic TOML
Potential Credential Access via Windows Credential History Undefined Elastic TOML
Potential Discovery of DPAPI Master Keys Undefined Elastic TOML
Potential Discovery of Windows Credential Manager Store Undefined Elastic TOML
PowerShell Script with Passwords Vault Access Capability Undefined Elastic TOML
Sensitive File Access by an Unsigned Process Undefined Elastic TOML
Suspicious Access to Windows Vault Files Undefined Elastic TOML
Suspicious Vault Client Image Load Undefined Elastic TOML
Suspicious Vault Files Access via RPC Undefined Elastic TOML

SigmaHQ/sigma

4 rules
Detection Severity Format
Suspicious Key Manager Access High Sigma
Access To Windows Credential History File By Uncommon Applications Medium Sigma
Access To Windows DPAPI Master Keys By Uncommon Applications Medium Sigma
Windows Credential Manager Access via VaultCmd Medium Sigma

elastic/detection-rules

4 rules
Detection Severity Format
Potential Invoke-Mimikatz PowerShell Script Critical Elastic TOML
Potential Credential Access via Trusted Developer Utility High Elastic TOML
Multiple Vault Web Credentials Read Medium Elastic TOML
Searching for Saved Credentials via VaultCmd Medium Elastic TOML

socfortress/Wazuh-Rules

1 rule
Detection Severity Format
Sysmon - Event 7: Image loaded by · vaultcli.dll Loaded (T1555.004) High Wazuh XML

splunk/security_content

1 rule
Detection Severity Format
Windows Credentials Access via VaultCli Module Undefined SPL

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