Cross-source coverage

T1557.001 / ATT&CK

Adversary-in-the-Middle: Name Resolution Poisoning and SMB Relay

20 rules across 3 sources.

3 atomic-IOC hidden · include

From MITRE ATT&CK 19.2

By responding to LLMNR/NBT-NS/mDNS network traffic, adversaries may spoof an authoritative source for name resolution to force communication with an adversary controlled system. This activity may be used to collect or relay authentication materials.

Link-Local Multicast Name Resolution (LLMNR) and NetBIOS Name Service (NBT-NS) are Microsoft Windows components that serve as alternate methods of host identification. LLMNR is based upon the Domain Name System (DNS) format and allows hosts on the same local link to perform name resolution for other hosts. NBT-NS identifies systems on a local network by their NetBIOS name.

Multicast Domain Name System(mDNS) is a zero-configuration service used to resolve hostnames to IP addresses with “.local” as a top-level domain. MDNS is based upon Domain Name System (DNS) format and allows hosts on the same network segment to perform name resolution for other hosts, using multicast.

Adversaries can spoof an authoritative source for name resolution on a victim network by responding to LLMNR (UDP 5355)/NBT-NS (UDP 137)/mDNS (UDP 5353) traffic as if they know the identity of the requested host, effectively poisoning the service so that the victims will communicate with the adversary controlled system. If the requested host belongs to a resource that requires identification/authentication, the username and NTLMv2 hash will then be sent to the adversary controlled system. The adversary can then collect the hash information sent over the wire through tools that monitor the ports for traffic or through Network Sniffing and crack the hashes offline through Brute Force to obtain the plaintext passwords.

In some cases where an adversary has access to a system that is in the authentication path between systems or when automated scans that use credentials attempt to authenticate to an adversary controlled system, the NTLMv1/v2 hashes can be intercepted and relayed to access and execute code against a target system. The relay step can happen in conjunction with poisoning but may also be independent of it. Additionally, adversaries may encapsulate the NTLMv1/v2 hashes into various other protocols, such as LDAP, MSSQL and HTTP, to expand and use multiple services with the valid NTLM response. 

Several tools may be used to poison name services within local networks such as NBNSpoof, Metasploit, and Responder.

Platforms
Windows
Telemetry
WinEventLog:SecurityNSM:Flow

How MITRE says to detect it DET0462

Detect LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay on Windows

Windows Analytic 1274

Detects anomalous network traffic on UDP 5355 (LLMNR) and UDP 137 (NBT-NS) combined with unauthorized SMB relay attempts, registry modifications re-enabling multicast name resolution, or suspicious service creation indicative of adversary-in-the-middle credential interception.

  • WinEventLog:Security EventCode=4697
  • WinEventLog:Security Registry key modification HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows NT\DNSClient\EnableMulticast
  • NSM:Flow Unusual responses to LLMNR (UDP 5355) or NBT-NS (UDP 137) queries from unauthorized hosts
  • NSM:Flow Abnormal SMB authentication attempts correlated with poisoned LLMNR/NBT-NS sessions

SigmaHQ/sigma

8 rules
Detection Severity Format
Potential SMB Relay Attack Tool Execution Critical Sigma
Attempts of Kerberos Coercion Via DNS SPN Spoofing High Sigma
HackTool - ADCSPwn Execution High Sigma
HackTool - Impacket Tools Execution High Sigma
Local Privilege Escalation Indicator TabTip High Sigma
RottenPotato Like Attack Pattern High Sigma
WinDivert Driver Load High Sigma
Potential PetitPotam Attack Via EFS RPC Calls Medium Sigma

elastic/detection-rules

7 rules
Detection Severity Format
Potential Kerberos Coercion via DNS-Based SPN Spoofing High Elastic TOML
Potential Kerberos Relay Attack against a Computer Account High Elastic TOML
Potential Machine Account Relay Attack via SMB High Elastic TOML
Potential NTLM Relay Attack against a Computer Account High Elastic TOML
Potential PowerShell Pass-the-Hash/Relay Script High Elastic TOML
Potential Computer Account NTLM Relay Activity Medium Elastic TOML
Creation of a DNS-Named Record Low Elastic TOML

splunk/security_content

5 rules
Detection Severity Format
DNS Kerberos Coercion Undefined SPL
Windows Credential Target Information Structure in Commandline Undefined SPL
Windows Kerberos Coercion via DNS Undefined SPL
Windows Short Lived DNS Record Undefined SPL
Windows Theme File Creation in Unusual Location Undefined SPL

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