Cross-source coverage
T1556.007 / ATT&CK
Modify Authentication Process: Hybrid Identity
4 rules across 2 sources.
From MITRE ATT&CK 19.2
Adversaries may patch, modify, or otherwise backdoor cloud authentication processes that are tied to on-premises user identities in order to bypass typical authentication mechanisms, access credentials, and enable persistent access to accounts.
Many organizations maintain hybrid user and device identities that are shared between on-premises and cloud-based environments. These can be maintained in a number of ways. For example, Microsoft Entra ID includes three options for synchronizing identities between Active Directory and Entra ID:
- Password Hash Synchronization (PHS), in which a privileged on-premises account synchronizes user password hashes between Active Directory and Entra ID, allowing authentication to Entra ID to take place entirely in the cloud
- Pass Through Authentication (PTA), in which Entra ID authentication attempts are forwarded to an on-premises PTA agent, which validates the credentials against Active Directory
- Active Directory Federation Services (AD FS), in which a trust relationship is established between Active Directory and Entra ID
AD FS can also be used with other SaaS and cloud platforms such as AWS and GCP, which will hand off the authentication process to AD FS and receive a token containing the hybrid users’ identity and privileges.
By modifying authentication processes tied to hybrid identities, an adversary may be able to establish persistent privileged access to cloud resources. For example, adversaries who compromise an on-premises server running a PTA agent may inject a malicious DLL into the AzureADConnectAuthenticationAgentService process that authorizes all attempts to authenticate to Entra ID, as well as records user credentials. In environments using AD FS, an adversary may edit the Microsoft.IdentityServer.Servicehost configuration file to load a malicious DLL that generates authentication tokens for any user with any set of claims, thereby bypassing multi-factor authentication and defined AD FS policies.
In some cases, adversaries may be able to modify the hybrid identity authentication process from the cloud. For example, adversaries who compromise a Global Administrator account in an Entra ID tenant may be able to register a new PTA agent via the web console, similarly allowing them to harvest credentials and log into the Entra ID environment as any user.
- Tactics
- Defense Impairment · Persistence · Credential Access
- Platforms
- IaaS · Identity Provider · Office Suite · SaaS · Windows
- Telemetry
-
WinEventLog:SysmonWinEventLog:Securityazure:signinlogsm365:unifiedAWS:CloudTrailsaas:okta
How MITRE says to detect it DET0293
Detect Hybrid Identity Authentication Process Modification
Windows Analytic 0814
Detects injection or tampering of DLLs in hybrid identity agents (e.g., AzureADConnectAuthenticationAgentService), registry or configuration changes tied to PTA/AD FS, and anomalous LSASS or AD FS module loads correlated with authentication anomalies.
WinEventLog:SysmonEventCode=7WinEventLog:SecurityEventCode=5136WinEventLog:SecurityAnomalous logon without MFA enforcement
Identity Provider Analytic 0815
Detects registration of new PTA agents, conditional access changes disabling hybrid MFA enforcement, or suspicious updates to AD FS token-signing configurations.
azure:signinlogsRegister PTA Agent or Modify AD FS trustm365:unifiedNew agent registration by non-admin user
IaaS Analytic 0816
Detects API calls registering or updating hybrid identity connectors, modification of cloud-to-on-premises federation trust, and unusual token issuance logs.
AWS:CloudTrailUpdateFederationSettings or RegisterHybridConnector
Office Suite Analytic 0817
Detects tenant-wide authentication or conditional access changes that weaken hybrid identity enforcement, including disabling AD FS or bypassing hybrid MFA policies.
m365:unifiedModify Federation Settings or Update Authentication Policy
SaaS Analytic 0818
Detects suspicious changes to SAML/OAuth federation configurations, such as new signing certificates, altered endpoints, or claims issuance rules granting elevated privileges.
saas:oktaFederation configuration update or signing certificate change
elastic/detection-rules
3 rules| Detection | Severity | Format |
|---|---|---|
| Entra ID Domain Federation Configuration Change | High | Elastic TOML |
| Untrusted DLL Loaded by Azure AD Connect Authentication Agent | High | Elastic TOML |
| New Okta Identity Provider (IdP) Added by Admin | Medium | Elastic TOML |
panther-labs/panther-analysis
1 rule| Detection | Severity | Format |
|---|---|---|
| MongoDB Identity Provider Activity | Medium | Panther Python |