Cross-source coverage
T1563 / ATT&CK
Remote Service Session Hijacking
18 rules across 5 sources.
From MITRE ATT&CK 19.2
Adversaries may take control of preexisting sessions with remote services to move laterally in an environment. Users may use valid credentials to log into a service specifically designed to accept remote connections, such as telnet, SSH, and RDP. When a user logs into a service, a session will be established that will allow them to maintain a continuous interaction with that service.
Adversaries may commandeer these sessions to carry out actions on remote systems. Remote Service Session Hijacking differs from use of Remote Services because it hijacks an existing session rather than creating a new session using Valid Accounts.
- Tactics
- Lateral Movement
- Platforms
- Linux · macOS · Windows
- Telemetry
-
WinEventLog:SecurityWinEventLog:Sysmonauditd:SYSCALLNSM:ConnectionsNSM:Flowmacos:unifiedlog
How MITRE says to detect it DET0079
Detection of Remote Service Session Hijacking
Windows Analytic 0216
Detection of anomalous RDP or remote service session activity where a logon session is hijacked rather than newly created. Indicators include mismatched user credentials vs. active session tokens, service session takeovers without corresponding successful logon events, or RDP shadowing activity without user consent.
WinEventLog:SecurityEventCode=4624, 4648WinEventLog:SysmonEventCode=1WinEventLog:SysmonEventCode=3, 22
Linux Analytic 0217
Detection of SSH/Telnet session hijacking via discrepancies between authentication logs and active session tables. Adversary behavior includes reusing or stealing active PTY sessions, attaching to screen/tmux, or issuing commands without corresponding login events.
auditd:SYSCALLexecve: Commands executed within an SSH session where no matching logon/authentication event existsNSM:ConnectionsMismatch between recorded user logon and active sessions (e.g., wtmp/utmp entries without corresponding authentication in auth.log)NSM:FlowLong-lived or hijacked SSH sessions maintained with no active user activity
macOS Analytic 0218
Detection of hijacked VNC or SSH sessions on macOS where adversaries take over an existing session rather than authenticating directly. Indicators include process execution from active sessions without new logon events, manipulation of TTY sessions, or anomalous network activity tied to dormant sessions.
macos:unifiedlogAuthentication inconsistencies where commands are executed without corresponding login eventsmacos:unifiedlogExecution of processes linked to hijacked sessions (e.g., anomalous parent-child process lineage)NSM:FlowSuspicious long-lived or reattached remote desktop sessions from unexpected IPs
Sub-techniques with coverage
Counted in the 18 above — a rule tagged a sub-technique covers this technique too.
elastic/detection-rules
9 rules| Detection | Severity | Format |
|---|---|---|
| Potential Remote Desktop Shadowing Activity | High | Elastic TOML |
| Potential THC Tool Downloaded | High | Elastic TOML |
| Network Connection Initiated by Suspicious SSHD Child Process | Medium | Elastic TOML |
| Potential Execution via SSH Backdoor | Medium | Elastic TOML |
| SSH Authorized Key File Activity Detected via Defend for Containers | Medium | Elastic TOML |
| SSH Authorized Keys File Activity | Medium | Elastic TOML |
| Renaming of OpenSSH Binaries | Low | Elastic TOML |
| SSH Key Generated via ssh-keygen | Low | Elastic TOML |
| Unusual SSHD Child Process | Low | Elastic TOML |
socfortress/Wazuh-Rules
3 rules| Detection | Severity | Format |
|---|---|---|
| Sysmon - Event 1: Process creation · RDP Hijacking Using tscon (T1563.002) | High | Wazuh XML |
| Sysmon - Event 1: Process creation · RDP Hijacking via sc.exe Service Creation (T1563.002) | High | Wazuh XML |
| Sysmon - Event 1: Process creation · RDP Hijacking via Service Start (T1563.002) | High | Wazuh XML |
SigmaHQ/sigma
2 rules| Detection | Severity | Format |
|---|---|---|
| Potential MSTSC Shadowing Activity | High | Sigma |
| Suspicious RDP Redirect Using TSCON | High | Sigma |
elastic/protections-artifacts
2 rules| Detection | Severity | Format |
|---|---|---|
| Potential HackersChoice Tool Downloaded | Undefined | Elastic TOML |
| Unusual SSH Parent/Child Execution | Undefined | Elastic TOML |
splunk/security_content
2 rules| Detection | Severity | Format |
|---|---|---|
| Windows RDP Connection Successful | Undefined | SPL |
| Windows Service Create with Tscon | Undefined | SPL |