Cross-source coverage

T1556.007 / ATT&CK

Modify Authentication Process: Hybrid Identity

4 rules across 2 sources.

From MITRE ATT&CK 19.2

Adversaries may patch, modify, or otherwise backdoor cloud authentication processes that are tied to on-premises user identities in order to bypass typical authentication mechanisms, access credentials, and enable persistent access to accounts.

Many organizations maintain hybrid user and device identities that are shared between on-premises and cloud-based environments. These can be maintained in a number of ways. For example, Microsoft Entra ID includes three options for synchronizing identities between Active Directory and Entra ID:

  • Password Hash Synchronization (PHS), in which a privileged on-premises account synchronizes user password hashes between Active Directory and Entra ID, allowing authentication to Entra ID to take place entirely in the cloud
  • Pass Through Authentication (PTA), in which Entra ID authentication attempts are forwarded to an on-premises PTA agent, which validates the credentials against Active Directory
  • Active Directory Federation Services (AD FS), in which a trust relationship is established between Active Directory and Entra ID

AD FS can also be used with other SaaS and cloud platforms such as AWS and GCP, which will hand off the authentication process to AD FS and receive a token containing the hybrid users’ identity and privileges.

By modifying authentication processes tied to hybrid identities, an adversary may be able to establish persistent privileged access to cloud resources. For example, adversaries who compromise an on-premises server running a PTA agent may inject a malicious DLL into the AzureADConnectAuthenticationAgentService process that authorizes all attempts to authenticate to Entra ID, as well as records user credentials. In environments using AD FS, an adversary may edit the Microsoft.IdentityServer.Servicehost configuration file to load a malicious DLL that generates authentication tokens for any user with any set of claims, thereby bypassing multi-factor authentication and defined AD FS policies.

In some cases, adversaries may be able to modify the hybrid identity authentication process from the cloud. For example, adversaries who compromise a Global Administrator account in an Entra ID tenant may be able to register a new PTA agent via the web console, similarly allowing them to harvest credentials and log into the Entra ID environment as any user.

Platforms
IaaS · Identity Provider · Office Suite · SaaS · Windows
Telemetry
WinEventLog:SysmonWinEventLog:Securityazure:signinlogsm365:unifiedAWS:CloudTrailsaas:okta

How MITRE says to detect it DET0293

Detect Hybrid Identity Authentication Process Modification

Windows Analytic 0814

Detects injection or tampering of DLLs in hybrid identity agents (e.g., AzureADConnectAuthenticationAgentService), registry or configuration changes tied to PTA/AD FS, and anomalous LSASS or AD FS module loads correlated with authentication anomalies.

  • WinEventLog:Sysmon EventCode=7
  • WinEventLog:Security EventCode=5136
  • WinEventLog:Security Anomalous logon without MFA enforcement

Identity Provider Analytic 0815

Detects registration of new PTA agents, conditional access changes disabling hybrid MFA enforcement, or suspicious updates to AD FS token-signing configurations.

  • azure:signinlogs Register PTA Agent or Modify AD FS trust
  • m365:unified New agent registration by non-admin user

IaaS Analytic 0816

Detects API calls registering or updating hybrid identity connectors, modification of cloud-to-on-premises federation trust, and unusual token issuance logs.

  • AWS:CloudTrail UpdateFederationSettings or RegisterHybridConnector

Office Suite Analytic 0817

Detects tenant-wide authentication or conditional access changes that weaken hybrid identity enforcement, including disabling AD FS or bypassing hybrid MFA policies.

  • m365:unified Modify Federation Settings or Update Authentication Policy

SaaS Analytic 0818

Detects suspicious changes to SAML/OAuth federation configurations, such as new signing certificates, altered endpoints, or claims issuance rules granting elevated privileges.

  • saas:okta Federation configuration update or signing certificate change

elastic/detection-rules

3 rules
Detection Severity Format
Entra ID Domain Federation Configuration Change High Elastic TOML
Untrusted DLL Loaded by Azure AD Connect Authentication Agent High Elastic TOML
New Okta Identity Provider (IdP) Added by Admin Medium Elastic TOML

panther-labs/panther-analysis

1 rule
Detection Severity Format
MongoDB Identity Provider Activity Medium Panther Python

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